Type confusion in [@ JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed] via doubly-delivered LoadRequestedModules rejection callback in ModuleLoaderBase
Categories
(Core :: JavaScript Engine, defect, P1)
Tracking
()
| Tracking | Status | |
|---|---|---|
| firefox-esr115 | --- | unaffected |
| firefox-esr140 | --- | unaffected |
| firefox-esr153 | 154+ | fixed |
| firefox153 | --- | wontfix |
| firefox154 | + | fixed |
| firefox155 | + | fixed |
People
(Reporter: bugmon, Assigned: allstars.chh)
References
(Blocks 2 open bugs)
Details
(5 keywords, Whiteboard: [adv-main154+r][adv-esr153.1+r])
Attachments
(5 files, 4 external files, 2 obsolete files)
The module loader's rejection callback for JS::LoadRequestedModules can be delivered twice for the same dynamic-import ModuleLoadRequest, and the second delivery dereferences an undefined JS::Value as a JSObject*.
When js::LoadRequestedModules fails by returning false (here: AutoCheckRecursionLimit failure at js/src/vm/Modules.cpp:1616 during a nested InnerModuleLoading descent over previously recorded [[LoadedModules]] edges, which no host frame absorbs), ModuleLoaderBase::StartFetchingModuleDependencies invokes the rejection handler directly as a fallback (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1385). This consumes the single AddRef taken at line 1335 and rejects the dynamic-import promise, but never deactivates the engine-side GraphLoadingStateRecordObject: its isLoading flag stays true and it stays alive as the payload of a sibling dependency request parked in a pending fetch's mWaiting list. The first rejection then runs ModuleErrored -> LoadFinished -> ProcessDynamicImport, whose guard checks only IsErrored() (ModuleLoadRequest.cpp:71-73) and not mErroredLoadingImports (set at ModuleLoadRequest.h:112-116, read only in an assert at ModuleLoadRequest.cpp:152), so FinishLoadingImportedModule runs a second time and its trailing ClearImport() (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:333, ModuleLoadRequest.cpp:184-188) sets the request's mPayload to UndefinedValue.
When the still-pending sibling fetch later fails, OnFetchFailed (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:892) calls JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailedWithPendingException on the live state object; ContinueModuleLoading sees isLoading == true (Modules.cpp:1735) and synchronously invokes the rejected callback again for the already-finished request (workers use the synchronous callback variant of LoadRequestedModules, ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1377-1380). OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1461-1463) passes the now-undefined mPayload to JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed, which executes &payloadArg.toObject() (Modules.cpp:183) with no runtime type check in release builds; XOR-unboxing the undefined tag yields a wild pointer and the subsequent object-header read faults at 0x0007800000000000. The same double delivery also receives the request via a non-owning PrivateValue raw pointer (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1437-1438) whose balancing strong reference was already released, and ends with a second aRequest->Release() (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1496), i.e. a reference-count underflow on the same path. The trigger is pure web content (a dedicated worker doing dynamic imports of blob and cross-origin HTTP module URLs) with no prefs and no source modifications.
Build Info
- Branch: main
- Revision: 91d6cd2d1476bca635bb96f82ca34eda283b5460
- Timestamp: 2026-07-22T16:05:43+00:00
Affected Code
File: js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp, line 1333-1386
// Wrap the request into a JS::Value, and AddRef() it.
// The Release() will be called in the resolved/rejected handlers.
Rooted<Value> hostDefinedVal(cx, PrivateValue(aRequest));
aRequest->AddRef();
...
} else {
result = LoadRequestedModules(cx, module, hostDefinedVal,
OnLoadRequestedModulesResolved,
OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected);
}
if (!result) {
LOG(("ScriptLoadRequest (%p): LoadRequestedModules failed", aRequest));
OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected(cx, aRequest, UndefinedHandleValue);
// BUG: consumes the one balancing callback, but the
// GraphLoadingStateRecordObject created inside LoadRequestedModules is
// left with isLoading == true and can outlive this call via a sibling
// request parked in a pending fetch's mWaiting list.
}
File: js/src/vm/Modules.cpp, line 1615-1618
AutoCheckRecursionLimit recursion(cx);
if (!recursion.check(cx)) {
return false; // raw unwind: state->isLoading() is left true
}
File: js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp, line 1667-1676
if (aRequest->IsErrored()) { // only !mModuleScript || HasParseError();
// mErroredLoadingImports is never consulted
LOG(("ScriptLoadRequest (%p): ProcessDynamicImport, request has an error",
aRequest));
// The error is already processed in OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected.
return;
}
LOG(("ScriptLoadRequest (%p): ProcessDynamicImport", aRequest));
FinishLoadingImportedModule(cx, aRequest); // trailing ClearImport() sets
// mPayload = UndefinedValue()
File: js/src/vm/Modules.cpp, line 1735-1757
// Step 1. If state.[[IsLoading]] is false, return unused.
if (!state->isLoading()) {
return true;
}
...
