Open Bug 2087990 Opened 16 days ago Updated 2 days ago

SECOM: Insufficient randomness in serial numbers of two Cybertrust Japan subordinate CA certificates

Categories

(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)

Tracking

(Not tracked)

ASSIGNED

People

(Reporter: cainfo, Assigned: cainfo)

Details

(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [ca-misissuance])

Attachments

(3 files)

Preliminary Incident Report

Summary

  • Incident description:

    At 2026-10-30T23:26:00Z, SECOM Trust Systems received a report from an Application Software Supplier concerning the serial numbers of previously issued CA certificates.

    At 2026-10-31T08:00:00Z, SECOM Trust Systems determined that the two subordinate CA certificates described below did not comply with the applicable Baseline Requirements.

    Our investigation confirmed that the random values contained in the certificate serial numbers of the following two valid subordinate CA certificates issued for Cybertrust Japan were 40 bits in length.

    CA Certificate notBefore Serial Number
    Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 2019-09-27T01:54:23Z 22B9B1630CECB43C2E
    Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3 2019-09-27T02:04:20Z 22B9B16488BCE695FC

    The serial numbers of these two subordinate CA certificates were generated by combining a sequential portion consisting of the first eight hexadecimal digits with a random portion consisting of the following ten hexadecimal digits.

    The serial-number structures are as follows:

    Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4
    Serial Number:      22B9B1630CECB43C2E
    Sequential portion: 22B9B163
    Random portion:     0CECB43C2E
    Random length:      40 bits
    
    Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3
    Serial Number:      22B9B16488BCE695FC
    Sequential portion: 22B9B164
    Random portion:     88BCE695FC
    Random length:      40 bits
    

    Each random portion consists of ten hexadecimal digits and is therefore 40 bits in length.

    The Baseline Requirements Version 1.6.6, Section 7.1, applicable at the time these certificates were issued, required CAs to generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

    The serial numbers of these two subordinate CA certificates contained only 40 bits of random output and therefore did not meet the 64-bit requirement.

    Based on this finding, we determined that these two subordinate CA certificates did not comply with Section 7.1 of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.6.6 applicable at the time of issuance.

    No end-entity certificates are currently being issued from the affected subordinate CAs.

    These two subordinate CA certificates are currently valid. We have decided to revoke both certificates and are proceeding with the necessary revocation activities.

  • Relevant policies:

    CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, Version 1.6.6, Section 7.1.

    Section 7.1 required CAs to generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

  • Source of incident disclosure:

    Third Party Reported

While implementing similar serial number checks across a range of CAs I also found the 2 certs that you've mentioned, but as well as those I found these two which are both still valid, both trusted by root stores including Mozilla, and both without technical constraints via EKU:

Subject CN SHA-256 notBefore notAfter Serial
SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 7a4fcba079f5bddcf0a76c3b03a377e155a53009474a1b3eb8f34961a53bda9c 2018-01-09 2028-01-09 22B9B12B288A041897
SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 b10861737b3ec9b11fa6154d23970ffb2dabfc28ae6a6bf56c3f3204266239ad 2018-10-04 2028-10-04 22B9B1575075487009

Even though they seem to be intended for issuing client certificates, they are not technically constrained by EKU so I believe they therefore fall with the Baseline Requirements, and they have fewer than 64 bits of CSPRNG output within their serial numbers (also at 40 bits it would seem).

Assignee: nobody → cainfo
Status: UNCONFIRMED → ASSIGNED
Type: defect → task
Ever confirmed: true
Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [ca-misissuance]
Attached file 20261106.csv —

Status Update - 2026-11-06

SECOM Trust Systems completed the revocation of the following two affected subordinate CA certificates on 2026-11-06:

  • Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4
    Serial Number: 22B9B1630CECB43C2E
  • Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3
    Serial Number: 22B9B16488BCE695FC

The detailed CSV is available here:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9675588

(In reply to Daniel C from comment #1)
Thank you for bringing these two additional Subordinate CA Certificates to our attention.

SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 have been operated exclusively for non-TLS purposes. PUB CA4 has been used to issue document-signing certificates, and PUB CA8 has been used to issue client-authentication certificates. Neither CA has ever issued TLS server certificates.

