Closed
Bug 1152177
Opened 10 years ago
Closed 10 years ago
"Assertion failure: js::CurrentThreadCanAccessRuntime(runtime_)" with watch() in Worker
Categories
(Core :: JavaScript Engine, defect)
Tracking
()
RESOLVED
FIXED
mozilla40
People
(Reporter: jruderman, Assigned: terrence)
Details
(Keywords: assertion, sec-high, testcase, Whiteboard: [adv-main38+][adv-esr31.7+])
Attachments
(7 files)
161 bytes,
text/html
|
Details | |
7.88 KB,
text/plain
|
Details | |
3.21 KB,
patch
|
jonco
:
review+
dveditz
:
sec-approval+
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
4.68 KB,
patch
|
abillings
:
approval-mozilla-aurora+
abillings
:
approval-mozilla-beta+
abillings
:
approval-mozilla-esr31+
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
3.78 KB,
patch
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review | |
3.68 KB,
patch
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review | |
1.31 KB,
patch
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
1. Create a profile with:
e10 disabled
https://www.squarefree.com/extensions/domFuzzLite3.xpi installed
2. Run: firefox -profile <profiledir> o.html
Assertion failure: js::CurrentThreadCanAccessRuntime(runtime_), at ../../dist/include/js/HeapAPI.h:127
Reporter | ||
Comment 1•10 years ago
|
||
This looks like JS mostly...
Component: DOM: Workers → JavaScript Engine
![]() |
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Updated•10 years ago
|
Flags: needinfo?(terrence)
Assignee | ||
Comment 3•10 years ago
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||
Good find! On first glance this appears to be a missing check for permanent atoms when pre-barriering one inside a jsid. I'll take a closer look this afternoon.
Flags: needinfo?(terrence)
Assignee | ||
Comment 4•10 years ago
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My guess was correct. The attached patch makes the jsid pre barrier have the same structure as the Value pre barrier. It also MOZ_CRASHES if we try to use the zone-specified barrier outside HeapSlot.
Comment 5•10 years ago
|
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Comment on attachment 8589948 [details] [diff] [review]
make_jsid_and_value_barriers_symetrical-v0.diff
Review of attachment 8589948 [details] [diff] [review]:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The jsid barrier change looks good.
For the preBarrier() overload that takes a zone, can we just not define it except in InternalGCMethods<Value>?
Attachment #8589948 -
Flags: review?(jcoppeard) → review+
Assignee | ||
Comment 6•10 years ago
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Comment 7•10 years ago
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Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 10 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Target Milestone: --- → mozilla40
Comment 8•10 years ago
|
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Does this affect any older versions?
Updated•10 years ago
|
Flags: in-testsuite?
Assignee | ||
Comment 9•10 years ago
|
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(In reply to Ryan VanderMeulen [:RyanVM UTC-4] from comment #8)
> Does this affect any older versions?
Right, this needs to get uplifted basically everywhere.
status-firefox37:
--- → affected
status-firefox38:
--- → affected
status-firefox39:
--- → affected
status-firefox-esr31:
--- → affected
status-firefox-esr38:
--- → affected
Comment 10•10 years ago
|
||
Sounds like this bug needs a sec rating and possibly a retroactive sec-approval request then too.
status-b2g-v1.4:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.0:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.0M:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.1:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.1S:
--- → affected
status-b2g-v2.2:
--- → affected
status-b2g-master:
--- → fixed
Assignee | ||
Comment 11•10 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8589948 [details] [diff] [review]
make_jsid_and_value_barriers_symetrical-v0.diff
[Security approval request comment]
How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch?
Not easily.
Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem?
Not at all.
Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw?
All of them.
If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw?
-
Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be?
Should be simple to backport.
How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?
Unlikely to cause regressions.
Attachment #8589948 -
Flags: sec-approval?
Comment 12•10 years ago
|
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This sounds kind of bad but hard to exploit so I'm going to set it to sec-high.
Keywords: sec-high
Comment 13•10 years ago
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Please nominate this for Aurora/Beta/esr31 approval when you get a chance.
Comment 14•10 years ago
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BTW, this has conflicts on Aurora, so please do post a rebased patch for that (and beta if necessary).
Updated•10 years ago
|
Comment 15•10 years ago
|
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Comment on attachment 8589948 [details] [diff] [review]
make_jsid_and_value_barriers_symetrical-v0.diff
sec-approval=dveditz
Attachment #8589948 -
Flags: sec-approval? → sec-approval+
Assignee | ||
Comment 17•10 years ago
|
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Comment on attachment 8593542 [details] [diff] [review]
backport_1152177_aurora-v0.diff
[Security approval request comment]
How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch?
Not easily.
Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem?
Not at all.
Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw?
Everything with permanent atoms and incremental gc, which is all of them at this point.
If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw?
n/a
Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be?
Shouldn't be particularly hard to backport.
How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?
Has been on m-i for a week; risk is pretty low.
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: sec-approval?
Comment 18•10 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8593542 [details] [diff] [review]
backport_1152177_aurora-v0.diff
Review of attachment 8593542 [details] [diff] [review]:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This is just a backport of the other patch, right? You don't need a separate sec-approval for it, as the assumption is any adversary could see the m-c checkin. Just flag it for approval-mozilla-aurora.
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: sec-approval?
Assignee | ||
Comment 19•10 years ago
|
||
Comment on attachment 8593542 [details] [diff] [review]
backport_1152177_aurora-v0.diff
NOTE: Please see https://wiki.mozilla.org/Release_Management/B2G_Landing to better understand the B2G approval process and landings.
[Approval Request Comment]
Bug caused by (feature/regressing bug #): ancient
User impact if declined: occasional, rare crashes
Testing completed: 1 week on m-i
Risk to taking this patch (and alternatives if risky): low
String or UUID changes made by this patch: none
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-esr31?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g37?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g34?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g32?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g30?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora?
Updated•10 years ago
|
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g37?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g34?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g32?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-b2g30?
Updated•10 years ago
|
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-esr31?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-esr31+
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-beta+
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora?
Attachment #8593542 -
Flags: approval-mozilla-aurora+
Comment 20•10 years ago
|
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https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-aurora/rev/0100f5c33e38
https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-beta/rev/d79194507f32
The attached patch applies fine to b2g37 as well. Has conflicts from 34 down, though, which Terrence is currently rebasing through.
Comment 21•10 years ago
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Assignee | ||
Comment 22•10 years ago
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Here is a backport for b2g34.
Comment 23•10 years ago
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Assignee | ||
Comment 25•10 years ago
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Finally got this working on on b2g32; sorry for the delay.
Flags: needinfo?(terrence)
Comment 26•10 years ago
|
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Depressingly, esr31 is all different yet again :(
Flags: needinfo?(terrence)
Comment 28•10 years ago
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Updated•10 years ago
|
Whiteboard: [adv-main38+][adv-esr31.7+]
Comment 29•10 years ago
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Reproduced the initial issue on Asan build from 2015-04-07, verified that this issue is fixed using Firefox 31.7.0 ESR build 2 and 38.0 ESR build 1 on Ubuntu 13.10 64-bit.
Updated•10 years ago
|
Group: core-security → core-security-release
Updated•9 years ago
|
Group: core-security-release
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Description
•