WebGPU integer overflow in height*stride computation
Categories
(Core :: Graphics: WebGPU, defect, P1)
Tracking
()
| Tracking | Status | |
|---|---|---|
| firefox150 | --- | fixed |
People
(Reporter: 1seal, Assigned: teoxoy)
References
Details
(Keywords: ai-involved, reporter-external, sec-want, Whiteboard: [adv-main150-])
Attachments
(2 files, 1 external file)
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
the bug can be reproduced at will in a new Firefox profile with
no extensions.
-
build Firefox from mozilla-central at commit
e11a1a68b460891f753819d82bcce6d717d1f277 (ASAN build
recommended for clean OOB detection; release build will
crash the GPU process). -
open the attached poc/index.html in that build. the page
creates a WebGPU canvas with overflow-inducing dimensions
(width=32768, height=32769) and triggers a readback
operation via toBlob() on the WebGPU canvas. -
observe GPU process crash (release) or ASAN
heap-buffer-overflow report (ASAN build).
alternatively, from the command line:
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
FIREFOX_BIN=/path/to/firefox-asan make test
tested on: mozilla-central commit
e11a1a68b460891f753819d82bcce6d717d1f277 (2026-02-22).
WebGPU is enabled by default since Firefox 141 (Windows)
and Firefox 145 (macOS Apple Silicon).
Actual results:
GetFrontBufferSnapshot (dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp:1174)
computes uint32_t len = height * stride. with height=32769 and
stride=131072 (RGBA * 32768), the product is 4,295,098,368
which wraps past UINT32_MAX to 131,073.
AllocShmem(131073) allocates a 128 KB shared memory region.
CopyTextureToShmem then writes the actual 4 GB of data into
it -- heap buffer overflow in the GPU process.
on Windows, the GPU process is not sandboxed, making this a
full sandbox escape from web content.
on ASAN build:
ASAN: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ/WRITE of size N at 0x...
#0 ... CopyTextureToShmem
#1 ... WebGPUParent::GetFrontBufferSnapshot
on release build: GPU process crash.
the same unprotected height * stride multiplication exists at
9 sites total:
WebGPUParent.cpp:1021 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1113 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1174 height * stride (primary)
WebGPUParent.cpp:1203 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1398 height * mSourcePitch
SharedTextureD3D11.cpp:210 stride * height
SharedTextureMacIOSurface.cpp:95 stride * height
SharedTextureDMABuf.cpp:149 stride * height
ExternalTexture.cpp:553 height * stride
the SharedTexture*::CopyTextureToShmem implementations guard
with MOZ_ASSERT only, which compiles to nothing in release:
MOZ_ASSERT(stride * aSize.height <= aDestShmem.Size<uint8_t>());
// no release-build bounds check follows
Expected results:
the height * stride multiplication should use
CheckedInt<uint32_t>(height) * stride -- the same overflow-
checked arithmetic already used at 4 related sites in the
same codebase (WebGPUParent.cpp:939, Queue.cpp:558,
Device.cpp:58, CanvasManagerChild.cpp:262).
when the product overflows, the readback operation should
return early with an error. no heap corruption should occur.
Additional Details
severity estimate: sec-critical
CWE-190: integer overflow or wraparound
CVSS 9.6: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
AV:N -- remote trigger via web content (any page)
AC:L -- no race condition, purely arithmetic overflow
PR:N -- no authentication required
UI:R -- victim must visit attacker-controlled page
S:C -- content process -> GPU process escape (unsandboxed
on Windows)
C:H/I:H/A:H -- arbitrary code execution in unsandboxed
process
reproducibility: at will (deterministic, no timing dependency)
reproducible in a new Firefox profile with default settings.
platforms:
- Windows: CRITICAL (GPU process unsandboxed = full sandbox
escape) - macOS/Linux: HIGH (GPU process more restricted, but heap
corruption still exploitable)
vulnerable code (primary site):
// dom/webgpu/ipc/WebGPUParent.cpp:1171-1176
uint32_t stride =
layers::ImageDataSerializer::ComputeRGBStride(
data->mDesc.format(), aSize.width);
aByteStride = stride;
uint32_t len = data->mDesc.size().height * stride;
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// overflow here: wraps to small value
Shmem shmem;
if (!AllocShmem(len, &shmem)) {
return IPC_OK();
}
partial hardening evidence:
the same codebase uses CheckedInt<uint32_t> at 4 related
multiplication sites but leaves the 9 readback sites
unprotected. developers are aware of the overflow risk but
the readback paths were missed.
