lpSecurityDescriptor not set in CreatePipe call in PR_CreatePipe

VERIFIED DUPLICATE of bug 24461

Status

NSPR
NSPR
P3
major
VERIFIED DUPLICATE of bug 24461
20 years ago
19 years ago

People

(Reporter: dshea, Assigned: srinivas)

Tracking

Firefox Tracking Flags

(Not tracked)

Details

(URL)

Attachments

(1 attachment)

Updated

20 years ago
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Last Resolved: 20 years ago
Resolution: --- → INVALID

Description

20 years ago
lpSecurityDescriptor is set to NULL by
the ZeroMemory call on line 549.
(Reporter)

Comment 1

20 years ago
There is a recently discovered technique in which NT processes can be hijacked
to allow a user on an NT machine to get higher privileges on that machine.  This
is often due to NT calls which have a SECURITYATTRIBUTE, which is set as NULL,
which gives it the default security.
In PR_CreatePipe there is a call to CreatePipe, in which portions of the
SECURITYATTRIBUTE struct are set, but not the lpSecurityDescriptor, which means
this process is still given the default (bad) security.
(Reporter)

Updated

20 years ago
Status: RESOLVED → REOPENED
(Reporter)

Comment 2

20 years ago
Here is some additional reading on the recent NT object security exploitation
technique.

 L0pht Security Advisory


           Release date: February 18, 1999
            Application: Microsoft Windows NT 4.0
               Severity: any local user can gain administator privileges
                         and/or take full control over the system

                 Author: dildog@l0pht.com
                    URL: http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html

---
Overview :
---

        Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 implements a system-wide cache of
file-mapping objects for the purpose of loading system dynamic link
libraries (DLLs) as quickly as possible. These cache objects, located in
the system's internal object namespace, are created with permissions such
that the 'Everyone' group has full control over them. Hence, it is
possible to delete these cache objects and replace them with others that
point to different DLLs.

        When processes are created, the loader maps/loads the loading
executable's imported DLLs into the process space. If there is a DLL cache
object available, it is simply mapped into the process space, rather than
going to the disk. Hence, there is an exploitable condition, when a
low-privilege user replaces a DLL in the cache with a trojan DLL, followed
by a high-privelege account launching a process. The high priveleged
process will map in the trojan DLL and execute code on behalf of the low
privelege user.

---
Affected systems:
---

        Windows NT 4.0 Server SP4
        Windows NT 4.0 Workstation SP4
        Other service packs are likely to be vulnerable, but the exploit has
        not been tested on them, neither has the fix presented below.

---
Description :
---

        The Windows NT object namespace is the place where the kernel
keeps the names of mutexes, semaphores, filemapping objects, and other
kernel objects. It is organized hierarchically, like a directory
structure. Amongst the directories are:
        \Device
        \BaseNamedObjects
        \Driver
        \KnownDlls
        ...

        The NT object namespace is browsable with a tool called 'WinObj
2.0' from System Internals (their website is http://www.sysinternals.com).
You may wish to look around this namespace and browse the default
permissions of objects. It is quiet entertaining, really.

        The "\Knowndlls" directory contains a list of DLLs in the
c:\winnt\system32 directory, like:
        \KnownDlls\COMCTL32.dll
        \KnownDlls\MPR.dll
        \KnownDlls\advapi32.dll
        \KnownDlls\kernel32.dll
        ..

        All of these objects are created at boot time, and are 'permanent
shared objects'. Normally, users can not create permanent shared objects
(it's an advanced user right, and it is normally not assigned to any
group, even Administrators). But the system preloads this cache for you.
Permanent shared objects differ from regular shared objects only in the
fact that they have a flag set, and an incremented reference count, such
that if you create one, and then terminate the creating process or close
all handles to the object, it does not disappear from the object space.

        To exploit the poor permissions on this cache, one first needs to
delete one of the shared objects by name, in order to later replace it. So
we make a call to the NTDLL.DLL native function "OpenSection()", getting a
handle to the object. Then we call the NTOSKRNL.EXE native function
"ZwMakeTemporaryObject()" which removes the 'permanent' flag and
decrements the reference counter from the object. Now we just call
NTDLL.DLL:NtClose() on the handle and it is destroyed.