// Step 3.a. Set state.[[IsLoading]] to false.
state->setIsLoading(false);
// Step 3.b. Perform ! Call(state.[[PromiseCapability]].[[Reject]], ...)
RootedValue hostDefined(cx, state->hostDefined());
return state->rejected(cx, hostDefined, error); // second delivery for the
// same, finished request
File: js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp, line 1443-1496
bool ModuleLoaderBase::OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected(
JSContext* aCx, ModuleLoadRequest* aRequest, Handle<Value> error) {
...
if (aRequest->IsDynamicImport()) {
...
Rooted<Value> payload(aCx, aRequest->mPayload); // undefined after
// ClearImport()
if (!error.isUndefined()) {
FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed(aCx, payload, error); // line 1463:
// crash site
}
...
}
...
// Decrease the reference 'AddRef'ed when converting the hostDefined.
aRequest->Release(); // line 1496: second Release for a single AddRef
return true;
}
File: js/src/vm/Modules.cpp, line 173-189
JS_PUBLIC_API bool JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed(
JSContext* cx, Handle<Value> payloadArg, Handle<Value> error) {
...
// Step 2. If payload is a GraphLoadingState Record, then
JSObject* payload = &payloadArg.toObject(); // undefined Value unboxed as
// JSObject* (no release-mode
// type check)
if (payload->is<GraphLoadingStateRecordObject>()) { // header read faults
// at 0x0007800000000000
Failure of LoadRequestedModules via raw false return triggers a fallback rejection that does not deactivate the GraphLoadingStateRecordObject; ProcessDynamicImport then clears the request's payload despite the load having errored; a later ContinueModuleLoading on the still-loading state re-delivers the rejection callback, which dereferences the cleared (undefined) payload as an object.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker page creates a dedicated worker from a blob URL; all remaining steps run automatically in the worker with no user interaction.
- The worker builds a 400-deep chain of blob module scripts a1 -> ... -> a400 -> miss (an HTTP module URL that returns 404), plus a module k containing
import slow; import a1;, where slow is an HTTP module URL that returns 404 only after 14 seconds. - First import(k): every chain module compiles and records its [[LoadedModules]] edges, the miss 404 rejects the load (module statuses stay New, edges persist), and the slow fetch remains pending in ModuleLoaderBase::mFetchingModules.
- From deeply recursed JS (an adaptive sweep toward the stack ceiling), the worker calls import(k) again: the fetched-module-map hit resumes synchronously; StartFetchingModuleDependencies AddRefs the request (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1335) and calls the synchronous-callback variant of JS::LoadRequestedModules, creating GraphLoadingStateRecordObject S with hostDefined = PrivateValue(request); HostLoadImportedModule for slow parks a child request whose payload is S in the pending fetch's mWaiting list, keeping S alive.
- The engine-only InnerModuleLoading descent over the 400 recorded [[LoadedModules]] edges trips AutoCheckRecursionLimit (Modules.cpp:1616) and unwinds via raw
return falsewith no host frame in between, so js::LoadRequestedModules returns false while S.isLoading remains true. - The
if (!result)fallback (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1385) delivers the rejection callback the first time: the dynamic-import promise is rejected, mErroredLoadingImports is set, ModuleErrored runs, and the single AddRef is Released — S is never deactivated. - ModuleErrored -> LoadFinished -> ProcessDynamicImport: the guard checks only IsErrored() (mModuleScript is valid and has no parse error) and ignores mErroredLoadingImports, so FinishLoadingImportedModule runs again and its trailing ClearImport() sets the request's mPayload to undefined (ModuleLoadRequest.cpp:184-188).
- About 14 seconds later the slow fetch fails: OnFetchComplete -> ResumeWaitingRequests -> OnFetchFailed(child) -> JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailedWithPendingException(S) -> ContinueModuleLoading sees S.isLoading == true and synchronously invokes S.rejected a second time with the raw request pointer.
- OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1461-1463) passes the now-undefined mPayload to JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed, which unboxes it with
&payloadArg.toObject()(Modules.cpp:183); the object-header read through the resulting wild pointer faults at 0x0007800000000000 in the content-process worker thread. Had the read not faulted, the same path ends with a second aRequest->Release() (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1496) against a single AddRef — a reference-count underflow on the doubly-delivered path.