Both CAs have been included in our annual WebTrust for Certification Authorities audits. However, based on their intended purposes and actual non-TLS certificate issuance history, they have not been included in the scope of our Baseline Requirements audits.

We recognize that these Subordinate CA Certificates do not contain an Extended Key Usage extension. We are therefore reviewing whether the absence of an EKU technical constraint causes these certificates to fall within the scope of the Baseline Requirements, notwithstanding their exclusively non-TLS operation and issuance history.

We have confirmed that the serial numbers of these certificates were generated using the same structure identified in the previously reported certificates: a 32-bit sequential portion followed by a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG.

Accordingly, if these Subordinate CA Certificates are determined to fall within the scope of the Baseline Requirements, we consider their serial numbers to be non-compliant with the applicable requirement for at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

We are currently reviewing the applicability of the Baseline Requirements to these Subordinate CA Certificates, including the requirements in effect when the certificates were issued and any continuing obligations. We also plan to issue new Subordinate CA Certificates containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes.

We will provide a further update after completing this review.

Status Update - 2026-11-11

On 2026-11-10, SECOM Trust Systems completed the issuance of the following new Subordinate CA Certificates containing Extended Key Usage extensions limited to their intended non-TLS purposes:

  1. SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4

    • Serial Number: 22B9B1B63C98AAA0C23B09ADC28FA4EB
    • notBefore: 2026-11-10T01:36:49Z
    • Extended Key Usage: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12 (Microsoft Document Signing)
    • SHA-256 Fingerprint: 16BB40109C9F040BBAC91401CFA67FB1B69CD2B4889CB0CD749B3DAE2B399797
  2. SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8

    • Serial Number: 22B9B1B74630D5D892C12AB2E67E94D8
    • notBefore: 2026-11-10T01:53:22Z
    • Extended Key Usage: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 (TLS Web Client Authentication)
    • SHA-256 Fingerprint: 477D78D6E868E77A269204640DF25669E189B27C6CFB70E463BD434551E6BDC1

These Extended Key Usage extensions technically limit the new Subordinate CA Certificates to their respective intended non-TLS purposes.

SECOM Trust Systems has also completed the disclosure of these new Subordinate CA Certificates in the CCADB.

Full Incident Report

Summary

  • CA Owner CCADB unique ID: SECOM Trust Systems: A000045

  • Incident description:

    SECOM Trust Systems identified 42 Subordinate CA Certificates whose serial numbers contained only 40 bits of CSPRNG output. The serial numbers were generated by combining a 32-bit sequential portion with a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG and therefore did not meet the applicable Baseline Requirements requirement for at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

    The Preliminary Incident Report covered two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates, which were revoked on 2026-11-06. During the investigation, SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 were also identified as affected. These two Subordinate CAs had been operated exclusively for non-TLS purposes, but their Subordinate CA Certificates did not contain an Extended Key Usage extension or other technical constraints that excluded TLS server authentication. A subsequent review of all CA certificates identified 38 additional affected Subordinate CA Certificates, all of which had already been revoked or had expired before this incident was identified.

    After consulting with our auditor and reviewing the applicable requirements, SECOM Trust Systems determined at 2026-11-13T09:00:00Z that PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 fell within the scope of the Baseline Requirements and were non-compliant. Replacement Subordinate CA Certificates containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were issued on 2026-11-10T01:53:22Z. Revocation of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 has not been completed as of the submission of this report and will be completed by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z.

  • Timeline summary:

    • Non-compliance start date: 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z
    • Non-compliance identified date: 2026-10-31T08:00:00Z
    • Non-compliance end date: 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z (planned; all remaining non-compliant Subordinate CA Certificates are scheduled to be revoked by this time)
  • Relevant policies:

    CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, Section 7.1, in the version in effect at the time each affected certificate was issued (including Version 1.5.4 for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8, and Version 1.6.6 for the two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates).

    This section required CAs to generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

  • Source of incident disclosure:

    Third Party Reported

Impact

  • Total number of certificates: 42 Subordinate CA Certificates.

  • Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: 2 Subordinate CA Certificates as of the submission of this report:

    • SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4
    • SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8
  • Affected certificate types: Subordinate CA Certificates. The affected certificates do not contain CA/Browser Forum reserved certificate policy OIDs (DV, IV, OV, or EV).

    The two Cybertrust Japan certificates were TLS-capable Subordinate CA Certificates.

    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 were intended and operated for non-TLS purposes, but their certificates were not technically constrained by EKU to exclude TLS server authentication.

  • Incident heuristic:

    The full corpus of affected certificates consists of the 42 Subordinate CA Certificates disclosed in the Appendix. All of them were issued between 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z and 2020-07-10T05:09:35Z by Security Communication RootCA2 or Security Communication ECC RootCA1, and their serial numbers were generated using the same structure: a 32-bit sequential portion followed by a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG (18 hexadecimal digits, or 17 when the leading zero is omitted).

  • Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?:

    No. No end-entity certificates were being issued from the two affected Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CAs when the incident was identified, and the 38 additional affected Subordinate CA Certificates had already been revoked or had expired.

    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 continued to support existing non-TLS services while replacement Subordinate CA Certificates with EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were prepared and issued.

  • Analysis:

    N/A. PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 will be revoked by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z in accordance with the applicable requirements.

  • Additional considerations:

    PUB CA4 has been used to issue document-signing certificates, and PUB CA8 has been used to issue client-authentication certificates. Neither CA has ever issued TLS server certificates.

    Both CAs were included in annual WebTrust for Certification Authorities audits but were not included in the scope of Baseline Requirements audits because their intended purpose and actual issuance were exclusively non-TLS. The absence of EKU technical constraints, however, caused the Subordinate CA Certificates themselves to fall within the scope of the Baseline Requirements.

Timeline

All dates and times below are stated in UTC.

Date and time Event
2016-12-15T08:31:14Z The earliest affected certificate (Subordinate Advanced ECC CA1, serial number 10000349A43149790) was issued.
2018-01-09T06:01:29Z SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 was issued with serial number 22B9B12B288A041897.
2018-10-04T05:28:09Z SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 was issued with serial number 22B9B1575075487009.
2019-09-27T01:54:23Z Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 was issued with serial number 22B9B1630CECB43C2E.
2019-09-27T02:04:20Z Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3 was issued with serial number 22B9B16488BCE695FC.
2020-07-10T05:09:35Z The latest affected certificate (JPRS Domain Validation Authority - G3, serial number 22B9B174E5DA7D6EEB) was issued.
2026-10-30T23:26:00Z SECOM Trust Systems received a third-party report concerning the serial numbers of previously issued CA certificates.
2026-10-31T08:00:00Z SECOM Trust Systems determined that the two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates did not comply with Section 7.1 of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.6.6 applicable at the time of issuance.
2026-11-02T09:43:00Z SECOM Trust Systems submitted the Preliminary Incident Report in Bug 2087990.
2026-11-03T00:38:00Z A community member identified SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 as two additional potentially affected Subordinate CA Certificates.
2026-11-06T04:59:35Z SECOM Trust Systems completed revocation of Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 and Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3.
2026-11-06 SECOM Trust Systems confirmed that the serial numbers of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 used the same structure as the two previously reported certificates: a 32-bit sequential portion followed by a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG. SECOM Trust Systems began reviewing the applicability of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.5.4, including consultation with its auditor.
2026-11-10T01:53:22Z SECOM Trust Systems completed issuance of replacement Subordinate CA Certificates for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes. The replacement certificates use serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.
2026-11-13T09:00:00Z After completing the review and consultation with its auditor, SECOM Trust Systems determined that PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 fell within the scope of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.5.4 and did not comply with the applicable serial-number requirement.
2026-11-13T09:30:00Z SECOM Trust Systems had already completed the identification of all time-valid, non-revoked CA certificates with the affected serial-number structure. To align with the definition of "Total number of certificates" in the CCADB Incident Reporting Guidelines, SECOM Trust Systems additionally extracted expired and revoked CA certificates with the same serial-number structure, and updated the affected population to 42 Subordinate CA Certificates.
2026-11-20T09:00:00Z Deadline for completing revocation of SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8.

