Closed Bug 2050515 Opened 1 month ago Closed 1 month ago

Enable WebGL Vendor and Renderer protection in Nightly PBM

Categories

(Core :: Privacy: Anti-Tracking, enhancement)

enhancement

Tracking

()

RESOLVED FIXED
154 Branch
Tracking Status
firefox154 --- fixed

People

(Reporter: tjr, Assigned: tjr)

References

(Blocks 1 open bug, Regressed 1 open bug)

Details

Attachments

(2 files)

Now that we have Remote Settings overrides for the known concerns, let's enable this.

Assignee: nobody → tom
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Pushed by rperta@mozilla.com: https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/commit/47ef212881bf https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/rev/e035a4dd4d4d Revert "Bug 2050515: Enable WebGL Vendor and Renderer protection in Nightly PBM r=timhuang" for causing gl1c failures at test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html

Backed out for causing gl1c failures at test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html
Backout link
Push with failures
Failure log(s)

Flags: needinfo?(tom)
Pushed by agoloman@mozilla.com: https://github.com/mozilla-firefox/firefox/commit/9b76a2f882af https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/autoland/rev/cd8b93a107ef Revert "Bug 2050515: Enable WebGL Vendor and Renderer protection in Nightly PBM r=timhuang" for causing mochitest failures @test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html.

Backed out for causing mochitest failures @test_webgl_constant_vendor_fpp.html.

So I sent it to try but not phab; uhg.

Flags: needinfo?(tom)
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Closed: 1 month ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Target Milestone: --- → 154 Branch
Regressions: 2055176
Attached image test.png

unmasked vendor is random per execution making it inconsistent even between contexts. This is a red flag for anti-bot, fraud-detection scripts and is only going to end in tears. Mismatched values (think conflicting useragent in navigator/header or iframe vs document results ) seen numerous times in RFP over the years, is never good.

personally I think the randomizing here is (ultimately) a waste of time, as it can always be detected (and the pattern here is trivial) - and is not strictly needed - you could just as easily always return Mozilla or some consistent result per platform. I will refer to [1] and [2]. Do read them - [1] you were part of and [2] I wrote in parallel to [1] without knowing it's existence and it only reinforces it with real world knowledge and experience including from other FP researchers such as Antoine Vastel.

If you are going to randomize at least make it persistent (per session/eTLD+1 etc) which could at least help mitigate mismatched values - but again, I think this is the wrong approach to take - randomizing should be a last resort (e.g. canvas) - everywhere randomizing has been used (including brave), it has been either bypassed (complexity, too subtle etc), the poisoned-data effect rendered useless (advanced scripts, backend analysis such as fpjspro can/could do), or weaponized against the user

Sorry, I don't want to come across as all preachy, but I would like a reply - otherwise I feel like I am wasting my time

[1] https://w3c.github.io/fingerprinting-guidance/#a_standardized_profile
[2] https://arkenfox.github.io/thorin/items/02browserfingerprinting.html#random

Flags: needinfo?(tom)
Regressions: 2056780

It's possible we're seeing this effect in CAPTCHA rates, I'm going to back out the randomization in Bug 2056780 while we run an experiment to measure.

Flags: needinfo?(tom)
QA Whiteboard: [qa-triage-done-c155/b154]
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