Open Bug 1329996 (uplift_tor_fingerprinting) Opened 7 years ago Updated 1 month ago

[META] Tor Uplift: Fingerprinting Resistance

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Security, defect, P2)

Product:
Core
Component:
DOM: Security
Type:
defect

Tracking

()

Milestone:
mozilla54

People

(Reporter: ethan, Unassigned, Mentored)

References

(Depends on 51 open bugs, Blocks 2 open bugs)

Details

(Keywords: meta, Whiteboard: [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta][fp-triaged]) 

As part of the Tor uplift project, we are going to implement anti-fingerprinting protection [1] in Firefox.

This bug is used as the meta bug of all anti-fingerprinting features.


Reference:
[1] Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability
https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability
Alias: AntiFingerprinting
Assignee: nobody → ettseng
Blocks: meta_tor
Priority: -- → P2
Whiteboard: [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta]
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla54
Depends on: 1233691
Depends on: 1330892
Depends on: 1222285
Depends on: 1217290
Depends on: 1330890
Depends on: 1330882
Depends on: 1330876
No longer depends on: 959893
Depends on: 1333651
Fingerprinting defenses work best when they are used together. Therefore an idea we have proposed is to make all anti-fingerprinting features active when the pref "privacy.resistFingerprinting" = true. That will make it easier for users to activate all anti-fingerprinting features at once, and also will give a simple definition of what is included in Firefox's fingerprinting resistance so that we can measure our progress using tools such as https://panopticlick.eff.org/. Also, Tor Browser will enable this pref.
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Bug 1077986 could also be added
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Depends on: linux-nnt
Depends on: 1420234
Depends on: 1418537
Whiteboard: [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta] → [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta][fp-triaged]
No longer depends on: 1398414
Assignee: ethantseng → nobody
Depends on: 1433350
Depends on: 1433815
Depends on: 1437349
Depends on: 1439784
Depends on: 1433592
Depends on: 467035
No longer depends on: 1453504
Depends on: 1462115
Recent research suggests the work on anti-fingerprinting being done here matters a lot : https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/06/29/against-privacy-defeatism-why-browsers-can-still-stop-fingerprinting/

Thanks for the work already done here by the Firefox and Tor teams and looking forward to new improvements as well :-)
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Depends on: 1470828
Whiteboard: [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta][fp-triaged] → [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta]
From now on, this meta bug is used to track anti-fingerprinting bugs which will be used by Tor Browser. The purpose is to help us narrow down the scope of the Tor Uplift project, and track its progress more easily.

If a bug is a fingerprinting issue in general, but not necessary to fix for Tor, we'll simply mark it as [fingerprinting] in Whiteboard and not block this meta bug.
Alias: AntiFingerprinting → uplift_tor_fingerprinting
Summary: [META] Support anti-fingerprinting protection → [META] Tor Uplift: Fingerprinting Resistance
No longer depends on: 1485264
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Assignee: nobody → ettseng
Whiteboard: [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta] → [tor][fingerprinting][domsecurity-meta][fp-triaged]
No longer depends on: 1325874
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No longer depends on: linux-nnt
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Mozilla should follow Apple's attitude and disable some Web APIs by default: https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-declined-to-implement-16-web-apis-in-safari-due-to-privacy-concerns/

The more features have to be disabled by Fingerprinting Resistance, it becomes less effective and users have a risk of standing out.

Thanks for listening.

See Also: → 1662349
Depends on: 1711179
Depends on: 1745715
Assignee: ettseng → nobody
Severity: normal → S3
Depends on: 1827576
Depends on: 1834307
See Also: → finegrained-rfp
Depends on: 1871789
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