Steps to Reproduce
- Build Firefox with the ASAN fuzzing mozconfig (mozconfig.linux.asan.fuzzing) from an unmodified tree.
- Start the auxiliary HTTP server: python3 external_services/mod_server.py (listens on 127.0.0.1:8765; serves /js?fail=1 as 404 and /js?delay=N&fail=1 as 404 after N ms, with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *).
- Load testcase.html over HTTP from any origin (the module fetches to 127.0.0.1:8765 are cross-origin and CORS-allowed). No prefs and no source modifications are required.
- Wait ~14-16 seconds after load; the worker thread of the content process crashes with the SEGV shown below.
Security Impact
- Severity: High
- Attacker capability: From unprivileged web content, with no prefs and no user interaction beyond loading the page, an attacker can force the module loader's rejection callback to run a second time on a request whose import state has already been torn down. The demonstrated result is a type confusion in the content process: an undefined JS::Value is unboxed as JSObject* and dereferenced (in this run, a read at a fixed non-canonical address). The same doubly-delivered path holds the request only as a non-owning raw PrivateValue pointer whose balancing strong reference was released at the first delivery, and ends with a second aRequest->Release() (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1496) against a single AddRef (ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1335) — an unbalanced-refcount condition on a refcounted object in the same code path. Exploitation beyond the demonstrated content-process crash was not shown in this run.
- Preconditions: None beyond normal browsing: victim loads an attacker page over HTTP(S). The attacker needs a server that serves a delayed 404 module response (~14 s) to keep a fetch pending; the recursion-limit trigger is an automated in-page sweep. Reproduced deterministically on the first attempt.
ASAN Report
==42717==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x7686b8b2fdc2 bp 0x768603b712f0 sp 0x768603b71260 T20)
==42717==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==42717==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below).
#0 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in js::gc::HeaderWord::get() const /firefox/js/src/gc/Cell.h:113:23
#1 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in js::gc::CellWithTenuredGCPointer<js::gc::Cell, js::Shape>::headerPtr() const /firefox/js/src/gc/Cell.h:876:60
#2 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in JSObject::shape() const /firefox/js/src/vm/JSObject.h:100:37
#3 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in JSObject::getClass() const /firefox/js/src/vm/JSObject.h:121:44
#4 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in bool JSObject::is<js::GraphLoadingStateRecordObject>() const /firefox/js/src/vm/JSObject.h:530:12
#5 0x7686b8b2fdc2 in JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/src/vm/Modules.cpp:184:16
#6 0x7686a8c39de4 in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected(JSContext*, JS::loader::ModuleLoadRequest*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1463:7
#7 0x7686a8c39973 in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::OnLoadRequestedModulesRejected(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:1439:10
#8 0x7686b6d08fba in js::GraphLoadingStateRecordObject::rejected(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/src/builtin/ModuleObject.cpp:1786:10
#9 0x7686b8b2fb9e in ContinueModuleLoading(JSContext*, JS::Handle<js::GraphLoadingStateRecordObject*>, JS::Handle<js::ModuleObject*>, js::ImportPhase, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/src/vm/Modules.cpp:1757:17
#10 0x7686b8b2fe7d in JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailed(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/src/vm/Modules.cpp:187:12
#11 0x7686b8b2f89a in JS::FinishLoadingImportedModuleFailedWithPendingException(JSContext*, JS::Handle<JS::Value>) /firefox/js/src/vm/Modules.cpp:218:10
#12 0x7686a8c30867 in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::OnFetchFailed(JS::loader::ModuleLoadRequest*) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:892:7
#13 0x7686a8c349ab in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::ResumeWaitingRequest(JS::loader::ModuleLoadRequest*, bool) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:723:5
#14 0x7686a8c349ab in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::ResumeWaitingRequests(JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::LoadingRequest*, bool) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:710:5
#15 0x7686a8c34fe1 in JS::loader::ModuleLoaderBase::OnFetchComplete(JS::loader::ModuleLoadRequest*, nsresult) /firefox/js/loader/ModuleLoaderBase.cpp:812:3
#16 0x7686b311e12a in JS::loader::ModuleLoadRequest::OnFetchComplete(nsresult) dist/include/js/loader/ModuleLoadRequest.h:96:21
#17 0x7686b311e12a in mozilla::dom::workerinternals::loader::ScriptExecutorRunnable::ProcessModuleScript(JSContext*, mozilla::dom::WorkerPrivate*) /firefox/dom/workers/ScriptLoader.cpp:1745:18
#18 0x7686b311e655 in mozilla::dom::workerinternals::loader::ScriptExecutorRunnable::WorkerRun(JSContext*, mozilla::dom::WorkerPrivate*) /firefox/dom/workers/ScriptLoader.cpp:1792:12
#19 0x7686b318ff7b in mozilla::dom::WorkerThreadRunnable::Run() /firefox/dom/workers/WorkerRunnable.cpp:438:12
#20 0x7686a879038a in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*) /firefox/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1174:16
#21 0x7686a8799af9 in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool) /firefox/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:471:10
#22 0x7686b316f0aa in mozilla::dom::WorkerPrivate::DoRunLoop(JSContext*) /firefox/dom/workers/WorkerPrivate.cpp:4173:7
#23 0x7686b312f4b1 in mozilla::dom::workerinternals::(anonymous namespace)::WorkerThreadPrimaryRunnable::Run() /firefox/dom/workers/RuntimeService.cpp:2408:42
==42717==Register values:
rax = 0x0000f00000000000 rbx = 0x0000768603b71260 rcx = 0x0000000000000001 rdx = 0x00007756d3b071e0
