Bugzilla

(In reply to Kai Engert (:KaiE:) from comment #2)
> morgan, does that explain it?
> 
> Can we close this bug?

So it explains *why* it happens but it seems to me it shouldn't happen. Do these OpenPGP engins support somehow only trying to decrypt with a particular key? Presumably encrypt+sign operations support this given one can use multiple keys on multiple accounts without crossing the streams.

One could imagine a scenario where someone accidentally bricks their security token if they input the wrong pin multiple times because they don't realise the GPG agent is actually asking for foo's credentials, despite being in bar's Thunderbird account.

Another potential problem is a malicious actor wants to determine if foo@hotmail.com is the same person as bar@hotmail.com, by sending foo an email with some tracking element encrypted with bar's key (and the user happens to have bar's yubikey plugged in and decrypts without thinking).

Does that make sense?

(In reply to Kai Engert (:KaiE:) from comment #2)
> morgan, does that explain it?
> 
> Can we close this bug?

So it explains *why* it happens but it seems to me it shouldn't happen. Do these OpenPGP engines support somehow only trying to decrypt with a particular key? Presumably encrypt+sign operations support this given one can use multiple keys on multiple accounts without crossing the streams.

One could imagine a scenario where someone accidentally bricks their security token if they input the wrong pin multiple times because they don't realise the GPG agent is actually asking for foo's credentials, despite being in bar's Thunderbird account.

Another potential problem is a malicious actor wants to determine if foo@hotmail.com is the same person as bar@hotmail.com, by sending foo an email with some tracking element encrypted with bar's key (and the user happens to have bar's yubikey plugged in and decrypts without thinking).

Does that make sense?