firefox ipc principal validation gap in RecvBlobURLDataRequest
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: 1seal, Unassigned)
References
()
Details
(Keywords: ai-involved, reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])
Attachments
(1 file)
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14.06 KB,
application/zip
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Details |
hey folks,
ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest accepts aTriggeringPrincipal and aLoadingPrincipal from the content process and forwards them to BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry without ValidatePrincipal checks. this creates a principal-forgery path where compromised content-process code can influence ACL decisions for blob data access.
severity
MEDIUM
cvss (suggested): CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N (6.1)
impact
a compromised content process can request blob data across origin boundaries by supplying forged principals to an IPC handler that does not validate them before ACL evaluation. this is a confidentiality issue at the ipc trust boundary.
attacker model
attacker controls execution in a compromised content process and can send crafted PContent::BlobURLDataRequest messages with forged principal arguments.
relevant links
- repository: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev
- commit: 5836a062726f715fda621338a17b51aff30d0a8c
- callsite permalink: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/blob/5836a062726f715fda621338a17b51aff30d0a8c/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#L7458
- acl sink permalink: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/blob/5836a062726f715fda621338a17b51aff30d0a8c/dom/file/uri/BlobURLProtocolHandler.cpp#L855
- validated comparator path: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/blob/5836a062726f715fda621338a17b51aff30d0a8c/dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp#L5845
vulnerability details
RecvBlobURLDataRequest does not validate principals received over IPC. in contrast, nearby handler RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration performs ValidatePrincipal(aPrincipal, {ValidatePrincipalOptions::AllowSystem}) before use. in GetDataEntry, the unvalidated principal is used in Subsumes ACL logic and system-principal branching.
proof of concept
canonical:
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
if [ -d "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001" ]; then cd "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001"; fi
bash ./canonical.sh
output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:7458 ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest
[PROOF_MARKER]: missing_validate_principal=true triggering_principal_validated=false loading_principal_validated=false acl_sink=BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry
control:
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
if [ -d "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001" ]; then cd "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001"; fi
bash ./control.sh
control output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:5838 ContentParent::RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration
[NC_MARKER]: validate_principal_present=true forged_principal_blocked=true
expected: principal arguments from child IPC should be validated before ACL-relevant use.
actual: principal arguments are consumed without ValidatePrincipal in RecvBlobURLDataRequest.
remediation
validate both aTriggeringPrincipal and aLoadingPrincipal in RecvBlobURLDataRequest before forwarding to BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry, matching the validated pattern used in neighboring handlers.
fix accepted when: both IPC principal inputs in RecvBlobURLDataRequest are validated before ACL use and regression coverage prevents reintroduction.
attachments: poc.zip (attached)
credit: 1seal (https://github.com/1seal)
best,
oleh
Updated•9 months ago
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Updated•9 months ago
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Description
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