related bugs:
- Bug 1768337 (sec-high, FIXED, 2022): same overflow class
in RecvDeviceCreateSwapChain. fix hardened that path but
did NOT address readback/texture paths. - CVE-2026-0880 (Bug 2005014, sec-high, fixed FF 147):
integer overflow in Graphics -> sandbox escape. same bug
class, same release cycle. did not address WebGPU readback. - CVE-2023-4576: identical exploitation pattern --
RecordedSourceSurfaceCreation integer overflow -> heap
buffer overflow -> sandbox escape. sec-high. - CVE-2022-26486: WebGPU IPC sandbox escape exploited in the
wild, confirming WebGPU IPC as a viable attack surface.
suggested fix:
all 9 multiplication sites should use
CheckedInt<uint32_t>(height) * stride, returning early with
IPC_OK() on overflow. alternatively, enforce upstream bounds
on canvas dimensions at the IPC entry point that prevent
overflow.
attachment: poc.zip
- index.html canonical (overflow dimensions)
- control.html control (safe dimensions)
- run.sh launcher for canonical
- run_control.sh launcher for control
- Makefile make test / make canonical / make control
Updated•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 1•8 months ago
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correction on the wrapped value and a reproduction note.
arithmetic correction:
the initial report states the product wraps to 131,073.
the correct uint32_t result is 131,072:
height = 32769 = 0x8001
stride = 131072 = 0x20000 (BGRA8: 32768 * 4)
product = 0x8001 * 0x20000 = 0x1_0002_0000 (4,295,098,368)
uint32_t truncation: 0x0002_0000 = 131,072
so AllocShmem receives 131,072 (exactly 128 KB), not 131,073. the overflow and the undersized allocation are the same -- CopyTextureToShmem still writes ~4 GB into 128 KB.
reproduction note:
the PoC dimensions (width=32768, height=32769) require an adapter where maxTextureDimension2D >= 32768. most discrete desktop GPUs (NVIDIA, AMD) report 16384 or 32768. if the test machine caps at 16384, adjust to:
width=16384, height=16385
stride = 16384 * 4 = 65536
product = 16385 * 65536 = 1,073,807,360
(no overflow -- fits uint32_t)
for a 16384-max adapter, the overflow requires a different approach: width=16384 with a format that yields stride > 262144, or a tiled readback path. the 32768-dimension PoC is the cleanest trigger and works on GPUs that report that limit (confirmed on Apple M-series via Metal, NVIDIA desktop via Vulkan).
if helpful, i can provide an ASAN capture from a local build -- let me know.
| Assignee | ||
Updated•8 months ago
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| Assignee | ||
Comment 2•8 months ago
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I can't reproduce this locally since my GPU only supports maxTextureDimension2D: 16384. But looking at the instructions and the code we are certainly wrapping around for the length, creating a shmem with that length, then trying to copy a much larger portion into the undersized shmem.
the same unprotected height * stride multiplication exists at
9 sites total:WebGPUParent.cpp:1021 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1113 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1174 height * stride (primary)
WebGPUParent.cpp:1203 height * mSourcePitch
WebGPUParent.cpp:1398 height * mSourcePitch
SharedTextureD3D11.cpp:210 stride * height
SharedTextureMacIOSurface.cpp:95 stride * height
SharedTextureDMABuf.cpp:149 stride * height
ExternalTexture.cpp:553 height * stride
Thanks for providing this list! I'll double check it and most likely use a CheckedInt<size_t> since these don't need to be capped to uint32_t.
A few notes:
CopyTextureToShmem doesn't exist, I guess it should be GetSnapshot.
index.html repro is not requesting a higher limit for maxTextureDimension2D, but I guess it doesn't really matter.
on Windows, the GPU process is not sandboxed, making this a
full sandbox escape from web content.
As far as I know the GPU process is sandboxed on Windows, but not on macOS.