        To create a section, one calls NTDLL.DLL:CreateSection(), which is
undocumented. There are other calls one needs to make in order to set up
the object and open the KnownDlls directory, but they are trivial and will
not be discussed here. Feel free to browse the source code presented at
the end of this advisory to see what you need to do though. Anyway, you
create a section (aka file-mapping) object that points to a trojan DLL. A
good candidate for DLL trojan is KERNEL32.DLL, since it is loaded by
pretty much every executable you're going to run.

        Note that any DLL cache objects you create as a user can not be
'permanent', hence, when you log out, the cache object _will_ disappear.
So how can we get a higher privelege process to run while we're logged in?
There are many ways. We can wait for an 'At' job to go off, or we can set
up the DLL hack as an 'At' job that goes off when someone else is logged
in. But more reliable is this:

        When a new Windows NT subsystem is started, it creates a subsystem
process to handle various system details. Examples of these processes are
LSASS.EXE and PSXSS.EXE. The PSXSS.EXE is the POSIX subsystem. But since
no one ever really uses the POSIX subsystem under NT. So, chances are, it
won't be loaded into memory yet. Once it is, though, it's loaded until the
machine reboots. If it loaded, reboot the machine, and it won't be :P.

        So, we launch our DLL cache hack, and then run a POSIX subsystem
command, thus launching PSXSS.EXE (which runs as 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM',
the system account), and running our DLL with local administrator
privileges. Incidentally, other subsystems have the same effect, such as
the OS/2 subsystem (the only other one that probably isn't started yet).

---
Workarounds/Fixes:
---

        I developed a patch for this security problem in the form of a
Win32 Service program that can be installed by the Administrator of the
system. It sets itself to run every time the system is started, and before
the user has the opportunity to start a program, it adjusts the
permissions of the DLL cache to something much safer. The source code for
this service is also provided, along with a compiled version. Links to the
programs can be found at http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html.

        One can verify the validity of the patch by downloading the WinObj
v2.0 tool from System Internals (www.sysinternals.com) and inspecting the
permissions of the KnownDlls directory, and the section objects within it.

        Microsoft has been sent a copy of this advisory, and I would
expect a hotfix from them at some point in the near future.

---
Example:
---

        I wrote up a trojan to test exploitability, and it was a simple
'forwarder' DLL that had the same exported names as KERNEL32.DLL, but a
different 'DllMain()' function, to be called when the DLL is loaded. The
function calls in my trojan, simply forward off to the real KERNEL32.DLL
calls located in a copy of the kernel that you make in 'REALKERN.DLL' in
the c:\temp directory.

        To try out this vulnerability, obtain an account as a
low-privilege guest user (referred to as 'Dick') and do the following:

        1. Log in as Dick at the console.
        2. Start up two "cmd.exe" shells. Do the following in one of them.
        3. Copy c:\winnt\system32\kernel32.dll to c:\temp\realkern.dll
(The egg dll is hard coded to use the c:\temp directory to find this file.
If you can't put it in c:\temp, then modify the source '.def' file to
point to a different location and recompile eggdll.dll)
        4. Copy the provided hackdll.exe and eggdll.dll to c:\temp
        5. Ensure that there is no file named c:\lockout. If there is,
delete it. The exploit uses this file as a lockfile.
        6. Delete the KERNEL32.DLL file-mapping object from the system
cache:
           c:\> cd\temp
           c:\temp> hackdll -d kernel32.dll
        7. Insert the new file-mapping object with:
           c:\temp> hackdll -a kernel32.dll c:\temp\eggdll.dll
           Don't hit a key in this window after hitting enter.
        8. Now move to the other cmd.exe window that you started.
        9. Run a POSIX subsystem command. A good way to start it is:
           c:\temp> posix /c calc
           (if you have calculator installed. If not, pick some other program)
       10. Now the EGGDLL.DLL will prompt you with a few message boxes:
           Say no to the "User is DOMAIN\DICK, Spawn Shell?" box.
           Say no to the "User is \[garbage], Spawn Shell?" box.
           Say YES to the "User is NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, Spawn Shell?" box.
           Say YES to the "Winsta0" window station message box.
           Say YES to the "Desktop" window desktop message box.
           You will now see a "System Console" command.com shell open up.
           (saying yes to the next 'winlogon' box will give you something
            funny when you log out, btw :P)
        11. Now go back to your first cmd.exe window and hit a key to
unpoison the DLL cache
        12. In the System Console window, run the User Manager program,
and modify Dick's account (or anyone else's for that matter) to your
hearts content.
            (NT Server) c:\winnt\system32> usrmgr
            (NT Workstation) c:\winnt\system32> musrmgr

---
Source and Compiled Code:
---

        Exploit code can be downloaded from L0pht's website at
http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html. It is available in compiled form,
and in pure source form as two zipfiles. The L0pht patch for this advisory
is also available in both source form and compiled form from the same URL.


dildog@l0pht.com

---------------
For more L0pht (that's L - zero - P - H - T) advisories check out:
http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html
---------------

Updated

20 years ago
Assignee: wtc → srinivas
Status: REOPENED → NEW

Comment 3

20 years ago
(Assigned the bug to the module owner.)

