Bug 1622640 Comment 12 Edit History

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Looking at [RFC 3501](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3501#section-6.2.1) it seems that everything after the server response (`<tag> OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n`) would be considered part of the StartTLS negotiation. So I'd guess a server which sends extra plaintext _should_ result in a failed negotiation.

In an ideal world the TB IMAP parser would stop after the "\r\n", call StartTLS() and then, once the negotiation was complete, continue reading on the newly-secured socket. In practice, the IMAP parser will be greedy and slurp in as much data as it can buffer (otherwise you're just reading single bytes, looking for `\r\n`, which would suck). Because the StartTLS upgrade is handled at a lower level, the IMAP parser needs a way to feed the remaining buffered data back into the stream for the negotiation.

Back In the real world:
After the server sends it's `<tag> OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n` response, it must wait upon the client for the next step (which is, I think, the client saying which versions of SSL/TLS and ciphers it talks).
So, with that in mind, it seems perfectly fine for the client to completely discard everything after the  server's `OK Begin...` line.

Gene's approach in comment 11 seems to be the right approach... although technically I think it wants to drain the socket and clear the TB IMAP-parser-incoming-data buffer _before_ StartTLS() is called, rather than afterwards. But the main thing is that any dodgy data buffered up in the IMAP parser is ditched rather than used.
Looking at [RFC 3501](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3501#section-6.2.1) it seems that everything after the server response (`<tag> OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n`) would be considered part of the StartTLS negotiation:

> A [TLS] negotiation begins immediately after the CRLF at the end
> of the tagged OK response from the server.  Once a client issues a
> STARTTLS command, it MUST NOT issue further commands until a
> server response is seen and the [TLS] negotiation is complete.

 So I'd guess a server which sends extra plaintext _should_ result in a failed negotiation.

In an ideal world the TB IMAP parser would stop after the "\r\n", call StartTLS() and then, once the negotiation was complete, continue reading on the newly-secured socket. In practice, the IMAP parser will be greedy and slurp in as much data as it can buffer (otherwise you're just reading single bytes, looking for `\r\n`, which would suck). Because the StartTLS upgrade is handled at a lower level, the IMAP parser needs a way to feed the remaining buffered data back into the stream for the negotiation.

Back In the real world:
After the server sends it's `<tag> OK Begin TLS negotiation now\r\n` response, it must wait upon the client for the next step (which is, I think, the client saying which versions of SSL/TLS and ciphers it talks).
So, with that in mind, it seems perfectly fine for the client to completely discard everything after the  server's `OK Begin...` line.

Gene's approach in comment 11 seems to be the right approach... although technically I think it wants to drain the socket and clear the TB IMAP-parser-incoming-data buffer _before_ StartTLS() is called, rather than afterwards. But the main thing is that any dodgy data buffered up in the IMAP parser is ditched rather than used.

Back to Bug 1622640 Comment 12