Closed Bug 2040307 Opened 6 months ago Closed 5 months ago

Forged browser drag/drop IPC lets a compromised content process trigger parent-side file:, chrome:, and DevTools loads

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Copy & Paste and Drag & Drop, defect)

defect

Tracking

()

RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 1500946

People

(Reporter: atsu120225, Unassigned)

References

Details

(Keywords: reporter-external, sec-moderate, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])

Attachments

(1 file)

Description

A compromised content process can forge browser drag/drop IPC so the parent process accepts attacker-controlled drag data as a browser drag session. The PoC uses this to drive parent-side drop handling and load URLs that normal web content cannot load directly.

I confirmed the forged drag/drop can

  • load a local file: URL and read a temp-file marker;
  • load chrome://global/content/aboutSupport.xhtml as a SystemPrincipal document in a non-remote browsing context;
  • open about:devtools-toolbox as SystemPrincipal and connect it to an attacker-controlled fake RDP server;
  • make privileged DevTools/source-map code fetch attacker-chosen file: and chrome: source-map URLs.

I did not prove production arbitrary SystemPrincipal JavaScript execution from attacker-controlled bytes.

Flags: sec-bounty?
Group: firefox-core-security → dom-core-security
Component: Security → DOM: Copy & Paste and Drag & Drop
Product: Firefox → Core

This sounds like a dupe of bug 2039244, but I haven't checked the attached POC in detail to make sure. For now I'll make it "depends on"

Depends on: 2039244
Keywords: sec-moderate
Severity: -- → S3
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 5 months ago
Duplicate of bug: 2039244
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Duplicate of bug: 1500946
No longer duplicate of bug: 2039244
Flags: sec-bounty? → sec-bounty-
Group: dom-core-security
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