Closed Bug 2050763 Opened 4 months ago Closed 4 months ago

ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest trusts child-supplied principals and returns non-owned blob bytes

Categories

(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)

defect

Tracking

()

RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 2014103

People

(Reporter: iifizzyx, Unassigned)

Details

(Keywords: reporter-external, Whiteboard: [client-bounty-form])

Attachments

(3 files)

Summary

ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest accepts the blob URL, triggering
principal, loading principal, origin attributes, inner window ID, and partition
key from the content process. The parent passes those child-supplied values
directly into BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry and, if the lookup passes,
serializes the resolved BlobImpl back to the child as an IPCBlob.

Under the compromised-content-process threat model, this lets an
https://example.com content process request a blob URL created by
https://example.org. Normal web fetch(blobURL) is blocked, and raw IPC using
the attacker's real principal is blocked. Raw IPC using a forged victim principal
or forged SystemPrincipal returns the victim blob bytes.

Impact

After compromising a content process, an attacker can send
PContent::BlobURLDataRequest with forged principals and make the parent return
blob bytes that normal web security checks deny.

This report does not claim ordinary web JavaScript can trigger this directly,
and it does not claim a completed sandbox escape from this proof alone.

Tested Build

Firefox Nightly 154.0a1
Official Nightly BuildID: 20260625094708
Platform: Linux x86_64 / Ubuntu 24.04

Reproduction

Apply poc/bloburl_datarequest_core_poc.patch to the tested revision, build,
and run:

MOZ_HEADLESS=1 ./mach test dom/base/test/browser_bloburl_datarequest_forged_principal.js

The PoC adds a test-only nsIDOMWindowUtils helper to simulate the raw IPC a
compromised content process can send. It does not add a new web-exposed API.

Observed result:

PASS - ordinary cross-origin web fetch is blocked
PASS - raw IPC with attacker's real principal is blocked
PASS - raw IPC with forged system principal returned victim blob bytes
PASS - raw IPC with forged victim principal returned victim blob bytes
TEST_END: Test PASS. Subtests passed 4/4. Unexpected 0
Unexpected results: 0

Scope Note

This report is specifically about this sink:

ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest
  -> BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry
  -> IPCBlob returned to the child

It does not rely on blob registration behavior, navigation behavior, or a
completed sandbox escape chain.

Flags: sec-bounty?
Attached file validation_log.md —
Attached file root_cause.md —
Group: firefox-core-security
Status: UNCONFIRMED → RESOLVED
Closed: 4 months ago
Component: Security → DOM: Content Processes
Duplicate of bug: 2014103
Product: Firefox → Core
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Flags: sec-bounty? → sec-bounty-
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