Intra-struct buffer overflow in [@ ssl_DecodeResumptionToken] via oversized sessionID field
Categories
(NSS :: Libraries, defect, P1)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: bugmon, Assigned: djackson)
Details
(5 keywords)
Attachments
(3 files)
|
5.26 KB,
application/octet-stream
|
Details | |
|
387 bytes,
patch
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review | |
|
2.79 KB,
text/plain
|
Details |
Summary
Buffer overflow in security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c at line 628. ssl_DecodeResumptionToken reads the sessionID field from a serialized resumption token using a 1-byte length prefix (permitting 0–255 bytes) and copies it into sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, a fixed 32-byte array, without validating that the length fits. The 223-byte excess overwrites adjacent members of the sslSessionIDStr.u.ssl3 struct — notably the alpnSelection SECItem — giving the attacker control of a pointer and length that are subsequently used in PORT_Memcpy inside SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfo.
Affected Code
File: security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c, lines 622–629
if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (readerBuffer.len) {
PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len);
}
The destination sid->u.ssl3.sessionID is declared at sslimpl.h:460 as PRUint8 sessionID[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES] where SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES == 32 (sslimpl.h:108). Because sslRead_ReadVariable was called with lenSize = 1, readerBuffer.len can be up to 255. No comparison against SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES is performed before the copy.
Immediately following sessionID in the struct are cipherSuite, policy, keys, masterWrapMech, slot IDs, srvName, signedCertTimestamps, and alpnSelection — all corrupted by the overflow. Notably the wrapped_master_secret field just below does have a bounds check (lines 644–648), showing the sessionID omission is an oversight rather than a deliberate trust assumption.
Correct Pattern
if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (readerBuffer.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (readerBuffer.len) {
PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len);
}
Exploit Chain
- Application retrieves a stored TLS resumption token from persistent storage (disk cache, database, or shared store) that has been tampered with by an attacker.
- Application calls the public API
SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo(tokenData, tokenLen, &info, sizeof(info))— exported viasslexp.h:434— orSSL_SetResumptionTokento resume the session. SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfoallocatessslSessionID sid = {0}on the stack and callsssl_DecodeResumptionToken(&sid, tokenData, tokenLen).- The malformed token encodes a
sessionIDfield with length byte0xFFfollowed by 255 attacker-controlled bytes. - At
sslnonce.c:628,PORT_Memcpywrites 255 bytes into the 32-bytesid.u.ssl3.sessionID[], overflowing intocipherSuite,policy,keys,masterWrapMech, slot IDs,srvName,signedCertTimestamps, andalpnSelection. - Back in
SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfoat line 4693–4701,sid.u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len(now attacker-controlled, e.g.0x41414141) is passed toPORT_ZAlloc, andsid.u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data(now an attacker-controlled pointer, e.g.0x4141414141414141) is used as the source ofPORT_Memcpy. - ASAN reports a wild-pointer read. With a valid mapped address, this becomes an arbitrary-address read primitive whose output is returned to the caller in
tokenOut->alpnSelection, leaking process memory. - Via the
SSL_SetResumptionTokenpath, thesidis heap-allocated (ssl3_NewSessionID), and the corruptedSECItempointers (srvName.data,signedCertTimestamps.data,alpnSelection.data) are later passed toSECITEM_FreeIteminssl_DestroySID, yielding an arbitrary-free primitive.
Security Impact
Severity: Moderate–High.
Attacker capability:
- Intra-struct overflow of up to 223 bytes with fully controlled content.
- Control of
SECItem.dataandSECItem.lenforsrvName,signedCertTimestamps, andalpnSelection. - Arbitrary-read info leak via
SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfo(corrupted pointer + length copied into caller-visible buffer). - Arbitrary-free via
ssl_DestroySIDwhen reached throughSSL_SetResumptionToken, which can be escalated to use-after-free / heap corruption with grooming.
Preconditions: Attacker must be able to supply or modify a resumption token before the application passes it to NSS. This typically requires local file-system access to the application's session cache, a shared multi-tenant cache, or an application bug that forwards untrusted bytes to these APIs. The token format is not network-exposed by NSS itself, so this is not directly remote-triggerable by a TLS peer.
ASAN Report
==54534==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: unknown-crash on address 0x4141414141414141 at pc 0x7e6aa3f0e42e bp 0x7ffefd25e1b0 sp 0x7ffefd25d958
READ of size 1094795585 at 0x4141414141414141 thread T0
#0 0x7e6aa3f0e42d in memcpy ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors_memintrinsics.inc:115
#1 0x576871ff47cf in SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfo ../../lib/ssl/sslsock.c:4700
#2 0x576871b48cee in nss_test::ResumptionTokenOverflow_SessionIDOverflow_Test::TestBody() ../../gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_token_overflow_unittest.cc:155
#3 0x576871f1ac6c in void testing::internal::HandleSehExceptionsInMethodIfSupported<testing::Test, void>(testing::Test*, void (testing::Test::*)(), char const*) ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2607
#4 0x576871f0815f in void testing::internal::HandleExceptionsInMethodIfSupported<testing::Test, void>(testing::Test*, void (testing::Test::*)(), char const*) ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2643
#5 0x576871eb0f61 in testing::Test::Run() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2682
#6 0x576871eb2589 in testing::TestInfo::Run() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2861
#7 0x576871eb39ec in testing::TestSuite::Run() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:3015
#8 0x576871eda9e4 in testing::internal::UnitTestImpl::RunAllTests() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:5855
#9 0x576871f1e1d4 in bool testing::internal::HandleSehExceptionsInMethodIfSupported<testing::internal::UnitTestImpl, bool>(testing::internal::UnitTestImpl*, bool (testing::internal::UnitTestImpl::*)(), char const*) ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2607
#10 0x576871f0acb6 in bool testing::internal::HandleExceptionsInMethodIfSupported<testing::internal::UnitTestImpl, bool>(testing::internal::UnitTestImpl*, bool (testing::internal::UnitTestImpl::*)(), char const*) ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:2643
#11 0x576871ed6f01 in testing::UnitTest::Run() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/src/gtest.cc:5438
#12 0x5768718ffaf1 in RUN_ALL_TESTS() ../../gtests/google_test/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h:2490
#13 0x5768718ffdcb in main ../../gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_gtest.cc:47
#14 0x7e6aa34c71c9 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2a1c9)
#15 0x7e6aa34c728a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2a28a)
#16 0x5768713f5e14 in _start (/firefox/security/dist/Debug/bin/ssl_gtest+0x225e14)
Address 0x4141414141414141 is a wild pointer inside of access range of size 0x000041414141.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: unknown-crash ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors_memintrinsics.inc:115 in memcpy
==54534==ABORTING
Suggested Fix
Add a bounds check identical in style to the wrapped_master_secret check a few lines below:
--- a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c
@@ -622,6 +622,10 @@ ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, ...)
if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
+ if (readerBuffer.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
if (readerBuffer.len) {
PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf);
PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len);
}
Optionally also validate that the separately-encoded sessionIDLength field (read at line 617–620) matches readerBuffer.len.
| Reporter | ||
Comment 1•7 months ago
|
||
| Reporter | ||
Comment 2•7 months ago
|
||
| Reporter | ||
Comment 3•7 months ago
|
||
Updated•7 months ago
|
| Assignee | ||
Comment 5•7 months ago
|
||
Marking sec-low because compromising the local session cache is a bit strange threat model.
| Assignee | ||
Updated•7 months ago
|
Updated•1 month ago
|
Description
•