PClientManagerOp accepts child-forged SystemPrincipalInfo and reaches parent-side chrome:// LoadURI in ClientOpenWindow
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Service Workers, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: 1seal, Unassigned)
Details
(Keywords: reporter-external)
Attachments
(4 files)
User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Steps to reproduce:
-
checked mozilla-firefox/firefox at commit
4bade96cdbdebf3f288b90f6eb17f08848553318. -
reproduced the issue against the parent-side
PClientManagerOp -> ClientManagerService::OpenWindow -> ClientOpenWindow -> WaitForLoadpath. -
from a compromised content-process test harness, sent
PClientManagerOp(ClientOpenWindowArgs)overPBackgroundwith a forgedprincipalInfo = SystemPrincipalInfo{}and a privileged target URL:- target URL:
chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml - base URL: attacker-controlled web origin
- sender: unprivileged content process
- target URL:
-
observed the parent accept the forged
PrincipalInfo, materialize it throughPrincipalInfoToPrincipal(), and use it as thetriggeringPrincipalinWaitForLoad. -
compared that against a control run using a normal content principal on the same target.
reproduction evidence from the attached PoC bundle:
canonical:
[CALLSITE_HIT]: ClientManagerOpParent::Init -> ClientManagerService::OpenWindow -> ClientOpenWindow::WaitForLoad[PROOF_MARKER]: clientopenwindow windowless loadURI_ok=true rv=0x00000000 url=chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml[PROOF_MARKER]: clientopenwindow promise_ok=true err=0x00000000[IMPACT_MARKER]: privileged_chrome_load_allowed=true target=chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml
control:
[NC_MARKER]: clientopenwindow windowless loadURI_ok=false rv=0x805303f4 url=chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml[NC_MARKER]: clientopenwindow promise_ok=false err=0x805303f4[NC_MARKER]: loadURI target=chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml content_ok=false error=NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI
relevant pinned callsites:
dom/clients/manager/ClientManagerOpParent.cpp:19-25, 73-75dom/clients/manager/ClientOpenWindowUtils.cpp:364, 472ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp:46-60caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp:709-712, 984-994
related precedent:
CVE-2025-2857/MFSA 2025-19is a different primitive, but it confirms Mozilla treats child-to-parent IPC sandbox escapes as sec-critical.
user agent / environment:
- reproduced on a local mozilla-central / Nightly-style macOS arm64 build from commit
4bade96cdbdebf3f288b90f6eb17f08848553318.
Actual results:
the parent process accepted child-supplied SystemPrincipalInfo in the PClientManager open-window path without binding that principal to the sending content process.
PrincipalInfoToPrincipal() materialized the forged value as SystemPrincipal, WaitForLoad() stored it as the navigation triggeringPrincipal, and the parent-side LoadURI(chrome://global/content/commonDialog.xhtml) path succeeded.
for the same target, the control case using a normal content principal was rejected with NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI / 0x805303f4.
in other words, a compromised content process can flip the parent-side authorization result for a privileged chrome:// navigation by forging principal metadata across IPC.
Expected results:
the parent should have rejected SystemPrincipalInfo from an unprivileged content-process sender before PrincipalInfoToPrincipal() ran.
a child content process must not be able to cause a parent-side chrome:// navigation, or any equivalent privileged navigation decision, by forging principalInfo in PClientManagerOp(ClientOpenWindowArgs).
the effective principal for this path should be derived from trusted parent-owned sender state, or the IPC argument should be explicitly validated and rejected for system principals.
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Comment 1•8 months ago
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Comment 2•8 months ago
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Comment 3•8 months ago
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Updated•8 months ago
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Description
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