Closed Bug 640339 (CVE-2011-1202) Opened 13 years ago Closed 13 years ago

generate-id() function leaks information about valid heap addresses

Categories

(Core :: XSLT, defect)

x86
Windows 7
defect
Not set
normal

Tracking

()

RESOLVED FIXED
Tracking Status
blocking2.0 --- Macaw+
status2.0 --- .1-fixed
status1.9.2 --- .17-fixed
status1.9.1 --- .19-fixed

People

(Reporter: dveditz, Assigned: sicking)

References

()

Details

(Whiteboard: [sg:low])

Attachments

(1 file, 1 obsolete file)

As demonstrated at the test URL and announced on Chris Evans' blog the XPath generate-id() function returns a valid heap address which might provide a useful handle in other attacks. Appears to affect all browsers one way or another (Chrome was patched before announcing this).

http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/03/multi-browser-heap-address-leak-in-xslt.html
Version: 1.9.2 Branch → unspecified
Attached patch patch to fixSplinter Review
Needs a bit more testing, but I think this should do it. I originally used the address of the txExecutionState itself, but since that usually lives on the stack it's possible that that'll be on a predictable address.
Attachment #518223 - Flags: review?(peterv)
OS: Mac OS X → Windows 7
Comment on attachment 518223 [details] [diff] [review]
patch to fix

>diff --git a/content/xslt/src/xpath/txMozillaXPathTreeWalker.cpp b/content/xslt/src/xpath/txMozillaXPathTreeWalker.cpp

>+    PRUword nodeid = ((PRUword)aNode.mNode) - ((PRUword)aBase.mNode);

Don't think you need all those brackets.

>diff --git a/content/xslt/src/xslt/txGenerateIdFunctionCall.cpp b/content/xslt/src/xslt/txGenerateIdFunctionCall.cpp

>+            "called xslt extension function \"current\" with wrong context");

s/current/generate-id/

I don't think this can leak info about adresses anymore.
Attachment #518223 - Flags: review?(peterv) → review+
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.2.16?
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.1.18?
Dan, I don't know how you want to do about landing this on branches given that I don't think it can land on trunk right now.
Comment on attachment 518223 [details] [diff] [review]
patch to fix

Approved for 1.9.2.16 and 1.9.1.18, a=dveditz for release-drivers
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.2.16?
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.2.16+
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.1.18?
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval1.9.1.18+
blocking2.0: --- → .x+
S'ok, we'll take the branches now and 4.0.1 when we can.
Checked in to branches:

http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.1/rev/768b54fa2f7d
http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.2/rev/a201c429788b

Leaving open as it hasn't been check in to trunk yet.

Also nominating for the 2.0 branch as that'll likely be a separate landing.
blocking2.0: .x+ → Macaw
Comment on attachment 518223 [details] [diff] [review]
patch to fix

Approved for the mozilla2.0 repository, a=dveditz for release-drivers
Attachment #518223 - Flags: approval2.0+
Checked in on m-c and 2.0:

http://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/c2bd5cf4070e
http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-2.0/rev/e01dc3fc20d3
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 13 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Alias: CVE-2011-1202
Attached patch patch security (obsolete) — Splinter Review
Tarak, what is this attachment supposed to be? It looks like an executable.
Comment on attachment 529326 [details] [diff] [review]
patch security

Marking obsolete for now as I suspect this was added by mistake.
Attachment #529326 - Attachment is obsolete: true
Depends on: 1243337
You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.

Attachment

General

Created:
Updated:
Size: