Missing parent-side validation in WindowGlobalParent::RecvReloadWithHttpsOnlyException lets a compromised content process disable HTTPS-Only/HTTPS-First for the top-level site and force a system-principal http reload
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: bugmon, Unassigned)
Details
(5 keywords)
Attachments
(5 files)
The PWindowGlobal::ReloadWithHttpsOnlyException IPC message is intended to be sent only by the trusted about:httpsonlyerror error page when the user clicks the top-level-only 'Continue to HTTP Site' button. However, every protection in that flow — the [Func="Document::CallerIsTrustedAboutHttpsOnlyError"] WebIDL gate, the top-level-only button, and the clickjacking delay in toolkit/components/httpsonlyerror/content/errorpage.js — is enforced exclusively inside the (attacker-controllable) content process. The parent-side handler WindowGlobalParent::RecvReloadWithHttpsOnlyException (dom/ipc/WindowGlobalParent.cpp:1665) accepts the message from ANY WindowGlobal actor with no validation: it does not check that the sender is the top window global, that the sending document is the trusted error page, that user activation occurred, or that HTTPS-Only/HTTPS-First mode is even active for that load.
On receipt, the handler unconditionally mints the session-scoped 'https-only-load-insecure' permission (LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION) for the principal of the TOP-LEVEL site of the sender's browsing context tree and force-reloads the top browsing context over plain http using the SYSTEM triggering principal (LOAD_NORMAL_REPLACE). Consequently, a compromised content process that hosts only a cross-origin subframe (e.g. an ad iframe, which under Fission runs in a different process than the victim top document) can, with a single IPC message, disable HTTPS-Only enforcement for the victim's top-level site for the entire session and downgrade the currently-viewed page to plain http. Because nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::TestIfPrincipalIsExempt honors LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION for both HTTPS-Only and HTTPS-First upgrade modes, the primitive also neutralizes default-on HTTPS-First upgrades. This was verified end-to-end: on a fresh unpatched-parent ASAN build, a cross-origin iframe running in a separate content process (simulated compromised process via a minimal child-side-only pref hook) sent the message, the parent minted the exemption and force-reloaded the victim top-level page, and a fetch to an HTTPS-Only-protected host that was blocked before the attack succeeded over plain http afterwards ('Not upgrading insecure request ... because it is exempt').
Build Info
- Branch: main
- Revision: 3f0a76a52d496d01003b91cb2350557c1a9870a4
- Timestamp: 2026-07-10T16:32:00+00:00
Affected Code
File: dom/ipc/WindowGlobalParent.cpp, line 1665-1739
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult WindowGlobalParent::RecvReloadWithHttpsOnlyException() {
nsresult rv;
// No check that `this` is the top WindowGlobal of the BC tree.
// No check that the sending document is about:httpsonlyerror.
// No user-activation check. No check HTTPS-Only/First is enabled.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI = BrowsingContext()->Top()->GetCurrentURI();
...
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
(void)NS_MutateURI(innerURI).SetScheme("http"_ns).Finalize(
getter_AddRefs(newURI));
...
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal =
BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(newURI, originAttributes);
rv = permMgr->AddFromPrincipal(
principal, "https-only-load-insecure"_ns,
nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION,
nsIPermissionManager::EXPIRE_SESSION, 0); // <-- exemption minted for the TOP-LEVEL site on behalf of ANY frame's actor
...
RefPtr<nsDocShellLoadState> loadState = new nsDocShellLoadState(insecureURI);
loadState->SetTriggeringPrincipal(nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal()); // <-- system triggering principal
loadState->SetLoadType(LOAD_NORMAL_REPLACE);
...
