948579 - Remove ANSSI / IGC/A Root Certificate

Status: RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 1272156

(NSS :: CA Certificates Code, task, P1)

Description

[paul.leo.steinberg]

This is exactly the same situation as at the Trustwave incident ( https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=724929 ). A subordinate CA has knowingly issued an intermediate certificate usable for MITM attacks.

The issuing of the malicious intermediate certificate was only reported by ANSSI after Google discovered it. This proves that ANSSI is not able to enforce their own certificate policies and thus should not be trusted to operate any CA. There can be no difference whether the certificate was issued directly by ANSSI or a subordinate CA as any CA is to be held liable for actions of its subordinate CAs.

At the Trustwave incident, it was communicated ( https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications ) that April 27, 2012 would be the last chance to disclose any issued certificates suitable for MITM attacks without consequences.

As it is now AFTER April 27, 2012 AND ANSSI has not disclosed the certificate before it was discovered by public, the consequence MUST be to exclude ANSSI's root certificates from Mozilla products. Otherwise, this will happen again and again and any remaining trust in HTTPS will be lost.

Comment 1

[Jan]

Not only did they misissue a cert that was used for actual MitM attacks, there are also other issues:

1. They don't seem to have a current audit report on file. The Spreadsheet[tm] [1] links a document covering an audit performed at the end of 2011. Their website [2] also refers to this audit, making it likely that this is the most recent audit in existence. According to the CAB BR 17.2, an audit period must not exceed one year and the sequence of audits must cover the entire time during which the CA was operational. Thus, an audit covering 2012 should have been provided. According to the CAB BR 17.3, this should have happened within 3 months of the end of the audit period (i.e. by March 2013). Furthermore, this audit seems to have been performed by ANSSI, which does not fulfill the "Independence from the subject of the audit" criterion required in the BR and a corresponding requirement in the Mozilla Certificate Maintenance Policy.

2. As per the discussion on mozilla.dev.security.policy, there are certificates chaining up to this CA that have likely been misissued (e.g. two for "your.server.address.com", and a number of certificates for truncated domain names). This casts serious doubts about proper domain validation in the hierarchy.


[1] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0Ah-tHXMAwqU3dGx0cGFObG9QM192NFM4UWNBMlBaekE&single=true&gid=1&output=html
[2] http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/fr/anssi/services-securises/igc-a/attestation-audits.html

Comment 2

[Yuhong Bao]

FYI, they in the end decided to restrict it to specific DNS namespaces.

Comment 3

[Tony]

Are there any further actions taken?

Comment 4

[Ratul]

Attachment: u

Comment 5

[Kathleen Wilson]

(In reply to Yuhong Bao from comment #2)
> FYI, they in the end decided to restrict it to specific DNS namespaces.

Correct. This root was constrained via Bug #952572
Specifics: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=952572#c2

The update is that this root was removed via Bug #1272156. So, I guess I'll resolve this as a duplicate of that bug.