Closed
Bug 287481
Opened 20 years ago
Closed 20 years ago
reading attributes or CSS-styled links allows sniffing global browser history
Categories
(Core :: Security, defect)
Core
Security
Tracking
()
VERIFIED
DUPLICATE
of bug 147777
People
(Reporter: seppi, Assigned: dveditz)
References
()
Details
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows 98; en-EN; rv:1.7.6) Gecko
Build Identifier:
One can apply different styles to links depending on whether they were visited
or not, using pseudo-class :visited. By reading back which style was applied
using JavaScript we can find out whether a site was visited (according to the
global history, which remains among sessions) or not.
CSS specification recommends that whenever :visited or other possibly
privacy-related attributes are applied, a tainting mechanism should invalidate
access to reading the style attributes using ECMA/Java-Script to avoid letting a
website read the browser history.
Reproducible: Always
Steps to Reproduce:
1. visit the site above
2. scroll to the paragraph with "CSS Exploit" in its title
3. visit one of the sites or maybe you alread visited one
4. look at the column "Besucht?"
Actual Results:
Visited sites will give a "JA, die Seite wurde vor Kurzem besucht!", non-visited
site will give a "Nein (oder nicht erkennbar)!".
Expected Results:
Every site should give a "Nein (oder nicht erkennbar)!".
Workaround: clear your browser history as often as possible (not so good).
| Assignee | ||
Comment 1•20 years ago
|
||
*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of 147777 ***
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 20 years ago
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Updated•20 years ago
|
Status: RESOLVED → VERIFIED
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Description
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