Related Incidents

Bug Date Description
Bug 1539358 2019-03-27 A previous SECOM Trust Systems incident involving insufficient entropy in certificate serial numbers. This incident is relevant to the historical design and review of serial-number generation controls.
Bug 2085769 2026-10-26 An incident involving a CA certificate serial number generated with java.util.Random.
Bug 2087236 2026-10-29 An incident involving CA certificate serial numbers containing fewer than 64 bits of CSPRNG output.
Bug 2090925 2026-11-09 An incident involving serial numbers that did not contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

Root Cause Analysis

Contributing Factor #1: Serial-number construction did not provide at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output

  • Description:

    The affected Subordinate CA Certificate serial numbers were generated by combining a 32-bit sequential portion with a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG. The design evaluated the overall serial number as non-sequential but did not ensure that the serial number contained at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

  • Timeline:

    This construction was used for the affected certificates issued from 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z through 2020-07-10T05:09:35Z. It remained undetected until the third-party report received on 2026-10-30T23:26:00Z.

  • Detection:

    The issue was detected through external analysis of the serial-number structure. The pre-issuance review verified the overall certificate profile and serial-number format but did not separately calculate and verify the number of bits generated by the CSPRNG.

  • Interaction with other factors:

    The absence of an explicit control for the minimum CSPRNG-output length interacted with the scope-classification issue described in Contributing Factor #2. As a result, PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 were not initially included in the affected population.

  • Root Cause Analysis methodology used:

    5 Whys.

Contributing Factor #2: Baseline Requirements scope was assessed from intended and actual use without sufficient consideration of technical constraints

  • Description:

    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 were intended and operated exclusively for non-TLS purposes and had never issued TLS server certificates. Based on that intended purpose and issuance history, they were not included in the scope of Baseline Requirements audits. However, the corresponding Subordinate CA Certificates did not contain EKU technical constraints excluding TLS server authentication.

  • Timeline:

    This scope classification existed from the issuance of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 in 2018 until the applicability review was completed on 2026-11-13T09:00:00Z.

  • Detection:

    A community member identified the absence of EKU technical constraints. The issue avoided earlier detection because review and audit scoping relied on the intended service and actual certificate issuance rather than requiring a documented technical-constraint assessment for every Subordinate CA Certificate.

  • Interaction with other factors:

    Because the two certificates were treated as outside the Baseline Requirements scope, the 64-bit CSPRNG-output requirement was not applied to their serial numbers during issuance or subsequent compliance reviews.

  • Root Cause Analysis methodology used:

    5 Whys.

Lessons Learned

  • What went well:
    • SECOM Trust Systems promptly confirmed the serial-number structure after receiving the third-party report.
    • The two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates were revoked on 2026-11-06.
    • Consultation with the auditor was used to validate the Baseline Requirements scope determination for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8.
    • Replacement Subordinate CA Certificates with EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were issued before revocation of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8.
  • What didn’t go well:
    • The serial-number generation specification and issuance review did not independently verify that at least 64 bits of the serial number were generated by a CSPRNG.
    • Baseline Requirements scope was determined primarily from intended purpose and actual issuance history, without requiring confirmation of technical constraints in the Subordinate CA Certificate.
    • Periodic compliance reviews and audit-scoping reviews did not detect the serial-number or technical-constraint issues.
    • The Preliminary Incident Report did not identify the full affected population, because the initial review was limited to the certificates reported by the third party rather than all CA certificates issued with the same serial-number structure.
  • Where we got lucky:
    • 38 of the 42 affected certificates had already been revoked or had expired before this incident was identified.
    • PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 had not issued TLS server certificates despite not being technically constrained by EKU.
  • Additional:
    • Compliance reviews must evaluate both operational intent and enforceable certificate constraints.
    • Serial-number length alone is not sufficient evidence that the serial number contains the required amount of CSPRNG output.

