Cross-frame policy overwrite: `SetContainerPermissionsPolicy` / `SetReferrerPolicyForEmbedderFrame` accept any browsing context (embedder-ownership check exists nearby in `DiscardBrowsingContext`)
Categories
(Core :: DOM: Security, defect)
Tracking
()
People
(Reporter: mnsy701x, Unassigned)
Details
Steps to reproduce
Summary
Two PContent handlers let a content process overwrite security-relevant embedder-side policy state on any browsing context id: the container permissions-policy info and the embedder referrer policy of a frame. Both are supposed to be set by the embedding document's process (when it creates/adjusts an iframe or object), and the parent has a ready-made ownership check for exactly this relation (CheckBrowsingContextEmbedder used by DiscardBrowsingContext) — but neither handler uses it, so a compromised child can retarget another process's frames.
What did you do (steps to reproduce)
RecvSetContainerPermissionsPolicy(dom/ipc/ContentParent.cpp:8058-8070):
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvSetContainerPermissionsPolicy(
const MaybeDiscardedBrowsingContext& aContainerContext,
MaybePermissionsPolicyInfo&& aContainerPermissionsPolicyInfo) {
if (aContainerContext.IsNullOrDiscarded()) { return IPC_OK(); }
auto* context = aContainerContext.get_canonical();
context->SetContainerPermissionsPolicy(
std::move(aContainerPermissionsPolicyInfo));
return IPC_OK();
}
RecvSetReferrerPolicyForEmbedderFrame(:8087-8095):
mozilla::ipc::IPCResult ContentParent::RecvSetReferrerPolicyForEmbedderFrame(
const MaybeDiscardedBrowsingContext& aContext,
const ReferrerPolicy& aPolicy) {
if (!aContext.IsNullOrDiscarded()) {
auto* canonical = aContext.get_canonical();
canonical->SetEmbedderFrameReferrerPolicy(aPolicy);
}
return IPC_OK();
}
- Neither checks that the named context is embedded in — a frame of — the sending process. The legitimate callers are the embedder process (
dom/html/HTMLIFrameElement.cpp:~330/:~269,dom/base/nsObjectLoadingContent.cpp:1891), and the parent already contains the correct relation check for a sibling message:DiscardBrowsingContext(:7009-7026) usesCheckBrowsingContextEmbedder/IsEmbeddedInProcessbefore acting.
Actual results
What happened (actual results)
- Referrer policy downgrade / privacy leak: the victim frame's stored embedder referrer policy can be replaced (e.g. with
unsafe-url), so loads attributed to that frame then send full URLs as theReferer— exactly the leakage the policy exists to prevent. - Permissions-policy falsification: the container policy consumed when constructing
LoadInfofor the frame and its descendants is overwritten, so feature-access decisions for a foreign frame's tree are made against attacker-chosen policy state. - Both writes target contexts the attacker does not own, from a process that has no legitimate reason to name them.
Honest limits: static-only finding (no dynamic run in this pass); the contrast with DiscardBrowsingContext and the abuse sketch are in the attached lane report.
Evidence/attachments: FF160_VALID_SWEEP.md (handler table and rank-6 abuse sketch).
Expected results
What should have happened (expected results)
Both handlers should apply the same embedder-ownership validation DiscardBrowsingContext already performs (CheckBrowsingContextEmbedder / IsEmbeddedInProcess on the named context against the sender). A process should only be able to set policy state for frames it actually embeds.
Comment 1•1 month ago
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The Bugbug bot thinks this bug should belong to the 'Core::DOM: Security' component, and is moving the bug to that component. Please correct in case you think the bot is wrong.
Comment 2•28 days ago
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The severity field is not set for this bug.
:freddy, could you have a look please?
For more information, please visit BugBot documentation.
Updated•28 days ago
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Description
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