PKIoverheid: TSP KPN Findings in 2025 ETSI Audit - Incident Report #7 – Change Management
Categories
(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: pkioverheid, Assigned: pkioverheid, NeedInfo)
Details
(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [audit-finding])
Preliminary Incident Report
Summary
- Incident Description:
- Minor Non-conformity: Change Management
- Relevant Policies:
- ETSI 319 401 (REQ-7.7-03, -04)
- Source of incident disclosure:
- Annual ETSI Audit
Updated•5 months ago
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| Assignee | ||
Comment 1•4 months ago
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Full Incident Report - ETSI Finding #7 - Change Management
Summary
-
CA Owner CCADB unique ID: A000068
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Incident description: The CAB noted that the established change management procedures weren’t always followed for system configuration changes. For Ansible changes a separate procedure had been devised but this hadn’t been formalized within KPN at the time of the audit. This was filed as a minor non-conformity on the audit statement.
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Timeline summary:
-
Non-compliance start date: 11-Jul-2025
-
Non-compliance identified date: 11-Jul-2025
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Non-compliance end date: Ongoing
-
-
Relevant policies:
-
ETSI 319 401 REQ-7.7-03: Change control procedures shall be applied for releases, modifications and emergency software fixes of any operational software and changes to the configuration which applies the TSP's security policy
-
ETSI 319 401 REQ-7.7-04: The procedures shall include documentation of the changes.
-
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Source of incident disclosure: Finding by CAB during annual ETSI audit
Impact
-
Total number of certificates: N/A
-
Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: N/A
-
Affected certificate types: N/A
-
Incident heuristic: N/A
-
Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?: N/A (see point below)
-
Analysis: N/A
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Additional considerations: KPN only operates legacy S/MIME-capable CAs, which have not issued any S/MIME certificates since 1 August 2023. At that time this was changed due to updated S/MIME regulations, under which email addresses and the EKU
emailProtectionwere no longer included in publicly trusted certificates.
Timeline
-
Sep-2024: During an assessment it was determined devops changes should be registered in service management tooling.
-
11-Jul-2025: Auditor identifies finding
-
17-Jul-2025: Created Corrective Action Plan
-
12-Aug-2025: Corrective Action Plan Approved by auditor
Related Incidents
N/A
Root Cause Analysis
Contributing Factor 1: API interface of service management tooling not yet operational
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Description: During an assessment in 2024 it was determined devops changes should be registered in the main service management tooling. KPN was not aware that this was a noncompliance, as the devops changes are implemented via a controlled procedure. Because manually registering all of these changes was deemed undesirable due to the chance of errors or omission, a solution was devised in which the changes would be automatically forwared from Ansible to the main service management tooling. However, this would require significant time. For this, an internal exception was granted by KPN management, but the CAB noted that the current implementation was not in line with the ETSI requirements in EN 319 401.
-
Timeline: See main timeline
-
Detection: Audit finding by CAB.
-
Interaction with other factors: No.
-
Root Cause Analysis methodology used: N/A
Lessons Learned
-
What went well: Devops changes are implemented via a controlled procedure and this was registered with KPN management
-
What didn’t go well: N/A
-
Where we got lucky: N/A
-
Additional: N/A
Action Items
| Action Item | Kind | Corresponding Root Cause(s) | Evaluation Criteria | Due Date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Implement API to maintain DevOps changes. | Mitigate/Detect | Root Cause # 1 | Implementation of API and report back | 2026-01-11 | In progress |
Appendix
N/A
| Assignee | ||
Comment 2•4 months ago
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PKIoverheid is monitoring this bug and we're open for additional questions or remarks people might have. Currently we don't have any updates with regards to the Action Items.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 3•3 months ago
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PKIoverheid is (still) monitoring this bug and we're open for additional questions or remarks people might have. Currently we don't have any updates with regards to the Action Items.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 4•2 months ago
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PKIoverheid is (still) monitoring this bug and we're open for additional questions or remarks people might have. Currently we don't have any updates with regards to the Action Items.
Comment 5•1 month ago
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Could you confirm whether the NCSSRs were impacted by this bug and why they weren’t listed under ‘Relevant Policies’?
| Assignee | ||
Comment 6•1 month ago
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Hi Dustin, thanks for your reply. The NCSSRs were in scope for this audit (specifically version 2.0.3). The audit criteria under "relevant policies" bullet in this bug were directly taken from the audit report (statement of non-conformity). As to why the CAB didn't include the NCSSRs for this specific finding, we're not exactly sure, so KPN has asked the CAB (BSI) for clarification. This might take a few days. Thanks.
Comment 7•1 month ago
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Thank you for confirming that NCSSRs v2.0.3 were in scope. For transparency, please clarify whether this finding relates to a non‑conformity with the NCSSRs and update the “Relevant Policies” section to reflect that.
I understand the CAB may not have listed the NCSSRs directly. At the same time, it is important for the CA to show its own awareness of these requirements, rather than relying only on the auditor’s report.
Comment 8•1 month ago
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As a reminder, the CCADB Incident Reporting Guidelines set an expectation for timely engagement with the community. A request was made in Comment 7 and does not appear to have been responded to.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 9•1 month ago
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Hi all,
Apologies for the delay. We have gotten a response from BSI (the CAB) regarding the applicability of NetSec in general with regards to this audit finding and together with KPN have made an assessment about the applicability of specific NCCSR requirements. Our questions to BSI and their answer are posted below verbatim accompanied by our our assessment below that.