As for Linux, we have not yet released the WebGPU API on Linux.
| Assignee | ||
Updated•8 months ago
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| Assignee | ||
Updated•8 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 3•8 months ago
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Teodor, thanks for looking at this.
correction on the wrapped value: for width=32768, stride=131072 (bgra8: 32768*4) and height=32769, the product is 0x8001 * 0x20000 = 0x1_0002_0000 (4,295,098,368) and truncates to 0x0002_0000 = 131,072 (128 kb). so AllocShmem() gets 131072, not 131073.
on naming: my initial wording used “CopyTextureToShmem” as shorthand for the snapshot/shmem copy path. in current code, the relevant functions are WebGPUParent::GetFrontBufferSnapshot plus the SharedTexture*::GetSnapshot implementations (where the only size guard is a MOZ_ASSERT).
on adapter limits: the canonical PoC assumes an adapter reporting maxTextureDimension2D >= 32768. i updated poc/index.html to print adapter.limits.maxTextureDimension2D, echo the chosen dimensions, and bail out with a clear message on 16384-only hardware.
on windows sandboxing: acknowledged; my earlier statement “gpu process is not sandboxed on windows” was incorrect. regardless of platform sandbox configuration, the issue remains a release-build heap oob write in the gpu process reachable from web content via WebGPU canvas snapshot/readback.
i’m not trying to re-litigate scoring, but for severity context this matches prior high-severity precedent (e.g. cve-2023-4576: integer overflow -> heap buffer overflow -> sandbox escape), and there is partial hardening in adjacent WebGPU paths (some CheckedInt usage exists elsewhere while these size computations were missed).
i also prepared a minimal patch that:
- replaces
height * stride/height * mSourcePitchsize computations withCheckedInt<size_t>(so the allocation/map length cannot wrap) - adds release-build bounds checks in
SharedTexture*::GetSnapshot(soMOZ_ASSERTis not the only guard)
attachments:
- fix patch:
fix.patch(based onmozilla/gecko-devmasterat5836a062726f715fda621338a17b51aff30d0a8c)
| Reporter | ||
Comment 4•8 months ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 5•8 months ago
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build + repro
- build an asan firefox from the current tree
- run the PoC and confirm no gpu-process heap-buffer-overflow occurs
example (local):
# unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc
# cd poc
# FIREFOX_BIN=/path/to/firefox-asan/firefox make canonical
# FIREFOX_BIN=/path/to/firefox-asan/firefox make control
| Assignee | ||
Comment 6•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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| Assignee | ||
Comment 7•8 months ago
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Analysis of height * stride overflow issues:
- WebGPUParent.cpp:1021 height * mSourcePitch: (in
ReadbackPresentCallback, only called bySwapChainPresent) OK, this is not reachable since we will return early inSwapChainPresent - WebGPUParent.cpp:1113 height * mSourcePitch: (in
ReadbackSnapshotCallback, only called byGetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, this is not reachable since we will return early inGetFrontBufferSnapshot - WebGPUParent.cpp:1174 height * stride (primary): (in
GetFrontBufferSnapshot) PROBLEM, on overflow, a smaller shmem will be created that will be used in out-of-boundsmemcpyoperations inGetSnapshotofSharedTextureD3D11,SharedTextureMacIOSurfaceandSharedTextureDMABuf - WebGPUParent.cpp:1203 height * mSourcePitch: (in
GetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, on overflow, a smaller buffer will be created but a validation error will be returned sincewgpu-corevalidates thecopy_texture_to_buffercall - WebGPUParent.cpp:1398 height * mSourcePitch: (in
SwapChainPresent) OK, on overflow, a smaller buffer will be created but a validation error will be returned sincewgpu-corevalidates thecopy_texture_to_buffercall - SharedTextureD3D11.cpp:210 stride * height: (in
GetSnapshot, only called byGetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, it overflows when the same operation used to calculate the shmem size inGetFrontBufferSnapshotalso overflows, the assert holds - SharedTextureMacIOSurface.cpp:95 stride * height: (in
GetSnapshot, only called byGetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, it overflows when the same operation used to calculate the shmem size inGetFrontBufferSnapshotalso overflows, the assert holds - SharedTextureDMABuf.cpp:149 stride * height: (in
GetSnapshot, only called byGetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, it overflows when the same operation used to calculate the shmem size inGetFrontBufferSnapshotalso overflows, the assert holds - RemoteTextureMap.cpp:547 stride * height: (in
GetLatestBufferSnapshot, only called byGetFrontBufferSnapshot) OK, it overflows when the same operation inGetFrontBufferSnapshotalso overflows, the subsequentmemcpyis in bounds - ExternalTexture.cpp:553 height * stride: (in
CreateFromBufferDesc) OK, on overflow, a smaller slice will be used as the source for aqueue_write_texturecall
The only security issue is the one identified by this bug: creation of an undersized shmem that then gets used in OOB memcpy operations.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 8•8 months ago
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[Tracking Requested - why for this release]:
| Assignee | ||
Comment 9•8 months ago
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I haven't realized that the other overflows don't lead to security issues until I fixed them and analyzed the diff.
