Closed Bug 1034949 Opened 10 years ago Closed 9 years ago

Swisscom: valid 512 bit certificate

Categories

(CA Program :: CA Certificate Root Program, task)

Product:
CA Program
Component:
CA Certificate Root Program
Type:
task
Priority:
Not set
Severity:
normal

Tracking

(Not tracked)

Status:
RESOLVED FIXED

People

(Reporter: kurt, Assigned: patrick.graber)

References

Details

(Whiteboard: BR Compliance - 512 bit cert) 

Hi,

I found a certificate that is using an RSA key with 512 bit that is still valid and not revoked.  It's been issued by:
C=ch, O=Swisscom, OU=Digital Certificate Services, CN=Swisscom Rubin CA 1
Blocks: BR-Compliance
Swisscom Rubin CA 1?  Do you mean Swisscom Root CA 1?  I cannot find a root named Swisscom Rubin CA 1 in my database.
That's the name of an intermediate CA.  The root CA is "Swisscom Root CA 1"
In the CT-dawn era, is there any reason to treat the certificate like a big secret?

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

And here's today's OCSP response for it:

-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----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-----BEGIN OCSP RESPONSE-----

Or, in more human friendly form:

OCSP Response Data:
    OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)
    Response Type: Basic OCSP Response
    Version: 1 (0x0)
    Responder Id: C = CH, O = Swisscom, OU = Digital Certificate Services, CN = OCSP Signer Swisscom Rubin CA 3
    Produced At: Jul 13 08:44:14 2014 GMT
    Responses:
    Certificate ID:
      Hash Algorithm: sha1
      Issuer Name Hash: 05E4639E5B4AB593F2690DD371F9FD91AADB5DB6
      Issuer Key Hash: 2DC2A7A3633E3F8347AB4833368185F7D4E9ACC0
      Serial Number: 0467DD88C55D766440813209F24E48A7
    Cert Status: good
    This Update: Jul 13 08:12:34 2014 GMT
    Next Update: Jul 20 10:12:38 2014 GMT

(The CRL is at http://crl.swissdigicert.ch/sdcs-rubin.crl, and doesn't list 0467DD88C55D766440813209F24E48A7 either, of course.)
Status: UNCONFIRMED → NEW
Ever confirmed: true
(In reply to Kaspar Brand from comment #3)
> In the CT-dawn era, is there any reason to treat the certificate like a big
> secret?

It's not a secret since we can obviously both find it.  But there is also no reason to make it more public then needed to get the problem solved.  Also, they didn't opt in on CT.
Assignee: kwilson → patrick.graber
Whiteboard: BR Compliance - 512 bit cert
The domain name of the Subject doesn't exist (anmyore), so shouldn't the CA be obligated to revoke this cert on demand within 24 hrs?
(In reply to M.Hunstock from comment #5)
> The domain name of the Subject doesn't exist (anmyore), so shouldn't the CA
> be obligated to revoke this cert on demand within 24 hrs?

So to quote baseline requirements:
13.1.5 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:
[...]
3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the
Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (also see Section 10.2.4) or no longer complies with the
requirements of Appendix A;
[...]
6. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP
address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant’s right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name);
[...]
9. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA’s Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;

And Appendinx A.3 has 2048 bit as minimum size for RSA.

There also seem to be various other things wrong with the certificate.

So yes, this should have been revoked almost 2 months ago.

Kurt
Patrick: this is a fairly serious issue. Are you able to give a response from Swisscom?

Gerv
This certificate is used for internal test use only. It will be revoked today.
What is the current state of this bug?
 The certificate was revoked on Sep 10 09:49:12 2014 GMT

    Serial Number: 0467DD88C55D766440813209F24E48A7
        Revocation Date: Sep 10 09:49:12 2014 GMT

This bug can be closed.

http://crl.swissdigicert.ch/sdcs-rubin.crl
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 9 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Product: mozilla.org → NSS
Product: NSS → CA Program
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