rdi = 0x0007800000000000 rsi = 0x00007756d3b071e0 rbp = 0x0000768603b712f0 rsp = 0x0000768603b71260
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/firefox/obj-firefox-asan/dist/bin/libxul.so+0x250cadc2) (BuildId: f3343165b74dff1cc1c75ae1d9635c98)
==42717==ABORTING
| Reporter | ||
Comment 1•3 months ago
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Comment 2•3 months ago
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Comment 3•3 months ago
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Comment 4•3 months ago
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Comment 5•3 months ago
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Comment 6•3 months ago
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This bug was filed automatically by an AI-powered security testing tool. The analysis, testcase, and any suggested patches were generated by an AI model and have NOT been verified by a human.
Please review all details carefully before triaging. The crash is real (confirmed by ASAN), but the root cause analysis and suggested fix may contain errors.
Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 7•3 months ago
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Yoshi, want to take a look at this sec-high?
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Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 8•3 months ago
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Comment 9•3 months ago
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Comment 10•3 months ago
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:allstars.chh, please update all release status flags to reflect the affected/unaffected/disabled state correctly. Which branches (beta, release, and/or ESR) are affected by this flaw?
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Comment 11•3 months ago
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The recursion check in InnerModuleLoading
https://searchfox.org/firefox-main/rev/7f451c7918ffe36840b0ef31dfc2272ded671f81/js/src/vm/Modules.cpp#1615-1618
is added in bug 2013604, which is in Firefox 149.
Comment 12•3 months ago
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The bug has a release status flag that shows some version of Firefox is affected, thus it will be considered confirmed.
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Comment 13•3 months ago
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Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 14•3 months ago
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https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.html
- The bug has a sec-high rating, but only affects the content process
..If it meets any of the above criteria, developers do not need to ask for sec-approval.
This bug is content-process only. So I won't ask for sec-approval? for this.
Comment 15•3 months ago
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Comment 16•3 months ago
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Comment 17•3 months ago
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The patch landed in nightly and beta is affected, along with ESR.
:allstars.chh, is this bug important enough to require an uplift?
- If yes, please nominate the patch for beta and ESR approvals.
- See https://wiki.mozilla.org/Release_Management/Requesting_an_Uplift for documentation on how to request an uplift.
- If no, please set
status-firefox154and the ESR status flag(s) towontfix.
For more information, please visit BugBot documentation.
| Assignee | ||
Comment 18•3 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D316025
Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 19•3 months ago
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firefox-beta Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: SEGV on unknown address when repeated loading the same large module grapgh, which may cause over-recursion.
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: no
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Handle over-recursion correctly during module loading.
- String changes made/needed?: no
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Comment 20•3 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D316025
Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 21•3 months ago
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firefox-beta Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: SEGV on unknown address when repeated loading the same large module grapgh, which may cause over-recursion.
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: no
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Handle over-recursion correctly during module loading.
String changes made/needed?: no - String changes made/needed?: no
- Is Android affected?: yes
| Assignee | ||
Comment 22•3 months ago
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Original Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D316025
Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 23•3 months ago
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firefox-release Uplift Approval Request
- User impact if declined/Reason for urgency: SEGV on unknown address when repeated loading the same large module grapgh, which may cause over-recursion.
- Code covered by automated testing?: yes
- Fix verified in Nightly?: no
- Needs manual QE testing?: no
- Steps to reproduce for manual QE testing:
- Risk associated with taking this patch: low
- Explanation of risk level: Handle over-recursion correctly during module loading.
String changes made/needed?: no - String changes made/needed?: no
- Is Android affected?: yes
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Updated•3 months ago
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Comment 24•3 months ago
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| uplift | ||
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Comment 25•3 months ago
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| uplift | ||
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Updated•23 days ago
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Description
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