privacy.resistFingerprinting.pbmode affects non-private browsing mode
Categories
(Core :: Privacy: Anti-Tracking, defect, P3)
Tracking
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People
(Reporter: pecil67671, Unassigned)
Details
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:129.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/129.0
Steps to reproduce:
- Create a new profile using about:profiles
- be sure to have a maximized window
- restart profile (should open maximized)
- inside that profile, toggle privacy.resistFingerprinting.pbmode using about:config to true (to enable resistFingerprinting in private browsing mode)
- restart profile again (opens windowed)
Actual results:
Instead of only affecting private browsing mode, the preference forces the non private browsing mode to start at a fixed size.
Expected results:
The preference should only affect the private browsing mode, as per the name suggests.
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Comment 1•1 year ago
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The Bugbug bot thinks this bug should belong to the 'Core::Privacy: Anti-Tracking' component, and is moving the bug to that component. Please correct in case you think the bot is wrong.
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Updated•1 year ago
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Comment 2•1 year ago
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This is a correct description of the behavior, but it is working as intended. We do not apply contextual decisions (e.g. pbmode/per-site exemptions) to this behavior (window size of new windows) because we aren't able to correctly decide the context in all cases. Meaning we might accidentally not apply it in cases we should (which is unsafe behavior). Or apply it in cases we shouldn't (which is safe but inconsistent and therefore unexpected/a bug.)
In the future we might be able to dig into this deeper and get it to do the right thing in all cases safely, but at the moment this behavior is a trade-off between 'safe but less than ideal behavior' and 'spending an inordinate amount of time to get a small corner-case working for a very small number of users' (as this is not actually a supported feature for Firefox or Tor Browser.)
Description
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