1334377 - Symantec: Mis-issued test certificates by CrossCert

Status: RESOLVED FIXED

(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)

Description

[Kathleen Wilson]

From
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/fyJ3EK2YOP8/yvjS5leYCAAJ

I. Misissued certificates for example.com

On 2016-07-14, Symantec misissued the following certificates for example.com:

        https://crt.sh/?sha256=A8F14F52CC1282D7153A13316E7DA39E6AE37B1A10C16288B9024A9B9DC3C4C6
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=8B5956C57FDCF720B6907A4B1BC8CA2E46CD90EAD5C061A426CF48A6117BFBFA
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=94482136A1400BC3A1136FECA3E79D4D200E03DD20B245D19F0E78B5679EAF48
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=C69AB04C1B20E6FC7861C67476CADDA1DAE7A8DCF6E23E15311C2D2794BFCD11

I confirmed with ICANN, the owner of example.com, that they did not
authorize these certificates.  These certificates were already revoked
at the time I found them.


II. Suspicious certificates for domains containing the word "test"

On 2016-11-15 and 2016-10-26, Symantec issued certificates for various
domains containing the word "test" which I strongly suspect were
misissued:

        https://crt.sh/?sha256=b81f339b971eb763cfc686adbac5c164b89ad03f8afb55da9604fd0d416bbd21
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=f45d090e1bf24738a8e86734aa7acf7c9e65b619eb19660b1f73c9973f11b841
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=bcbc26c9e06c4fe1c9e4d55fa27a501c504ea84e23e114b8ac004f7c0776cd0b
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=f0935ce297419cc148bde49a7a123f2b2419cdd52df8e7f49e7bba07fe872559
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=3601ab49034e69d6e2137a80e511a0640252f444b75d6baca7bf4672c35652a5

I have not attempted to contact the owners of these domains for
confirmation, as doing so is probably not feasible (many of the domains
are owned by squatters).  However, the following facts lead to me to
believe that these certificates were misissued:

1. The subject DNs contain clearly bogus values, such as:

        C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=12, OU=1
        C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=1, OU=1
        C=KR, ST=1, L=1, O=12, OU=1
        C=KR, ST=Test1, L=Test, O=Test

Note that the misissued example.com certificates also contain C=KR in
their subjects.

2. The third certificate in the list above contains a SAN for
DNS:*.crosscert.com - note that three of the misissued example.com
certificates contain "Crosscert" in their Subject Organization.

3. None of these certificates have been observed in the wild by Censys.
The live certificate for www.test.com was issued by Network Solutions.

4. The first two certificates in the list above both contain DNS SANs
for *all* of the following domains:

        test.com
        test1.com
        test2.com
        test3.com
        test4.com
        test5.com
        test6.com
        test7.com
        test8.com
        test9.com
        test11.com

With the exception of test4.com and test8.com, these domains are
registered to different entities and appear to be wholly unrelated with
one another in both ownership and operation.  It is unlikely that the
owners of these domains would collaborate to authorize these
certificates.

These certificates were already revoked at the time I found them.


III. Certificates with O=Test

Finally, Symantec has issued a large number of certificates with the
following attributes in the Subject:

        C=KR, ST=test, L=test, O=test, OU=test

e.g.:

        https://crt.sh/?sha256=09AECE5B94BBB8A9EE2152FA6FB7261630124918DA015EB3571508EF6D31DD30
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=CC0A2AE0EF5B1A6CF242D7B4C77AC9F05B49494B42C8486B47804874734CFC1C
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=F177AC0064167354025CE12B3914A0E056628DD31152B5DF22E41913FC9D9B45
        https://crt.sh/?sha256=DA7B1D433C071DA7A389EE2A4CAB854B89E441277B41E608F05FB7C7C6B2A761

For more, see:

        https://crt.sh/?O=test

I doubt there is an organization named "test" located in "test, Korea."

Regards,
Andrew

Comment 1

[Kathleen Wilson]

Attachment: Symantec Certificate Problem Report Jan 26 2017.pdf

Update provided by Symantec.

Comment 2

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Report of Independent Accountant - Certisign

Comment 3

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: CERTSUPERIOR 2016 WebTrust

Comment 4

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Deloitte Point in Time Certsuperior

Comment 5

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Deloitte Certsuperior Annex A

Comment 6

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Symantec Responses to Misissuance Questions Jan 30 2017

Comment 7

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Symantec Second Response to Misissuance Questions - Feb 12 2017

Comment 8

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Symantec Third Response to Misissuance Questions Feb 17 2017

Comment 9

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Symantec Fourth Response to Misissuance Questions Mar 3 2017

Comment 10

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: All Audits

Comment 11

[Peter Gervai]

https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/03/google-takes-symantec-to-the-woodshed-for-mis-issuing-30000-https-certs/

Comment 12

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Certisign CY2012 WTCA

Certisign's CY2012 WTCA audit

Comment 13

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: CrossCert 2015-2016 WTBR Audit

WebTrust SSL Baseline for CrossCert 7/2015-6/2016

Comment 14

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Certsuperior 5-2015 4-2016 Corrected Scope

Previously posted Deloitte audit of Certsuperior incorrectly stated scope as WT SSL Baseline only.

Comment 15

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Mozilla Feedback Consolidated Responses

Comment 16

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Aetna WTCA 2015

Comment 17

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Aetna WTBR 2015

Comment 18

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: Symantec Response to Further Questions from Mozilla

Comment 19

[Steven Medin]

Attachment: SSP PROF Common Policy v1.7

Comment 20

[Gervase Markham [:gerv]]

This bug was resolved by the action we decided to take regarding Symantec.

Gerv