Closed
Bug 1111079
Opened 11 years ago
Closed 11 years ago
Chromium IPC channel bug: use-after-free in IPC::Channel::ChannelImpl::ProcessOutgoingMessages()
Categories
(Core :: IPC, defect)
Core
IPC
Tracking
()
RESOLVED
FIXED
mozilla39
People
(Reporter: jld, Assigned: jld)
References
Details
(Keywords: csectype-uaf, sec-high, Whiteboard: [adv-main37-][post-critsmash-triage])
Attachments
(2 files)
2.61 KB,
patch
|
bent.mozilla
:
review+
abillings
:
sec-approval+
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
2.61 KB,
patch
|
lmandel
:
approval-mozilla-aurora+
lmandel
:
approval-mozilla-beta+
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
Upstream bug report: https://crbug.com/22451
Comment 1•11 years ago
|
||
Is this something you can look at soon, Jed?
Updated•11 years ago
|
Group: dom-core-security
Assignee | ||
Comment 3•11 years ago
|
||
Here's a patch, but I don't have any test cases to verify that it actually fixes anything.
Mildly obscured try run, combined with bug 1111065: https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try&revision=ea158edc4d70
Comment on attachment 8578024 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch
Review of attachment 8578024 [details] [diff] [review]:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Looks sane to me.
Attachment #8578024 -
Flags: review?(bent.mozilla) → review+
Assignee | ||
Comment 5•11 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8578024 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch
[Security approval request comment]
> How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch?
I'm not sure. I'm not even sure how exploitable this is. The upstream bug mentions a Chromium test case that caused valgrind failures, but it doesn't correspond directly to our use of IPC. Someone who knows the IPC code better might have a better idea.
> Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem?
Probably. I can remove the upstream commit ids from the commit message. The code comments, I'd prefer to leave intact.
But this bug has been public upstream since 2012: https://crbug.com/22451#c25
> Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw?
Potentially all of them, but see above about how I don't actually know what the impact is. Even branches that don't use IPC as a security boundary might be affected, if it were possible for web content to somehow cause the use-after-free to occur.
> Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be?
No, but not difficult; anything older than 35 will have a merge conflict with bug 1063318 but it's trivial to resolve.
> How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?
Someone with a better understanding of the IPC code might have a better idea about this.
Attachment #8578024 -
Flags: sec-approval?
Comment 6•11 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8578024 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch
sec-approval+ for trunk. We will want beta and aurora patches for this once it is in.
I don't think we'll take this for ESR31 as it isn't clear it is affected by the issue.
Attachment #8578024 -
Flags: sec-approval? → sec-approval+
Updated•11 years ago
|
status-firefox36:
--- → wontfix
status-firefox37:
--- → affected
status-firefox38:
--- → affected
status-firefox39:
--- → affected
status-firefox-esr31:
--- → ?
tracking-firefox37:
--- → +
tracking-firefox38:
--- → +
tracking-firefox39:
--- → +
![]() |
||
Comment 7•11 years ago
|
||
The final 37 Beta goes to build on Thu (Mar 19). Can you please create a Beta branch patch if one is necessary and request uplift approval by tomorrow morning?
Flags: needinfo?(jld)
Assignee | ||
Comment 8•11 years ago
|
||
Assignee | ||
Comment 9•11 years ago
|
||
Approval Request Comment
[Feature/regressing bug #]: GeckoMediaPlugin sandboxing
[User impact if declined]: See earlier comments about security implications.
[Describe test coverage new/current, TreeHerder]: Built and tested dom/media/test/test_eme_playback.html on Linux/x86_64 on aurora and beta. See also previous m-c try run.
[Risks and why]: Some; this touches core IPC code.
[String/UUID change made/needed]: None.
Note: I edited the commit message before landing (to omit the pointers to specific Chromium issues, and give it a description that may or may not be innocuous enough), which is reflected here; otherwise it's the same as the previous patch.
Flags: needinfo?(jld)
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora?
![]() |
||
Updated•11 years ago
|
![]() |
||
Comment 10•11 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8580350 [details] [diff] [review]
bug1111079-hg2.diff
This has already landed on inbound so we should get it onto Beta and Aurora. Beta+ Aurora+
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta+
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora?
Attachment #8580350 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora+
Comment 11•11 years ago
|
||
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-aurora/rev/276d869dd9e5
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-beta/rev/5bb1bb65cc28
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-b2g34_v2_1/rev/bf15248ee754
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-b2g32_v2_0/rev/c025034f7323
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-b2g30_v1_4/rev/5dc250261d6a
status-b2g-v1.4:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v2.0:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v2.0M:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.1:
--- → fixed
status-b2g-v2.1S:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.2:
--- → affected
status-b2g-master:
--- → affected
status-firefox-esr38:
--- → fixed
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 11 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla39
Comment 13•11 years ago
|
||
Updated•11 years ago
|
Whiteboard: [adv-main37+]
Updated•11 years ago
|
Group: dom-core-security
Updated•10 years ago
|
Whiteboard: [adv-main37+] → [adv-main37-]
Updated•10 years ago
|
Group: core-security → core-security-release
![]() |
||
Updated•10 years ago
|
Whiteboard: [adv-main37-] → [adv-main37-][post-critsmash-triage]
Updated•9 years ago
|
Group: core-security-release
Updated•9 years ago
|
Keywords: csectype-uaf
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Description
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