privacy.resistFingerprinting should NOT override general.*.override values
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(Core :: DOM: Security, defect)
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(Reporter: aros, Unassigned)
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Updated•7 years ago
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Comment 2•6 years ago
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Again, this is a wrong decision, and smacks of Google/Microsoft-esque 'we know better than the user' thinking.
If I set an override, I expect my decision to be honoured. If I was happy to use the default, I wouldn't have set the override.
What rationale has been given, to disallow the user having the ability to override resist fingerprinting defaults? What use case that causes harm, is this policy attempting to rectify? What is wrong with giving sensible defaults to RFP, but allowing a user to make a conscious informed choice to override them, when they don't work for them?
What percentage do you imagine would override RFP defaults, that you're attempting to stop by this decision? 1%? 5%?
Are you seriously claiming that you're not satisfied with a general pool of 95 or 99% having an identical fingerprint, that you NEED a full 100% and to do so, you consider it justifiable to remove users ability to opt-out from this pool?
Wrong. Completely wrong.
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