This issue is about [label](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediadeviceinfo-label) ([2](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediastreamtrack-label)), not [deviceId](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediadeviceinfo-deviceid). Labels get exposed to sites with cam/mic permission to let them implement *in-content device selection*. I've been championing an [alternative](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1zhbRBbxVAlwVzqU7j5SIYKoLRc6Ec-brcDhNcfAI1sU/edit?ts=5e13b393#slide=id.g7c3d2d4d1e_7_2) to this, which I'll be speaking more about [next week](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1NIHzumglY9cYa4b7rcEbHGVsMam5BiY80VfFDB6cDjQ/edit?ts=5e2b3630#slide=id.p), so I'm happy to take input. (In reply to Daniel Veditz [:dveditz] from comment #3) > I thought we exposed a generic device ID for everything? Preferably device IDs that change over time. > The information is a fingerprinting problem even before we start leaking personal names on apple devices here! There's a [long discussion on public-webrtc](https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-privacy/2019OctDec/0011.html) about whether deviceId poses any fingerprinting risk above local storage except when mis-partitioned with local storage (bug 1589685). > https://browserleaks.com/webrtc We have bug 1528042 about reigning in deviceId without permission for the sake of appearances (sites without permission see them rotate on process shutdown—would have been more frequently with bug 1223773 but I didn't get consensus for that). They're cleared with cookies. We could do a better job of making them less invisible. But let's keep this issue about labels.
Bug 1616661 Comment 6 Edit History
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This issue is about [label](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediadeviceinfo-label) ([2](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediastreamtrack-label)), not [deviceId](https://w3c.github.io/mediacapture-main/getusermedia.html#dom-mediadeviceinfo-deviceid). Labels get exposed to sites with cam/mic permission to let them implement *in-content device selection*. I've been championing an [alternative](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1zhbRBbxVAlwVzqU7j5SIYKoLRc6Ec-brcDhNcfAI1sU/edit?ts=5e13b393#slide=id.g7c3d2d4d1e_7_2) to this, which I'll be speaking more about [next week](https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1NIHzumglY9cYa4b7rcEbHGVsMam5BiY80VfFDB6cDjQ/edit?ts=5e2b3630#slide=id.p), so I'm happy to take input. (In reply to Daniel Veditz [:dveditz] from comment #3) > I thought we exposed a generic device ID for everything? Preferably device IDs that change over time. > The information is a fingerprinting problem even before we start leaking personal names on apple devices here! deviceIds are unique to the origin. There's a [long discussion on public-webrtc](https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-privacy/2019OctDec/0011.html) about whether deviceId poses any fingerprinting risk above local storage except when mis-partitioned with local storage (bug 1589685). > https://browserleaks.com/webrtc We have bug 1528042 about reigning in deviceId without permission for the sake of appearances (sites without permission see them rotate on process shutdown—would have been more frequently with bug 1223773 but I didn't get consensus for that). They're cleared with cookies. We could do a better job of making them less invisible. But let's keep this issue about labels.