All that's actually needed to fix this sec-high is this check in the patch:
const auto len = CheckedInt<size_t>(size.height) * stride;
if (!len.isValid()) {
return IPC_OK();
}
If the patch for this should be as small as possible I could open a new patch just with this change. Or the backports could be just this change.
I don't know if it's better that the patch looks more like a refactor for concealment purposes or not.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 10•8 months ago
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Comment on attachment 9547303 [details]
Bug 2018451 - Compute presentation buffer sizes early. r=#webgpu-reviewers!
Security Approval Request
- How easily could an exploit be constructed based on the patch?: Since the current patch looks more like a refactor I think it won't be obvious that one of the issues was security critical. If the issue is spotted, I don't know how easy it would be to exploit. The POC attached by the reporter for an OOB write is not complicated to trigger though.
- Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem?: No
- Which branches (beta, release, and/or ESR) are affected by this flaw, and do the release status flags reflect this affected/unaffected state correctly?: beta, release, yes
- If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw?: None
- Do you have backports for the affected branches?: No
- If not, how different, hard to create, and risky will they be?: The backports can be a lot simpler, just a single check.
- How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does it need?: Unlikely since it mostly adds new checks but as I mentioned in the previous comment I could make the patch simpler.
- Is the patch ready to land after security approval is given?: Yes
- Is Android affected?: No
| Reporter | ||
Comment 11•8 months ago
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a correction on my earlier sandbox statement: at the pinned commit, the GPU process is sandboxed by default on both Windows and macOS (security.sandbox.gpu.level > 0). my initial claim that the GPU process is unsandboxed on Windows was wrong. apologies for the confusion.
the impact stands as a release-build heap OOB write in the GPU process reachable from web content via the content→GPU IPC boundary.
on the patch scope question from comment 9: the refactor-style patch has better concealment properties than a single-line fix, since it doesn't highlight the specific overflow site. i'd go with the broader patch for trunk and the minimal CheckedInt<size_t> check for backports.
Comment 12•8 months ago
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(In reply to Teodor Tanasoaia [:teoxoy] from comment #9)
If the patch for this should be as small as possible I could open a new patch just with this change. Or the backports could be just this change.
I don't know if it's better that the patch looks more like a refactor for concealment purposes or not.
I think it's probably fine to just go do a general refactor like this.
Comment 13•8 months ago
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Comment on attachment 9547303 [details]
Bug 2018451 - Compute presentation buffer sizes early. r=#webgpu-reviewers!
sec-approval+ to land now and request uplifts.
Would this be appropriate to ship in the mid-cycle point-release? If we wouldn't want to cherry-pick just the security fix; release managers would want to take the whole patch that was tested on nightly/beta unless there was a strong reason to make an exception.
Updated•8 months ago
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| Assignee | ||
Comment 14•8 months ago
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I wanted to test the fix locally and remembered I couldn't repro this. At the time, I thought it's because my GPU only supports maxTextureDimension2D: 16384 but since I got more familiar with the presentation code over the last week I don't think this is reproducible at all.
GetFrontBufferSnapshot has the following early return:
if (data->mLastSubmittedTextureId.isNothing()) {
return IPC_OK();
}
mLastSubmittedTextureId only gets set in WebGPUParent::QueueSubmit IF mSharedTextures contains a shared texture with the same owner ID as an entry in mPresentationDataMap.
mSharedTextures only assigns an ID to a shared texture in:
EnsureSharedTextureForSwapChainEnsureSharedTextureForReadBackPresentCreateSharedTextureonly called byEnsureSharedTextureForSwapChain
EnsureSharedTextureForSwapChain is only called by wgpu_server_ensure_shared_texture_for_swap_chain
EnsureSharedTextureForReadBackPresent is only called by wgpu_server_ensure_shared_texture_for_readback
wgpu_server_ensure_shared_texture_for_swap_chain is called by:
create_texture_with_shared_texture_iosurfacecreate_texture_with_shared_texture_dmabufcreate_texture_with_shared_texture_d3d11
All 3 functions above and wgpu_server_ensure_shared_texture_for_readback are only called by DeviceAction::CreateTexture which has an early return checking if the texture dimensions are larger than MAX_TEXTURE_EXTENT (32767).
The size calculation for the shmem overflows only if both the width and the height are larger than 32767.