RefPtr<CanonicalBrowsingContext> topBC = BrowsingContext()->Top();
topBC->LoadURI(loadState, /* setNavigating */ true); // <-- forced top-level http reload
return IPC_OK();
}
File: dom/webidl/Document.webidl, line 336-337
// The ONLY gate on the message-sending API is evaluated inside the
// (attacker-controlled) content process:
[Func="Document::CallerIsTrustedAboutHttpsOnlyError"]
undefined reloadWithHttpsOnlyException();
File: dom/base/Document.cpp, line 1552-1556
void Document::ReloadWithHttpsOnlyException() {
if (WindowGlobalChild* wgc = GetWindowGlobalChild()) {
wgc->SendReloadWithHttpsOnlyException(); // any compromised child can send this directly on any of its PWindowGlobal actors
}
}
File: netwerk/protocol/http/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp, line 691-712
bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
UpgradeMode aUpgradeMode) {
...
rv = sPermMgr->TestExactPermissionFromPrincipal(
aPrincipal, "https-only-load-insecure"_ns, &perm);
...
return perm == nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW ||
perm == nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION || // <-- minted value exempts BOTH HTTPS-Only and default-on HTTPS-First
(checkForHTTPSFirst &&
perm == nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::HTTPSFIRST_LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW);
}
The parent-side IPC handler trusts the sender completely. It derives everything from the top of the sender's browsing context tree, mints the HTTPS-Only exemption permission, and issues a system-principal top-level load — with no check that the sending WindowGlobal is the top window, that it is the trusted about:httpsonlyerror page, or that any user interaction occurred. All of those checks exist only in content-process code (the WebIDL Func gate and errorpage.js), which a compromised content process bypasses trivially.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker compromises a content process via a renderer bug (e.g. the process hosting a cross-origin ad iframe embedded in a victim HTTPS-Only-protected page; under Fission this is a different process than the victim top document).
- From the compromised process, the attacker sends PWindowGlobal::ReloadWithHttpsOnlyException on any of its WindowGlobal actors (equivalent to calling WindowGlobalChild::SendReloadWithHttpsOnlyException; the only guard is the child-side WebIDL Func check, which the attacker controls).
- The pristine parent-side handler WindowGlobalParent::RecvReloadWithHttpsOnlyException accepts the message without any sender validation, resolves the TOP-LEVEL browsing context of the tab, and rewrites its current URI to scheme http.
- The parent mints the session-scoped 'https-only-load-insecure' permission (LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION) for the top-level site's principal via PermissionManager::AddFromPrincipal.
- The parent force-reloads the top browsing context over plain http with the SYSTEM triggering principal (LOAD_NORMAL_REPLACE), replacing the victim's page with its http version without any user interaction.
- All subsequent loads for that site during the session are exempt from HTTPS-Only and HTTPS-First upgrades (nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::TestIfPrincipalIsExempt), giving an on-path network attacker a session-wide TLS-downgrade / content-injection primitive against the victim's currently-viewed top-level site.
IPC Path
- PWindowGlobal
- Protocol: PWindowGlobal
- Parent process: Main
- Child process: Content
- Message flow: Content (compromised cross-origin iframe process) -> Main: ReloadWithHttpsOnlyException()
Steps to Reproduce
- Start from a clean Firefox checkout (verify with
git -C /firefox diff). - Apply the provided child-side-only simulation patch:
git apply simulate-compromised-child.patch(adds a pref-gated bypass of the child-evaluated WebIDL gate Document::CallerIsTrustedAboutHttpsOnlyError so an ordinary page can emit the same IPC a compromised content process would send directly; the parent side of the boundary under test is unmodified). - Build with the ASAN fuzzing mozconfig via build_firefox (mozconfig.linux.asan.fuzzing).
- Run testcase.html through browser_evaluator with prefs: dom.security.https_only_mode=true, network.dns.localDomains="victim.example", test.simulate-compromised-child.https-only-exception=true, browser.dom.window.dump.enabled=true, network.proxy.type=0, browser.tabs.remote.useCrossOriginEmbedderPolicy=false (the last two neutralize harness artifacts: proxying and the grizzly server's unconditional COEP: require-corp header).