1. Should NCSSRs be explicitly mentioned in the report for this type of finding?
The audit was conducted as an assertion-based audit, where KPN confirmed compliance with the applicable requirements outlined in the Statement of Applicability and the Overview of Applicability. These requirements include ETSI standards, NCSSRs, and the PKIoverheid Programme of Requirements, among others. For reporting purposes, each non-conformity is referenced against the requirement that most directly addresses the issue. In this case, ETSI EN 319 401 REQ-7.7-01 fully covers the observed condition (unsupported software). Referencing ETSI ensures clarity and consistency in the report, while all applicable criteria were evaluated during the audit.
2. Do you consider this non-conformity a breach of NCSSRs, or is reporting under ETSI sufficient?
The non-conformity also falls under NCSSR obligations (e.g., timely remediation of unsupported components) and PKIOverheid requirements. The audit team reviewed all applicable frameworks as part of the full-scope audit required by, for example, Mozilla Root Store Policy and Microsoft Trusted Root Certificate Program requirements. For reporting purposes, the finding was mapped to ETSI EN 319 401 because it most directly addresses the issue. This does not diminish the relevance of other frameworks, which remain part of the audit scope. In general, a TSP should ensure that any corrective action plan addresses compliance across all obligations.
As to the specific NCCSR criteria applicable to this finding, we’ve concluded that "1.3 – Change Management" is applicable in this case. We’ll update this bug accordingly.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 10•1 month ago
|
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As indicated in our previous post we hereby restate our incident report, now fully reflecting the applicable audit criteria including the NCSSRs. All other information is unchanged compared to the original report (comment #1)
Full Incident Report - ETSI Finding #7 - Change Management
Summary
-
CA Owner CCADB unique ID: A000068
-
Incident description: The CAB noted that the established change management procedures weren’t always followed for system configuration changes. For Ansible changes a separate procedure had been devised but this hadn’t been formalized within KPN at the time of the audit. This was filed as a minor non-conformity on the audit statement.
-
Timeline summary:
-
Non-compliance start date: 11-Jul-2025
-
Non-compliance identified date: 11-Jul-2025
-
Non-compliance end date: Ongoing
-
-
Relevant policies:
-
ETSI 319 401 REQ-7.7-03: Change control procedures shall be applied for releases, modifications and emergency software fixes of any operational software and changes to the configuration which applies the TSP's security policy
-
ETSI 319 401 REQ-7.7-04: The procedures shall include documentation of the changes.
-
Network and Certificate System Security Requirements section 1.3 - Change management: [...]The CA MUST ensure that all changes are completed in accordance with such a change management process for: [...] CA Infrastructure."
-
-
Source of incident disclosure: Finding by CAB during annual ETSI audit
Impact
-
Total number of certificates: N/A
-
Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: N/A
-
Affected certificate types: N/A
-
Incident heuristic: N/A
-
Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?: N/A (see point below)
-
Analysis: N/A
-
Additional considerations: KPN only operates legacy S/MIME-capable CAs, which have not issued any S/MIME certificates since 1 August 2023. At that time this was changed due to updated S/MIME regulations, under which email addresses and the EKU
emailProtectionwere no longer included in publicly trusted certificates.
Timeline
-
Sep-2024: During an assessment it was determined devops changes should be registered in service management tooling.
-
11-Jul-2025: Auditor identifies finding
-
17-Jul-2025: Created Corrective Action Plan
-
12-Aug-2025: Corrective Action Plan Approved by auditor
Related Incidents
N/A
Root Cause Analysis
Contributing Factor 1: API interface of service management tooling not yet operational
-
Description: During an assessment in 2024 it was determined devops changes should be registered in the main service management tooling. KPN was not aware that this was a noncompliance, as the devops changes are implemented via a controlled procedure. Because manually registering all of these changes was deemed undesirable due to the chance of errors or omission, a solution was devised in which the changes would be automatically forwared from Ansible to the main service management tooling. However, this would require significant time. For this, an internal exception was granted by KPN management, but the CAB noted that the current implementation was not in line with the ETSI requirements in EN 319 401.
-
Timeline: See main timeline
-
Detection: Audit finding by CAB.
-
Interaction with other factors: No.
-
Root Cause Analysis methodology used: N/A
Lessons Learned
-
What went well: Devops changes are implemented via a controlled procedure and this was registered with KPN management
-
What didn’t go well: N/A
-
Where we got lucky: N/A
-
Additional: N/A
Action Items
| Action Item | Kind | Corresponding Root Cause(s) | Evaluation Criteria | Due Date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Implement API to maintain DevOps changes. | Mitigate/Detect | Root Cause # 1 | Implementation of API and report back | 2026-01-11 | In progress |
Appendix
N/A
Comment 11•24 days ago
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Implementation is on schedule. No further updates.
Comment 12•10 days ago
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This report has gone stale. As a reminder, CA Owners may request the “Next update” Whiteboard field be set by a Root Store Operator to align with a specific date related to an open Action Item.
Comment 13•9 days ago
|
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PKIoverheid is monitoring this bug and we're open for additional questions or remarks people might have. Currently we don't have any updates with regards to the Action Items.
Description
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