Trivial to Access Saved Passwords
Categories
(Firefox :: Security, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: aaron, Unassigned)
Details
(Keywords: reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])
Firefox makes saved password exposure trivially easy through multiple attack vectors, including a built-in "Reveal Password" context menu option that requires no technical knowledge whatsoever.
Vulnerability Details
Firefox provides the easiest attack surface of any major browser:
Method 1: Built-in Context Menu
- Right-click directly on any auto-filled password field
- Select "Reveal Password" from the context menu
- The password is immediately displayed
This requires zero technical knowledge and can be performed in under 3 seconds.
Method 2: Developer Tools
- Right-click the password field and select "Inspect"
- Change
type="password"totype="text" - The saved password is visible
Method 3: JavaScript Bookmarklet
- Press
Cmd+Shift+B(Mac) orCtrl+Shift+B(Windows/Linux) to show the bookmarks toolbar if it's hidden - Right-click on the bookmarks toolbar and select Add Bookmark...
- In the Name field, enter:
Show Passwords - In the URL field, paste the entire bookmarklet code below
- Click Save
- Now click on the bookmark on any page that contains a password field to reveal the password in plaintext.
javascript:(function(){document.querySelectorAll('input[type="password"]').forEach(function(el){el.type='text';});})();
Steps to Reproduce
- Navigate to any website where Firefox has saved credentials
- Allow Firefox to auto-fill the password field
- Right-click the password field
- Select "Reveal Password"
- Observe the saved password displayed in plain text
Expected Behaviour
The "Reveal Password" context menu should not appear for password manager-populated fields or should reveal and empty box.
Actual Behaviour
Any user with physical access can reveal saved passwords with a single right-click. If that did not exist, they could use developer tools or a bookmarklet to reveal the password in plaintext.
Security Impact
Severity: Critical
Firefox's "Reveal Password" feature transforms credential theft into a trivial operation requiring:
- No technical knowledge
- No tools or preparation
- Less than 3 seconds of access
This is particularly dangerous because:
- Shared computers are extremely vulnerable
- The attack is so simple anyone can perform it
- There is no authentication barrier
- There is no audit trail
Suggested Remediation
- Remove or disable "Reveal Password" for password manager-populated fields
- Block DOM manipulation from revealing password manager values
- Block JavaScript access to password manager-populated values
Comment 1•9 months ago
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Method 2 and 3 exist in every desktop browser. Method 1 doesn't appear to be working as it should (bug 1967681), but given the other two methods it will only restrict people without much technical knowledge. The better approach would be to prevent the auto-filling without user authorization in the first place. That would work against method 2 and 3 as well, unless someone filled in their password and suddenly had to run off without submitting it
| Reporter | ||
Comment 2•9 months ago
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Yes, method 2 and 3 do exist in other browsers (have made a report elsewhere).
Just to clarify this: there is no intention to fix 2 and 3?
Comment 3•8 months ago
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options 2 and 3 would break thousands of web sites that depend on this functionality. It simply will not happen; no browser will do it. The best thing we have to offer is an alternative mechanism that does not rely on passwords: "passkeys". But it's up to web sites to switch over to using them.
| Reporter | ||
Comment 4•8 months ago
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I appreciate that my original remediation was a little terse and oversimplified, but I don't think that a fix would need to break the login functionality of any website that uses JavaScript. The desired behaviour would be:
- JavaScript cannot show or log the value from a password field that was populated by the password manager. The most simple way to do this is: if a password manager populates a password field with the value 'myPassword', then ensure that the JavaScript engine will not log that value to the console or JS alert, nor allow that value to be added to the DOM after the password manager value has activated.
I'm not familiar with the Firefox codebase, but there are many ways that this outcome could be achieved: allowing JavaScript to send the password to a login service (with the username), but prevent it from easily showing the details to the user.
I'm unclear on how option 2 would break any website? Why should you be able to change any password field that has been populated by the password manager into a plain text field? How would that break any existing website?
Finally, I do not have faith in passkeys, I think they will prove to be a failure. Explaining a password to a non-technical user is easy. Explaining MFA to a non-technical user is easy. Explaining passkeys to a non-technical user, where would you even start? Some magical process that 'just' logs you in? Try mentioning public-private key cryptography to a non-technical person and they've already stopped listening. It's just too weird to a 'normal' user and is too flawed (How do you log in from a difference device? What do you mean that I need to sync / back-up my keys?). Not to mention that you often need to log in with your password to set up your passkey in the first place.
Perhaps this comment won't age well, but I'll state here publicly that I think passkeys are dead on arrival. Much simpler to use a decent password manager such as KeePass and sync the file to different devices. But that's the problem with this issue: most people who are using the password manager in a web browser are, in my estimation, unlikely to be very technical in the first place. But a user's lack of technical experience does not remove software vendors responsibility to do their best to protect them and their data.
Description
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