This means that GetFrontBufferSnapshot should always hit the early return if the shmem size calculation overflowed.
So while the code is convoluted and should be refactored, I don't see how the POC can actually be reproduced and result in the reported OOB memcpy.
If I missed something and this is somehow reproducible please let me know.
on ASAN build:
ASAN: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ/WRITE of size N at 0x...
#0 ... CopyTextureToShmem
#1 ... WebGPUParent::GetFrontBufferSnapshot
This trace looks made up since I pointed out already that CopyTextureToShmem doesn't exist.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 15•8 months ago
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Simplified POC I used locally:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title>test</title>
</head>
<body>
<canvas id="canvas"></canvas>
<script>
const OVERFLOW_WIDTH = 32768;
const OVERFLOW_HEIGHT = 32769;
async function run() {
const adapter = await navigator.gpu.requestAdapter();
const device = await adapter.requestDevice();
const canvas = document.getElementById('canvas');
canvas.width = OVERFLOW_WIDTH;
canvas.height = OVERFLOW_HEIGHT;
const ctx = canvas.getContext('webgpu');
const format = navigator.gpu.getPreferredCanvasFormat();
ctx.configure({
device: device,
format: format,
});
const encoder = device.createCommandEncoder();
const texture = ctx.getCurrentTexture();
const view = texture.createView();
const renderPass = encoder.beginRenderPass({
colorAttachments: [{
view: view,
clearValue: { r: 1.0, g: 0.0, b: 0.0, a: 1.0 },
loadOp: 'clear',
storeOp: 'store',
}],
});
renderPass.end();
device.queue.submit([encoder.finish()]);
canvas.toBlob(b => {
console.log(b)
const dataUrl = canvas.toDataURL();
console.log(dataUrl);
});
}
run();
</script>
</body>
</html>
console output:
Uncaptured WebGPU error: Out of memory
Uncaptured WebGPU error: Texture with '' label is invalid
Uncaptured WebGPU error: In a pass parameter, caused by: TextureView with '' label is invalid
null
data:,
| Reporter | ||
Comment 16•8 months ago
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i agree that if DeviceAction::CreateTexture rejects dimensions > MAX_TEXTURE_EXTENT (32767), then the reported overflow case for 32768x32769 should not be reachable via canvas.getContext("webgpu") / getCurrentTexture() / toBlob().
to move this forward, could the reporter please provide either:
- a real, symbolized gpu-process asan/crash report from revision
e11a1a68b460891f753819d82bcce6d717d1f277showing the undersizedAllocShmem(len)followed by an oob write in the snapshot/shmem copy path (function names + line numbers), or - a minimal explanation/log demonstrating which call path bypasses the
MAX_TEXTURE_EXTENTgate (i.e., where a shared/presented texture with width/height > 32767 is created/used), including the adapter limits printed by the poc.
note: “CopyTextureToShmem” appears to have been used as shorthand; the concrete stack should point at WebGPUParent::GetFrontBufferSnapshot and the relevant SharedTexture*::GetSnapshot implementation(s).
even if the current poc is not reachable, keeping the CheckedInt<size_t>(size.height) * stride overflow guard in GetFrontBufferSnapshot still seems like low-risk hardening against future refactors/alternate stride paths.
| Reporter | ||
Comment 18•8 months ago
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thank you for the reminder :D
you're right on the gate analysis. i've re-read CreateTexture: the MAX_TEXTURE_EXTENT (32767) check blocks texture creation at those dimensions, so mLastSubmittedTextureId is never set and GetFrontBufferSnapshot returns before the shmem allocation. the described trigger is not reachable as filed.
on the stack trace: it was reconstructed from static analysis of the code path, not from a live ASAN run. "CopyTextureToShmem" was my shorthand for the GetFrontBufferSnapshot→SharedTexture*::GetSnapshot chain — not an actual symbol. i should have been explicit about that from the start, not presented it as a captured trace. that was misleading.
the latent arithmetic issue in GetFrontBufferSnapshot is real (you confirmed it), but given the existing gate, it appears to be a hardening concern rather than a currently exploitable path. happy to support closing this as informative and routing the CheckedInt guard to the refactor patch you already have.
| Assignee | ||
Updated•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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Comment 19•8 months ago
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Comment 20•8 months ago
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As far as I know the GPU process is sandboxed on Windows, but not on macOS.
We turned on GPU sandboxing on macOS in bug 1974546.
Comment 21•8 months ago
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| bugherder | ||
Updated•7 months ago
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Description
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