Closed Bug 2034446 Opened 6 months ago Closed 6 months ago

Missing ValidatePrincipal in RecvBlobURLDataRequest allows cross-origin blob URL data theft via forged SystemPrincipal

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)

defect

Tracking

()

RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 2014103

People

(Reporter: tranquac0312, Unassigned)

Details

(Keywords: reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])

Attachments

(1 file)

Attached file poc-blob-data-leak.cpp —

Summary

RecvBlobURLDataRequest (ContentParent.cpp:7382) does not call ValidatePrincipal() on two IPC-received principals. A compromised content process forges SystemPrincipal to read blob URL content from any origin, bypassing private browsing and container isolation.

Root Cause

// dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:7382-7409 — NO ValidatePrincipal
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest(
    const nsACString& aBlobURL, nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
    nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, ...) {
  // Both principals passed straight through, unvalidated
  BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry(aBlobURL, ..., aLoadingPrincipal,
                                       aTriggeringPrincipal, ...);
  aResolver(ipcBlob);  // blob data returned to caller
}

Contrast: RecvStoreAndBroadcastBlobURLRegistration (same file, line 5850) DOES call ValidatePrincipal. This handler is the only blob-URL IPC handler that skips it.

IPC deserializes TSystemPrincipalInfo into real SystemPrincipal with no process-origin check (BackgroundUtils.cpp:52-58).

What Gets Bypassed

Check 1 — Origin-attributes isolation (BlobURLProtocolHandler.cpp:781-787):

// "We also allow the system principal to create the channel regardless of
//  the OriginAttributes."
if ((!aLoadingPrincipal || !aLoadingPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) &&
    !IsOriginAttributesEqual(...)) {
  return false;  // HARD check — SystemPrincipal SKIPS this entirely
}

Private browsing, container tabs, first-party isolation — all bypassed.

Check 2 — Origin subsumption (BlobURLProtocolHandler.cpp:789-791):

if (!aTriggeringPrincipal->Subsumes(info->mPrincipal)) {
  return false;  // HARD check — SystemPrincipal subsumes ALL principals
}

Blob URL UUIDs Are Not a Barrier

The parent broadcasts blob URL registrations (including full UUIDs) to content processes:

// ContentParent.cpp:5776-5783
bool toBeSent = IsBlobURLBroadcastPrincipal(aPrincipal);  // true for system/addon
for (auto* cp : AllProcesses(eLive)) {
  if (!toBeSent && !cp->mLoadedOriginHashes.Contains(originHash))
    continue;  // content-origin: filtered. System/addon: sent to ALL.
  cp->SendBlobURLRegistration(uri, ipcBlob, aPrincipal, ...);
}

IsBlobURLBroadcastPrincipal (BlobURLProtocolHandler.cpp:895-898) returns true for SystemPrincipal and addon principals → every content process receives their blob URLs.

ContentParent.h:1594-1595 states "receiving a Blob URL does not grant access to its contents" — this assumption is broken by the missing ValidatePrincipal.

Impact

Full attack chain: enumerate blob URLs from broadcast → forge SystemPrincipal → read cross-origin data. This enables:

  • Cross-origin file theft — file upload previews (photos, tax docs), canvas exports, PDF blobs, media from any tab
  • Private browsing leak — normal process reads blobs from private browsing windows
  • Container isolation bypass — blobs leak across Firefox Multi-Account Containers
  • Post-revocation access — aAlsoIfRevoked=true (line 7394) gives ~5s window past revokeObjectURL()

Related: CVE-2021-23999 (Bug 1691153), CVE-2018-5108 (Bug 1421099). Bug 1670242 (IPC principal vetting meta) still open.

Affected

Firefox Release, Beta, Nightly, ESR (all current). Verified on mozilla-firefox/firefox main HEAD 2026-04-23.

Suggested Fix

Add ValidatePrincipal with IPC_FAIL on failure. See attached diff.

Flags: sec-bounty?
Group: firefox-core-security
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 6 months ago
Component: Security → DOM: Content Processes
Duplicate of bug: 2014103
Product: Firefox → Core
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Flags: sec-bounty? → sec-bounty-
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