Action Items

Action Item Kind Corresponding Root Cause(s) Evaluation Criteria Due Date Status
#1 Revoke Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 and Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3. Mitigate Contributing Factor #1 Both certificates appear as revoked in the applicable CRLs, with revocation completed on 2026-11-06. 2026-11-06 Complete
#2 Issue replacement Subordinate CA Certificates for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes and serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 Issuance records and certificate profiles confirm the EKU restrictions and the serial-number generation requirements. 2026-11-10 Complete
#3 Revoke SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 Both certificates appear as revoked in the applicable CRLs by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z. 2026-11-20 Ongoing
#4 Change the serial-number generation method for CA certificates so that serial numbers contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. Prevent Contributing Factor #1 All CA certificates issued on or after 2020-07-10T12:47:41Z have serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. 2020-07-10 Complete
#5 Identify all CA certificates with the affected serial-number structure, including expired and revoked certificates, and disclose the full affected population. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 The affected population of 42 Subordinate CA Certificates was identified on 2026-11-13T09:30:00Z and is disclosed in the Appendix. 2026-11-13 Complete
#6 Review the technical constraints (EKU) of all non-expired Subordinate CA Certificates, and ensure that those not technically constrained are replaced and revoked. Prevent Contributing Factor #2 All non-expired Subordinate CA Certificates either are within the Baseline Requirements audit scope or contain EKUs excluding id-kp-serverAuth. 2026-11-20 Ongoing
#7 Add a check of serial-number entropy (at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output) and EKU technical constraints for all non-expired CA certificates to the items reviewed in the quarterly self-audit. Detect Contributing Factors #1 and #2 The quarterly self-audit procedure is revised to include these items, and the first quarterly self-audit under the revised procedure is completed and its results are recorded. 2026-11-27 Ongoing

Appendix

The affected population consists of the 42 Subordinate CA Certificates listed in the following CSV:

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9682508

You should expand your scope to include Mozilla Root Store Policy 2.7, Section 5.2

all new certificates MUST have a serial number greater than zero, containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

As just an example: SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5 which has an EKU for S/MIME and clientAuth.

(In reply to Wayne from comment #8)
Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention.

We have reviewed the affected population against Section 5.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7, which was in effect when SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5 was issued.

We have confirmed that, as PUB CA5 is technically capable of issuing email certificates, it is within the scope of the Mozilla Root Store Policy, and its serial number does not contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

At 2026-11-16T09:00:00Z, we determined that PUB CA5 did not comply with Section 5.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7.

Full Incident Report

This Full Incident Report updates the report in Comment 7 to incorporate SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5, identified in Comment 8.

Summary

  • CA Owner CCADB unique ID: SECOM Trust Systems: A000045

  • Incident description:
    SECOM Trust Systems identified 43 Subordinate CA Certificates whose serial numbers contained only 40 bits of CSPRNG output. The serial numbers were generated by combining a 32-bit sequential portion with a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG and therefore did not meet the applicable Baseline Requirements and Mozilla Root Store Policy requirement for at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

    The Preliminary Incident Report covered two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates, which were revoked on 2026-11-06. During the investigation, SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 were also identified as affected. These two Subordinate CAs had been operated exclusively for non-TLS purposes, but their Subordinate CA Certificates did not contain an Extended Key Usage extension or other technical constraints that excluded TLS server authentication. A subsequent review of all CA certificates identified 38 additional affected Subordinate CA Certificates, all of which had already been revoked or had expired before this incident was identified.

    After consulting with our auditor and reviewing the applicable requirements, SECOM Trust Systems determined at 2026-11-13T09:00:00Z that PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 fell within the scope of the Baseline Requirements and were non-compliant. Replacement Subordinate CA Certificates containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were issued on 2026-11-10T01:53:22Z. Revocation of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 has not been completed as of the submission of this report and will be completed by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z.

    Following Comment 8, SECOM Trust Systems reviewed the affected population against Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7, Section 5.2. SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5 contains the id-kp-emailProtection and id-kp-clientAuth EKUs and was therefore excluded from our initial review, which was based on the scope of the Baseline Requirements. However, it is technically capable of issuing email certificates and is within the scope of the Mozilla Root Store Policy. SECOM Trust Systems determined at 2026-11-16T09:00:00Z that PUB CA5 did not comply with Section 5.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7 and will revoke it by 2026-11-23T09:00:00Z.