NSPR passes NULL as the lpSecurityAttributes
argument to many Win32 functions (e.g.,
CreateFile).  Should we be concerned?
What is a good security attributes or
security descriptor structure like?

Comment 4

20 years ago
I am confused.

There is no mention of the security attributes
or security descriptor structure in the
L0pht Security Advisory that you posted.
How is this DLL cache security hole related
to this bug?
(Reporter)

Comment 5

20 years ago
An ACL (access control list) should be created, with a single user ACE
(access control entry) and disallow everything else.
The single user ACE being that of the currently logged in user that started the
netscape process.  There should be a section of code that grabs the sid from the
current process token and makes an allow security descriptor for it.

I'll try to dig up some example of good security attribute handling.  Meanwhile,
here is the pointer to MSDN stuff on the securitydescriptor, which has links at
the bottom, which deal with the other API's for secure object handling in NT.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/sdkdoc/winbase/accctrl_6i5u.htm

The L0pht advisory is an example of a technique to exploit NT objects that have
incorrect permissions.
(Reporter)

Comment 6

20 years ago
Yes, other areas where the SECURITYATTRIBUTE has been set to NULL, like in the
CreateFile calls, are areas of concern.  Perhaps even better examples than the
CreatePipe call.
I'll wait for feedback concerning this bug, before entering bugs on the other
areas of NULL set sec. attributes.

Comment 7

20 years ago
I read the L0pht advisory thoroughly but
still don't see how one can exploit file or
pipe handles with the default security.  I even
downloaded the WinObj 2.0 tool (mentioned in
the L0pht advisory) and it doesn't show any
file or pipe handles.  I think this security
hole is only applicable to *named* objects,
which are kept in the Windows NT object namespace.
(Assignee)

Updated

20 years ago
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED

Updated

20 years ago
Resolution: INVALID → ---

Comment 8

20 years ago
ASSIGNED::INVALID makes no sense to me. clearing the resolution.
(Reporter)

Updated

20 years ago
Group: netscapeconfidential?
(Reporter)

Comment 9

20 years ago
Taking this bug out of the Netscape Confidential group, so that experts on the
NT SECURITY DESCRIPTOR add their comments.

Comment 10

20 years ago
The problem with not specifying a non-null security descriptor on objects isn't
just one of security, but also of decreasing unknowns. When specifying a NULL
security descriptor, one of two things happen:

1) NT will apply the ACEs with the inherit bit set in the parent object's ACL
to the new child object if the object is named

2) if the object is unnamed, it will apply the DACL from the user's token

Because these are uncontrolled variables, there is possibility that if a user
has secured their machine properly (or even improperly), your functionality
will break. You are relying on the operating environment to properly deal with
these issues when there is no guaruntee of such a thing happening (and no error
checking to make sure it is).

To avoid issues like this, all object creation API calls should be setting a
non-null security descriptor. Unless any of the threads launched form the
clinet run under a different user context,
CREATOR/OWNER     Full Control
and
SYSTEM            Full Control

should work just fine. Comments?

Comment 11

20 years ago
NSPR now has its own Bugzilla product.  Moving this bug to the NSPR product.

Comment 12

19 years ago
phillip gone, removing him from qa contact, sorry for spam
(Assignee)

Comment 13

19 years ago
Created attachment 4469 [details] [diff] [review]
The patch for the modifications is attached.
(Assignee)

Comment 14

19 years ago
Ignore the previous attachment; it was meant for bug 23815.
(Assignee)

Comment 15

19 years ago
A new API is being added to NSPR for specifying security attributes when 
creating files; see bug 24461.
Marking this bug as a duplicate of 24461.

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of 24461 ***
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Last Resolved: 20 years ago19 years ago
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE

Comment 16

19 years ago
Cleaning up a bit
VERIFY dupe, sorry for spam
Status: RESOLVED → VERIFIED
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