ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest does not validate principals from content process — cross-origin blob data theft via forged SystemPrincipal
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Content Processes, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: nguyentuanhung1149, Unassigned)
Details
Summary
ContentParent::RecvBlobURLDataRequest (dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp, lines 7537-7557 on mozilla-central tip) receives aTriggeringPrincipal and aLoadingPrincipal from the content process but does NOT call ValidatePrincipal() before passing them to BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry(). This allows a compromised content process to forge SystemPrincipal, bypassing blob URL access controls and stealing cross-origin blob data.
Comparison with Other Handlers
Other IPC handlers in ContentParent.cpp that receive principals DO validate them:
RecvLoadURIExternal(line 4762):ValidatePrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)✅RecvStoreUserInteractionAsPermission(line 6715):ValidatePrincipal(aPrincipal)✅RecvBlobURLDataRequest(line 7537): NO ValidatePrincipal call ❌
Impact Chain
Step 1: Compromised content process sends forged request
A compromised content process sends PContent::BlobURLDataRequest with:
aBlobURL= a known cross-origin blob URLaLoadingPrincipal= SystemPrincipal (forged)aTriggeringPrincipal= SystemPrincipal (forged)- Other fields matching expected values
Step 2: GetDataEntry access checks bypassed
In BlobURLProtocolHandler::GetDataEntry (dom/file/uri/BlobURLProtocolHandler.cpp, lines 780-840):
Origin attributes check (lines 808-814):
if ((NS_WARN_IF(!aLoadingPrincipal) ||
!aLoadingPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) && // ← SystemPrincipal BYPASSES this check
NS_WARN_IF(!ChromeUtils::IsOriginAttributesEqualIgnoringFPD(
aOriginAttributes,
BasePrincipal::Cast(info->mPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef()))) {
return false;
}
With forged SystemPrincipal as aLoadingPrincipal, IsSystemPrincipal() returns true, and the entire origin attributes check is SKIPPED.
Subsumes check (lines 816-818):
if (NS_WARN_IF(!aTriggeringPrincipal->Subsumes(info->mPrincipal))) {
return false;
}
SystemPrincipal subsumes ALL principals, so this check ALWAYS passes with forged SystemPrincipal.
Step 3: Cross-origin blob data returned
GetDataEntry returns the blob implementation to the content process, completing the cross-origin data theft.
The SystemPrincipal Bypass is Intentional — But Only for Parent Process
The code comment at lines 802-806 explains:
// We also allow the system principal to create the channel regardless of
// the OriginAttributes. This is primarily for the benefit of mechanisms
// like the Download API that explicitly create a channel with the system
// principal
This bypass is designed for legitimate parent-process APIs (Download API), NOT for content processes. But without ValidatePrincipal() in RecvBlobURLDataRequest, content processes can abuse it.
Steps to Reproduce (Code Path PoC)
- Content process constructs BlobURLDataRequest IPC message with:
aBlobURL= "blob:https://victim.com/UUID" (a known cross-origin blob URL)aTriggeringPrincipal= SystemPrincipalInfo{} (serialized SystemPrincipal)aLoadingPrincipal= SystemPrincipalInfo{}aOriginAttributes= default OriginAttributes{}
- Parent process receives in RecvBlobURLDataRequest (line 7537)
- No ValidatePrincipal check — forged SystemPrincipal accepted
- GetDataEntry called with SystemPrincipal — bypasses all access checks
- Cross-origin blob data serialized and sent back to content process
Affected Versions
mozilla-central tip (verified 2026-09-28)
Suggested Fix
Add ValidatePrincipal() calls for both principals, matching the pattern used by other IPC handlers:
if (!ValidatePrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)) {
return PrincipalValidationIpcFail(aTriggeringPrincipal, this, __func__);
}
if (!ValidatePrincipal(aLoadingPrincipal,
{ValidatePrincipalOptions::AllowNullPtr})) {
return PrincipalValidationIpcFail(aLoadingPrincipal, this, __func__);
}
Credit
Nguyen Tuan Hung (nguyentuanhung1149@gmail.com) VNUHCM - UIT
Updated•1 month ago
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Updated•1 month ago
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Description
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