Bugzilla

### Beta/Release Uplift Approval Request
* **User impact if declined**: This prefs-off a feature that seems to be effectively DDoS'ing NextDNS, one of our DNS over HTTPs providers. This patch is blocking the rollout of Fx77.
* **Is this code covered by automated tests?**: Yes
* **Has the fix been verified in Nightly?**: No
* **Needs manual test from QE?**: Yes
* **If yes, steps to reproduce**: Testing instructions in https://docs.google.com/document/d/1zc4KydwK_vRCzvHe2X_vVkR7ouTtrREi4tQyfrZYSFA/edit
* **List of other uplifts needed**: None
* **Risk to taking this patch**: Medium
* **Why is the change risky/not risky? (and alternatives if risky)**: This patch is not a simple visual change, which to me rules out the "Low" risk category. However, all it does is cause a code path to return early if a pref is false, which it is by default, and the code path in question is not responsible for anything that could cause breakage.
* **String changes made/needed**: None

### Beta/Release Uplift Approval Request
* **User impact if declined**: This prefs-off a feature that seems to be effectively DDoS'ing NextDNS, one of our DNS over HTTPs providers. This patch is blocking the rollout of Fx77.
* **Is this code covered by automated tests?**: Yes
* **Has the fix been verified in Nightly?**: No
* **Needs manual test from QE?**: Yes
* **If yes, steps to reproduce**:
* **List of other uplifts needed**: None
* **Risk to taking this patch**: Medium
* **Why is the change risky/not risky? (and alternatives if risky)**: This patch is not a simple visual change, which to me rules out the "Low" risk category. However, all it does is cause a code path to return early if a pref is false, which it is by default, and the code path in question is not responsible for anything that could cause breakage.
* **String changes made/needed**: None