Closed Bug 2025879 Opened 7 months ago Closed 7 months ago

Content process can forge SystemPrincipal via IPC + 5 WindowGlobalParent handlers blindly accept security state

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)

defect

Tracking

()

RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 2014103

People

(Reporter: joren, Unassigned)

Details

(Keywords: ai-involved, reporter-external)

User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0

Steps to reproduce:

  1. From a compromised content process, serialize a PrincipalInfo of type TSystemPrincipalInfo{}
  2. Send PContent::StoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration with:
    • url: "blob:<random-uuid>"
    • blob: IPCBlob containing HTML payload (e.g., <script>alert(ChromeUtils)</script>)
    • principal: the SystemPrincipalInfo from step 1
    • partitionKey: ""
  3. The parent process deserializes SystemPrincipalInfo into a real SystemPrincipal
    (ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp:52-58) with no sender validation
  4. ValidatePrincipal passes because AllowSystem is explicitly in the options
    (dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:5843)
  5. From the same content process, send PContent::BlobURLDataRequest with:
    • aBlobURL: the blob URL from step 2
    • aTriggeringPrincipal: TSystemPrincipalInfo{} (forged, no ValidatePrincipal on this handler)
    • aLoadingPrincipal: TSystemPrincipalInfo{} (forged)
  6. Navigate to the blob URL

Actual results:

  • ParamTraits creates a real SystemPrincipal from SystemPrincipalInfo with zero sender checks
  • RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration accepts system principal (AllowSystem option)
  • RecvBlobURLDataRequest has no ValidatePrincipal call at all
  • The blob URL document loads with system principal in the content process
  • ChromeUtils.importESModule(), Components.classes, and all [ChromeOnly] WebIDL APIs
    become available
  • The attacker can load any module from omni.ja, manipulate preferences via Services.prefs,
    and send further IPC messages with system principal that the parent trusts

AFFECTED CODE:

  • ipc/glue/BackgroundUtils.cpp:52-58 (PrincipalInfoToPrincipal)
  • dom/ipc/PermissionMessageUtils.cpp:27-47 (ParamTraits<nsIPrincipal*>::Read)
  • dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:5836-5856 (RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration)
  • dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:7392-7419 (RecvBlobURLDataRequest)
  • dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:1294-1338 (LogAndAssertFailedPrincipalValidationInfo - log only)

Expected results:

The parent process should reject SystemPrincipalInfo from content processes at the IPC
deserialization layer (ParamTraits<nsIPrincipal*>::Read). ValidatePrincipal failures should
return IPC_FAIL to kill the offending process, not just log telemetry.

SUGGESTED FIX:

  • Block SystemPrincipalInfo deserialization from content processes in ParamTraits
  • Make ValidatePrincipal failures return IPC_FAIL instead of logging
  • Remove AllowSystem from RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration options
  • Add ValidatePrincipal to RecvBlobURLDataRequest
Group: core-security → dom-core-security
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 7 months ago
Component: DOM: Security → DOM: Content Processes
Duplicate of bug: 2014103
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Group: dom-core-security
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