Closed Bug 171765 Opened 23 years ago Closed 23 years ago

notify when an application's own certificate cannot be path-validated

Categories

(NSS :: Libraries, defect, P1)

defect

Tracking

(Not tracked)

RESOLVED INVALID

People

(Reporter: Bill.Burns, Assigned: nelson)

Details

scenario: A webserver gets an SSL server certificate from verisign's Onsite program. These certificates are issued by an intermediate CA, not the VeriSign top-level root CAs. Web masters install the server's certificate but frequently fail to add the intermediate CA certificate into the server's certificate database. When clients connect to the SSL port of the webserver they are presented with a security error/warning alerting the user to the fact that the certificate is not trusted (because certificate path validation failed). For legitimate websites this is a problem because it trains users to ignore (serious) security dialog boxes. if possible, NSS should log an error whenever a certificate's path cannot be validated. (I suppose it's up to the application to make the detemination whether or not to continue, but currently admins are able to misconfigure their server and never know it's setup incorrectly.)
Status: UNCONFIRMED → NEW
Ever confirmed: true
OS: MacOS X → All
Priority: -- → P1
Hardware: Macintosh → All
Target Milestone: --- → 3.7
Do you think NSS should validate the SSL server certificate in the SSL_ConfigSecureServer function or it is the application's responsibility to validate the certificate?
Assignee: wtc → nelsonb
The NSS API to do path validation already exists. It is the application's responsibility to use it on its own cert chain and to decide whether or not to proceed if it fails. What else would you propose? Should SSL_ConfigSecureServer fail if the cert chain doesn't validate? That would implement a policy that I don't think it's NSS's place to implement. When the infamous V2k incident (not Y2k) happened a few years ago, server users were able to work around it simply by removing their expired root CA certs from their cert DBs. This worked precisely because the server WAS willing to continue to work even though it could no longer validate its own cert chain because the root CA cert was missing. If NSS had implemented the policy of refusing to configure the SSL socket when the cert chain didn't validate, those servers would have been dead in the water.
Having received no objections, I am marking this bug invalid.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 23 years ago
Resolution: --- → INVALID
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