Closed Bug 2015286 Opened 9 months ago Closed 9 months ago

firefox ipc principal validation gap in RecvBlobURLDataRequest

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)

defect

Tracking

()

RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 2014103

People

(Reporter: 1seal, Unassigned)

References

()

Details

(Keywords: ai-involved, reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])

Attachments

(1 file)

Attached file poc.zip —

hey folks,

ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest accepts aTriggeringPrincipal and aLoadingPrincipal from the content process and forwards them to BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry without ValidatePrincipal checks. this creates a principal-forgery path where compromised content-process code can influence ACL decisions for blob data access.

severity

MEDIUM

cvss (suggested): CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N (6.1)

impact

a compromised content process can request blob data across origin boundaries by supplying forged principals to an IPC handler that does not validate them before ACL evaluation. this is a confidentiality issue at the ipc trust boundary.

attacker model

attacker controls execution in a compromised content process and can send crafted PContent::BlobURLDataRequest messages with forged principal arguments.

relevant links

vulnerability details

RecvBlobURLDataRequest does not validate principals received over IPC. in contrast, nearby handler RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration performs ValidatePrincipal(aPrincipal, {ValidatePrincipalOptions::AllowSystem}) before use. in GetDataEntry, the unvalidated principal is used in Subsumes ACL logic and system-principal branching.

proof of concept

canonical:

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
if [ -d "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001" ]; then cd "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001"; fi
bash ./canonical.sh

output (excerpt):

[CALLSITE_HIT]: dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:7458 ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest
[PROOF_MARKER]: missing_validate_principal=true triggering_principal_validated=false loading_principal_validated=false acl_sink=BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry

control:

unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
if [ -d "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001" ]; then cd "poc-F-FIREFOX-IPC-001"; fi
bash ./control.sh

control output (excerpt):

[CALLSITE_HIT]: dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:5838 ContentParent::RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration
[NC_MARKER]: validate_principal_present=true forged_principal_blocked=true

expected: principal arguments from child IPC should be validated before ACL-relevant use.
actual: principal arguments are consumed without ValidatePrincipal in RecvBlobURLDataRequest.

remediation

validate both aTriggeringPrincipal and aLoadingPrincipal in RecvBlobURLDataRequest before forwarding to BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry, matching the validated pattern used in neighboring handlers.

fix accepted when: both IPC principal inputs in RecvBlobURLDataRequest are validated before ACL use and regression coverage prevents reintroduction.

attachments: poc.zip (attached)

credit: 1seal (https://github.com/1seal)

best,
oleh

Flags: sec-bounty?
Group: firefox-core-security → dom-core-security
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 9 months ago
Component: Security → DOM: Content Processes
Duplicate of bug: 2014103
Product: Firefox → Core
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Flags: sec-bounty? → sec-bounty-
Group: dom-core-security
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