Closed
Bug 2040307
Opened 6 months ago
Closed 5 months ago
Forged browser drag/drop IPC lets a compromised content process trigger parent-side file:, chrome:, and DevTools loads
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Copy & Paste and Drag & Drop, defect)
Core
DOM: Copy & Paste and Drag & Drop
Tracking
()
RESOLVED
DUPLICATE
of bug 1500946
People
(Reporter: atsu120225, Unassigned)
References
Details
(Keywords: reporter-external, sec-moderate, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])
Attachments
(1 file)
|
240.90 KB,
patch
|
Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
Description
A compromised content process can forge browser drag/drop IPC so the parent process accepts attacker-controlled drag data as a browser drag session. The PoC uses this to drive parent-side drop handling and load URLs that normal web content cannot load directly.
I confirmed the forged drag/drop can
- load a local
file:URL and read a temp-file marker; - load
chrome://global/content/aboutSupport.xhtmlas a SystemPrincipal document in a non-remote browsing context; - open
about:devtools-toolboxas SystemPrincipal and connect it to an attacker-controlled fake RDP server; - make privileged DevTools/source-map code fetch attacker-chosen
file:andchrome:source-map URLs.
I did not prove production arbitrary SystemPrincipal JavaScript execution from attacker-controlled bytes.
Flags: sec-bounty?
Updated•6 months ago
|
Group: firefox-core-security → dom-core-security
Component: Security → DOM: Copy & Paste and Drag & Drop
Product: Firefox → Core
Comment 1•6 months ago
|
||
This sounds like a dupe of bug 2039244, but I haven't checked the attached POC in detail to make sure. For now I'll make it "depends on"
Depends on: 2039244
Keywords: sec-moderate
Updated•6 months ago
|
Severity: -- → S3
Updated•5 months ago
|
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 5 months ago
Duplicate of bug: 2039244
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Updated•4 months ago
|
Updated•13 days ago
|
Group: dom-core-security
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Description
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