Firefox leaking user agent attributes through JavaScript even when privacy.resistFingerprinting is enabled
Categories
(Core :: Privacy: Anti-Tracking, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: hello, Unassigned)
Details
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:85.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/85.0
Steps to reproduce:
I enabled privacy.resistFingerprinting.
When I visit https://duckduckgo.com/?q=what+is+my+user+agent&ia=answer, a spoofed user agent is displayed (as expected).
Your user agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0
When I run console.log(navigator.userAgent), my system and operating system attributes were leaked.
Actual results:
My system and operating system attributes were leaked.
Expected results:
My system and operating system attributes should have been spoofed.
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Comment 1•4 years ago
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Sorry for the typos... noticed I cannot edit the description once submitted.
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Updated•4 years ago
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Comment 2•4 years ago
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Pretty sure this isn't a security issue that needs to be kept hidden, but I'll leave it moco-confidential and the anti-tracking folks can make a decision. Tom?
(In reply to Sun Knudsen from comment #0)
When I run console.log(navigator.userAgent)
Run how? The devtools console or from actual JS on the actual page?
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Comment 3•4 years ago
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I just submitted a privacy vulnerability report to Tor... unfortunately this issue is also present on Tor 10.0.10 on macOS.
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Comment 4•4 years ago
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Pretty sure this isn't a security issue that needs to be kept hidden, but I'll leave it moco-confidential and the anti-tracking folks can make a decision. Tom?
Given this can be used in attempts to de-anonymize Tor users, I believe it should be kept secret.
Run how? The devtools console or from actual JS on the actual page?
Both (I noticed the issue browsing through sentry.io logs)
Comment 5•4 years ago
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(In reply to Sun Knudsen from comment #4)
Pretty sure this isn't a security issue that needs to be kept hidden, but I'll leave it moco-confidential and the anti-tracking folks can make a decision. Tom?
Given this can be used in attempts to de-anonymize Tor users, I believe it should be kept secret.
OK, I went to actually look for this, but this is already public, cf. bug 1557620. So there's no point keeping it secret. There was discussion also in bug 1404608 if you're interested in the history behind that decision.
Description
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