- Observe the log sequence: PRE-ATTACK probe of http://victim.example => BLOCKED-BY-HTTPS-ONLY(TypeError); the cross-origin iframe (http://127.0.0.1, separate content process) sends the IPC; the top-level page is force-reloaded (phase 2); 'HTTPS-Only Mode: Not upgrading insecure request ... because it is exempt'; POST-ATTACK probe => ALLOWED-OVER-HTTP(responseType=opaque); '[HOE] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED'.
- Negative control: run the identical testcase and prefs on the unpatched build — the iframe's document.reloadWithHttpsOnlyException is undefined, no reload occurs, and HTTPS-Only remains enforced, proving the parent-side handler is reachable only via the (child-side-only) gate and that the prefs alone cause no effect.
- Restore the tree with
git -C /firefox checkout ..
Security Impact
- Severity: Moderate
- Attacker capability: A compromised content process — including one that only hosts a cross-origin subframe of the victim tab — can, with a single unvalidated IPC message: (1) mint the session-scoped 'https-only-load-insecure' exemption for the victim's top-level site, disabling HTTPS-Only and HTTPS-First upgrade enforcement for that site for the whole session; and (2) force-reload the victim's top-level page over plain http with the system triggering principal and no user interaction. Combined with an on-path network attacker, this yields session-wide TLS downgrade and active content injection into the victim's currently-viewed top-level site, defeating the user-consent, top-level-only, and anti-clickjacking protections of the HTTPS-Only error page. The forced load URI is derived from the current top-level URI (scheme swapped to http), so it is not an arbitrary system-principal navigation primitive.
- Preconditions: Attacker must first fully compromise a content process (renderer RCE) that hosts any frame of the target tab. Realizing the downgrade's full impact additionally requires an active network (MITM) position. HTTPS-Only mode (dom.security.https_only_mode) is non-default, but the minted permission also exempts default-on HTTPS-First upgrades.
ASAN Report
No memory-safety crash is claimed or expected — this is a logic/privilege-violation finding proven by observable effect. Verified evaluator log (fresh ASAN build, unmodified parent, child-side simulation patch only):
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] top document loaded, phase=1, url=http://localhost:43897/testcase.html"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: W/PageMessages [JavaScript Warning: "HTTPS-Only Mode: Upgrading insecure request \"http://victim.example:43897/testcase.html?probe=...\" to use \"https\"."]
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] PRE-ATTACK probe of http://victim.example:43897 => BLOCKED-BY-HTTPS-ONLY(TypeError)"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] injecting cross-origin attacker iframe (http://127.0.0.1:43897)"
[Child 15305: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] evil iframe loaded, origin=http://127.0.0.1:43897, reloadWithHttpsOnlyException is function"
[Child 15305: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] evil iframe sending PWindowGlobal::ReloadWithHttpsOnlyException targeting top-level site of top origin (cross-origin from us)"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] top document loaded, phase=2, url=http://localhost:43897/testcase.html"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] TOP-LEVEL PAGE WAS FORCE-RELOADED by the iframe's IPC message (system-principal LoadURI issued by WindowGlobalParent::RecvReloadWithHttpsOnlyException)"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/PageMessages [JavaScript Error: "HTTPS-Only Mode: Not upgrading insecure request \"http://victim.example:43897/testcase.html?probe=...\" because it is exempt."]
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] POST-ATTACK probe of http://victim.example:43897 => ALLOWED-OVER-HTTP(responseType=opaque)"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] pre=BLOCKED-BY-HTTPS-ONLY(TypeError) post=ALLOWED-OVER-HTTP(responseType=opaque)"
[Child 15262: Main Thread]: I/console log: "[HOE] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: a cross-origin iframe's process minted the session-scoped 'https-only-load-insecure' permission for the top-level site and force-reloaded the top-level page over plain http. HTTPS-Only enforcement for this site is now disabled for the whole session."
Negative control on the pristine build (same prefs): "reloadWithHttpsOnlyException is undefined", "TypeError: document.reloadWithHttpsOnlyException is not a function", no forced reload, HTTPS-Only enforcement unchanged.
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Description
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