  • Timeline summary:

    • Non-compliance start date: 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z
    • Non-compliance identified date: 2026-10-31T08:00:00Z
    • Non-compliance end date: 2026-11-23T09:00:00Z (planned; all remaining non-compliant Subordinate CA Certificates are scheduled to be revoked by this time)
  • Relevant policies:

    CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, Section 7.1, in the version in effect at the time each affected certificate was issued (including Version 1.5.4 for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8, and Version 1.6.6 for the two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates).
    This section required CAs to generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

    Mozilla Root Store Policy, Version 2.7, Section 5.2 (for PUB CA5).
    This section required all new certificates to have a serial number greater than zero, containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

  • Source of incident disclosure:
    Third Party Reported

Impact

  • Total number of certificates: 43 Subordinate CA Certificates.

  • Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: 3 Subordinate CA Certificates as of the submission of this report:

    • SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4
    • SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8
    • SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5
  • Affected certificate types:
    Subordinate CA Certificates. The affected certificates do not contain CA/Browser Forum reserved certificate policy OIDs (DV, IV, OV, or EV).
    The two Cybertrust Japan certificates were TLS-capable Subordinate CA Certificates.
    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 were intended and operated for non-TLS purposes, but their certificates were not technically constrained by EKU to exclude TLS server authentication.
    PUB CA5 contains the id-kp-emailProtection and id-kp-clientAuth EKUs and is technically capable of issuing email certificates.

  • Incident heuristic:

    The full corpus of affected certificates consists of the 43 Subordinate CA Certificates disclosed in the Appendix. All of them were issued between 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z and 2020-07-10T05:09:35Z by Security Communication RootCA2 or Security Communication ECC RootCA1, and their serial numbers were generated using the same structure: a 32-bit sequential portion followed by a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG (18 hexadecimal digits, or 17 when the leading zero is omitted).

  • Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?:

    No. No end-entity certificates were being issued from the two affected Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CAs when the incident was identified, and the 38 additional affected Subordinate CA Certificates had already been revoked or had expired.
    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 continued to support existing non-TLS services while replacement Subordinate CA Certificates with EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were prepared and issued.
    PUB CA5 continues to support existing services until its revocation.

  • Analysis:

    N/A. PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 will be revoked by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z, and PUB CA5 will be revoked by 2026-11-23T09:00:00Z, in accordance with the applicable requirements.

  • Additional considerations:

    PUB CA4 has been used to issue document-signing certificates, and PUB CA8 has been used to issue client-authentication certificates. Neither CA has ever issued TLS server certificates.
    Both CAs were included in annual WebTrust for Certification Authorities audits but were not included in the scope of Baseline Requirements audits because their intended purpose and actual issuance were exclusively non-TLS. The absence of EKU technical constraints, however, caused the Subordinate CA Certificates themselves to fall within the scope of the Baseline Requirements.

    PUB CA5 was not within the scope of the Baseline Requirements because its EKUs do not include id-kp-serverAuth, and it was issued before the S/MIME Baseline Requirements took effect. However, Section 1.1 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7 includes intermediate certificates technically capable of issuing email certificates, and Section 5.2 requires all new certificates within that scope to contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output in their serial numbers.

Timeline

All dates and times below are stated in UTC.

