PWindowGlobal LoadURI accepts forged srcdoc inherited principals for UXSS
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Navigation, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: atsu120225, Unassigned)
Details
(Keywords: reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])
Attachments
(1 file)
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12.01 KB,
patch
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Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
A compromised content process can call PWindowGlobal::LoadURI for a descendant out-of-process frame with an about:srcdoc nsDocShellLoadState containing attacker-controlled SrcdocData and a forged PrincipalToInherit for another web origin. WindowGlobalParent validates the target and blocks javascript: loads, but does not bind the load-state principals to the sending actor/process. docshell then creates the srcdoc document with the forged victim principal.
The patch adds a test-only raw send path and a browser test. The test first shows ordinary srcdoc inherits https://example.com and cannot read https://example.org cookies, localStorage, or response bodies. The raw PWindowGlobal::LoadURI load then runs attacker-controlled srcdoc as https://example.org, reads victim cookies/localStorage, reads a victim response body without a CORS error, writes a victim cookie/localStorage value, and postMessages from the victim origin.
Updated•5 months ago
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Comment 2•5 months ago
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Yes, it's a dupe.
It's also very similar to bug 2043820 from the same reporter. I.e. the principal can be forged on nsDocShellLoadState and the bugs differ in what URL they load and which method they use to send the load state.
Updated•4 months ago
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Updated•1 month ago
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Description
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