Bugzilla

So this issue is quite long, and obviously untangled a set of dependent/related issues, and has a lot of quoted text that can further make it difficult to follow on.

Trying to make sure I can summarize *this* issue adequately:
| Date | Source | Statement |
| -- | -- | -- |
| 2019-01-28 | Bug 1523186, Comment #2 | it's pointed out that KIR S.A.'s procedural controls have regularly been insufficient, and recommends halting all issuance until technical controls are in place (in this case, linting). |
| 2019-01-31 | Bug 1523186, Comment #5 | it's pointed out that KIR S.A. is responding "unknown" to issued certificates. |
| 2019-02-04 | Bug 1523186, Comment #13 | it's pointed out that the resolution of discussion affirmatively concludes that this is prohibited. |
| 2019-04-05 | Comment #16 |  KIR S.A. states they have begun implementing technical controls. |
| 2019-07-04 | Bug 1523186, Comment #17 | KIR S.A. is one of three CAs that has to be contacted due to their lack of progress updates. |
| 2020-05-06 | Bug 1525082, Comment #4 | KIR S.A. states that for TLS certificates, they have addressed the issue by changing their procedures. |
|  2021-04-07 | Comment #1 | KIR S.A. states that their solution to this problem was procedural controls, because technical controls were too difficult ("was too big a technical challenge for us"). |
| 2021-04-17 | Comment #7 | KIR S.A. states they have implemented technical controls. |
| 2021-04-19 | Comment #10 | KIR S.A. states they are beginning to implement technical controls. |
| 2021-04-20 | Comment #16 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes did not begin until this date. |
| 2021-04-21 | Comment #12 | A new incident of this issue is observed. In Comment #14, KIR S.A. states they've not completed implementing the technical controls.
| 2021-04-22 | Comment #16 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes are complete. |
| 2021-05-02 | Comment #46 | KIR S.A. states that the technical changes are not yet complete. |
| 2021-05-05 | Comment #48 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes are complete. |

Throughout this incident, it's been revealed that there are a host of systemic communication issues, which is something that was previously captured in Bug 1523186, Comment #25 and Bug 1523186, Comment #26. These issues appear to still be present, as evidenced by the ample discussion on this bug and the related incidents it has spawned. As https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/jOq6_ijw-9g/m/FdtIjvypAgAJ captures, this appears to be a systemic trend.

While I think more discussion about how to address the issues here is necessary, considering overall the quality of these incident responses, I think with the above captured, there's nothing further for this bug if that path is taken.

So this issue is quite long, and obviously untangled a set of dependent/related issues, and has a lot of quoted text that can further make it difficult to follow on.

Trying to make sure I can summarize *this* issue adequately:

| Date | Source | Statement |
| -- | -- | -- |
| 2019-01-28 | Bug 1523186, Comment #2 | it's pointed out that KIR S.A.'s procedural controls have regularly been insufficient, and recommends halting all issuance until technical controls are in place (in this case, linting). |
| 2019-01-31 | Bug 1523186, Comment #5 | it's pointed out that KIR S.A. is responding "unknown" to issued certificates. |
| 2019-02-04 | Bug 1523186, Comment #13 | it's pointed out that the resolution of discussion affirmatively concludes that this is prohibited. |
| 2019-04-05 | Comment #16 |  KIR S.A. states they have begun implementing technical controls. |
| 2019-07-04 | Bug 1523186, Comment #17 | KIR S.A. is one of three CAs that has to be contacted due to their lack of progress updates. |
| 2020-05-06 | Bug 1525082, Comment #4 | KIR S.A. states that for TLS certificates, they have addressed the issue by changing their procedures. |
|  2021-04-07 | Comment #1 | KIR S.A. states that their solution to this problem was procedural controls, because technical controls were too difficult ("was too big a technical challenge for us"). |
| 2021-04-17 | Comment #7 | KIR S.A. states they have implemented technical controls. |
| 2021-04-19 | Comment #10 | KIR S.A. states they are beginning to implement technical controls. |
| 2021-04-20 | Comment #16 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes did not begin until this date. |
| 2021-04-21 | Comment #12 | A new incident of this issue is observed. In Comment #14, KIR S.A. states they've not completed implementing the technical controls.
| 2021-04-22 | Comment #16 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes are complete. |
| 2021-05-02 | Comment #46 | KIR S.A. states that the technical changes are not yet complete. |
| 2021-05-05 | Comment #48 | KIR S.A. states the technical changes are complete. |

Throughout this incident, it's been revealed that there are a host of systemic communication issues, which is something that was previously captured in Bug 1523186, Comment #25 and Bug 1523186, Comment #26. These issues appear to still be present, as evidenced by the ample discussion on this bug and the related incidents it has spawned. As https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/jOq6_ijw-9g/m/FdtIjvypAgAJ captures, this appears to be a systemic trend.

While I think more discussion about how to address the issues here is necessary, considering overall the quality of these incident responses, I think with the above captured, there's nothing further for this bug if that path is taken.