Date and time Event
2016-12-15T08:31:14Z The earliest affected certificate (Subordinate Advanced ECC CA1, serial number 10000349A43149790) was issued.
2018-01-09T06:01:29Z SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 was issued with serial number 22B9B12B288A041897.
2018-10-04T05:28:09Z SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 was issued with serial number 22B9B1575075487009.
2019-09-27T01:54:23Z Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 was issued with serial number 22B9B1630CECB43C2E.
2019-09-27T02:04:20Z Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3 was issued with serial number 22B9B16488BCE695FC.
2020-05-20T07:10:35Z SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5 was issued with serial number 22B9B16DA7E6F3BBBA.
2020-07-10T05:09:35Z The latest affected certificate (JPRS Domain Validation Authority - G3, serial number 22B9B174E5DA7D6EEB) was issued.
2026-10-30T23:26:00Z SECOM Trust Systems received a third-party report concerning the serial numbers of previously issued CA certificates.
2026-10-31T08:00:00Z SECOM Trust Systems determined that the two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates did not comply with Section 7.1 of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.6.6 applicable at the time of issuance.
2026-11-02T09:43:00Z SECOM Trust Systems submitted the Preliminary Incident Report in Bug 2087990.
2026-11-03T00:38:00Z A community member identified SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8 as two additional potentially affected Subordinate CA Certificates.
2026-11-06T04:59:35Z SECOM Trust Systems completed revocation of Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 and Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3.
2026-11-06 SECOM Trust Systems confirmed that the serial numbers of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 used the same structure as the two previously reported certificates: a 32-bit sequential portion followed by a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG. SECOM Trust Systems began reviewing the applicability of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.5.4, including consultation with its auditor.
2026-11-10T01:53:22Z SECOM Trust Systems completed issuance of replacement Subordinate CA Certificates for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes. The replacement certificates use serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.
2026-11-13T09:00:00Z After completing the review and consultation with its auditor, SECOM Trust Systems determined that PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 fell within the scope of the Baseline Requirements Version 1.5.4 and did not comply with the applicable serial-number requirement.
2026-11-13T09:30:00Z SECOM Trust Systems had already completed the identification of all time-valid, non-revoked CA certificates with the affected serial-number structure. To align with the definition of "Total number of certificates" in the CCADB Incident Reporting Guidelines, SECOM Trust Systems additionally extracted expired and revoked CA certificates with the same serial-number structure, and updated the affected population to 42 Subordinate CA Certificates.
2026-11-13T13:35:00Z SECOM Trust Systems submitted the Full Incident Report (Comment 7).
2026-11-13T21:01:00Z A community member pointed out that the scope should be expanded to include Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7, Section 5.2, citing SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5 as an example (Comment 8).
2026-11-16T09:00:00Z SECOM Trust Systems determined that PUB CA5 fell within the scope of the Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 2.7 and did not comply with Section 5.2, and updated the affected population to 43 Subordinate CA Certificates.
2026-11-20T09:00:00Z Deadline for completing revocation of SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8.
2026-11-23T09:00:00Z Deadline for completing revocation of SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5.

Related Incidents

Bug Date Description
Bug 1539358 2019-03-27 A previous SECOM Trust Systems incident involving insufficient entropy in certificate serial numbers. This incident is relevant to the historical design and review of serial-number generation controls.
Bug 2085769 2026-10-26 An incident involving a CA certificate serial number generated with java.util.Random.
Bug 2087236 2026-10-29 An incident involving CA certificate serial numbers containing fewer than 64 bits of CSPRNG output.
Bug 2090925 2026-11-09 An incident involving serial numbers that did not contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

Root Cause Analysis

Contributing Factor #1: Serial-number construction did not provide at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output

  • Description:

    The affected Subordinate CA Certificate serial numbers were generated by combining a 32-bit sequential portion with a 40-bit random portion generated using a CSPRNG. The design evaluated the overall serial number as non-sequential but did not ensure that the serial number contained at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output.

  • Timeline:

    This construction was used for the affected certificates issued from 2016-12-15T08:31:14Z through 2020-07-10T05:09:35Z. It remained undetected until the third-party report received on 2026-10-30T23:26:00Z.

  • Detection:

    The issue was detected through external analysis of the serial-number structure. The pre-issuance review verified the overall certificate profile and serial-number format but did not separately calculate and verify the number of bits generated by the CSPRNG.

  • Interaction with other factors:

    The absence of an explicit control for the minimum CSPRNG-output length interacted with the scope-classification issues described in Contributing Factors #2 and #3. As a result, PUB CA4, PUB CA8, and PUB CA5 were not initially included in the affected population.

