User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-GB; rv:220.127.116.11) Gecko/2008070208 Firefox/3.0.1 Build Identifier: Thunderbird 18.104.22.168 Using IMAP with Google Mail. I received an email whose content suggested there was an image attached yet Thunderbird hadn't popped up it's attachment pane and strangely the box with the Subject etc. was collapsed. Clicking the expand icon did nothing but change it to a minimize icon, the content of the box was not revealed. Looking through Google's webmail interface however the messages is complete with headers and has detected the two images (jpeg) that were sent to me. This might have something to do with me clicking 'Get Messages', the message appearing in the message list pane, me clicking on it - but, not knowing it contained images and would download slower - clicking another image. Now that I check by using the IMAP - [All Mail] and viewing the email in question there, it is redownloaded properly. This suggests that my interruption of it, has left the email corrupted in my Inbox. Reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce: 1. 2. 3.
This differs from Bug 122491 's summary because it is not solved by a restart of Thunderbird. Although, given the last paragraph of my summary I'd appreciate it if
Summary: Receiving email with image attachment does not show up and messes with subject box → Selecting/unselecting email with image attachment whilst it is loading, corrupts the email. IMAP.
Sorry for the bug spam, forgive Comment #1's last sentence it was half finished when I committed accidentally whilst changing the bug's title/subject. This is what the last sentence was meant to reflect.
Same issue in TB3 - and not just image attachments but any attachment.
This strikes me as being a duplicate
Severity: normal → major
Component: General → Networking: IMAP
Product: Thunderbird → MailNews Core
QA Contact: general → networking.imap
Version: 2.0 → 1.8 Branch
Do you still see this issue when using a current version?
Created attachment 8965345 [details] How.pdf [Security approval request comment] How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch? Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem? Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw? If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw? Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be? How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?
Comment on attachment 8965345 [details] How.pdf Don't set sec-approval if you're not looking for mozilla-central permission for a patch.
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