Enable WebGL Vendor and Renderer protection in Nightly PBM
Categories
(Core :: Privacy: Anti-Tracking, enhancement)
Tracking
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| Tracking | Status | |
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| firefox154 | --- | fixed |
People
(Reporter: tjr, Assigned: tjr)
References
(Blocks 1 open bug, Regressed 1 open bug)
Details
Attachments
(2 files)
Now that we have Remote Settings overrides for the known concerns, let's enable this.
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Comment 1•1 month ago
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Updated•1 month ago
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Backed out for causing gl1c failures at test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html
Backout link
Push with failures
Failure log(s)
Backed out for causing mochitest failures @test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html.
Comment 10•1 month ago
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| bugherder | ||
Comment 11•1 month ago
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unmasked vendor is random per execution making it inconsistent even between contexts. This is a red flag for anti-bot, fraud-detection scripts and is only going to end in tears. Mismatched values (think conflicting useragent in navigator/header or iframe vs document results ) seen numerous times in RFP over the years, is never good.
personally I think the randomizing here is (ultimately) a waste of time, as it can always be detected (and the pattern here is trivial) - and is not strictly needed - you could just as easily always return Mozilla or some consistent result per platform. I will refer to [1] and [2]. Do read them - [1] you were part of and [2] I wrote in parallel to [1] without knowing it's existence and it only reinforces it with real world knowledge and experience including from other FP researchers such as Antoine Vastel.
If you are going to randomize at least make it persistent (per session/eTLD+1 etc) which could at least help mitigate mismatched values - but again, I think this is the wrong approach to take - randomizing should be a last resort (e.g. canvas) - everywhere randomizing has been used (including brave), it has been either bypassed (complexity, too subtle etc), the poisoned-data effect rendered useless (advanced scripts, backend analysis such as fpjspro can/could do), or weaponized against the user
Sorry, I don't want to come across as all preachy, but I would like a reply - otherwise I feel like I am wasting my time
[1] https://w3c.github.io/fingerprinting-guidance/#a_standardized_profile
[2] https://arkenfox.github.io/thorin/items/02browserfingerprinting.html#random
Updated•1 month ago
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| Assignee | ||
Comment 12•29 days ago
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It's possible we're seeing this effect in CAPTCHA rates, I'm going to back out the randomization in Bug 2056780 while we run an experiment to measure.
Updated•27 days ago
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Description
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