  • Root Cause Analysis methodology used:

    5 Whys.

Contributing Factor #2: Baseline Requirements scope was assessed from intended and actual use without sufficient consideration of technical constraints

  • Description:

    PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 were intended and operated exclusively for non-TLS purposes and had never issued TLS server certificates. Based on that intended purpose and issuance history, they were not included in the scope of Baseline Requirements audits. However, the corresponding Subordinate CA Certificates did not contain EKU technical constraints excluding TLS server authentication.

  • Timeline:

    This scope classification existed from the issuance of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 in 2018 until the applicability review was completed on 2026-11-13T09:00:00Z.

  • Detection:

    A community member identified the absence of EKU technical constraints. The issue avoided earlier detection because review and audit scoping relied on the intended service and actual certificate issuance rather than requiring a documented technical-constraint assessment for every Subordinate CA Certificate.

  • Interaction with other factors:

    Because the two certificates were treated as outside the Baseline Requirements scope, the 64-bit CSPRNG-output requirement was not applied to their serial numbers during issuance or subsequent compliance reviews.

  • Root Cause Analysis methodology used:

    5 Whys.

Contributing Factor #3: The affected population was assessed against the Baseline Requirements without considering the scope of the Mozilla Root Store Policy

  • Description:

    When identifying the affected population, SECOM Trust Systems assessed each CA certificate only against the scope of the Baseline Requirements. CA certificates capable of issuing email certificates but not TLS server certificates, such as PUB CA5, were treated as outside the scope of the 64-bit CSPRNG-output requirement. However, the Mozilla Root Store Policy applies the same requirement to all new certificates within its scope, including intermediate certificates technically capable of issuing email certificates.

  • Timeline:

    This scope assessment was applied from the start of the investigation until the review following Comment 8 was completed on 2026-11-16T09:00:00Z.

  • Detection:

    A community member identified PUB CA5 in Comment 8. The issue avoided earlier detection because the investigation used the Baseline Requirements as the sole reference for determining the applicable serial-number requirement.

  • Interaction with other factors:

    Together with Contributing Factor #2, this caused the affected population to be determined from a narrower scope than the applicable Root Store Policy requirements.

  • Root Cause Analysis methodology used:

    5 Whys.

Lessons Learned

  • What went well:

    • SECOM Trust Systems promptly confirmed the serial-number structure after receiving the third-party report.
    • The two Cybertrust Japan Subordinate CA Certificates were revoked on 2026-11-06.
    • Consultation with the auditor was used to validate the Baseline Requirements scope determination for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8.
    • Replacement Subordinate CA Certificates with EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes were issued before revocation of PUB CA4 and PUB CA8.
  • What didn't go well:

    • The serial-number generation specification and issuance review did not independently verify that at least 64 bits of the serial number were generated by a CSPRNG.
    • Baseline Requirements scope was determined primarily from intended purpose and actual issuance history, without requiring confirmation of technical constraints in the Subordinate CA Certificate.
    • Periodic compliance reviews and audit-scoping reviews did not detect the serial-number or technical-constraint issues.
    • The Preliminary Incident Report did not identify the full affected population, because the initial review was limited to the certificates reported by the third party rather than all CA certificates issued with the same serial-number structure.
    • The affected population in Comment 7 was determined only against the Baseline Requirements, without considering the scope and requirements of the Mozilla Root Store Policy.
  • Where we got lucky:

    • 38 of the 43 affected certificates had already been revoked or had expired before this incident was identified.
    • PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 had not issued TLS server certificates despite not being technically constrained by EKU.
  • Additional:

    • Compliance reviews must evaluate both operational intent and enforceable certificate constraints.
    • Serial-number length alone is not sufficient evidence that the serial number contains the required amount of CSPRNG output.
    • The scope of an incident must be assessed against all applicable requirements, including each Root Store Policy, not only the Baseline Requirements.

Action Items

Action Item Kind Corresponding Root Cause(s) Evaluation Criteria Due Date Status
#1 Revoke Cybertrust Japan SureServer CA G4 and Cybertrust Japan SureServer EV CA G3. Mitigate Contributing Factor #1 Both certificates appear as revoked in the applicable CRLs, with revocation completed on 2026-11-06. 2026-11-06 Complete
#2 Issue replacement Subordinate CA Certificates for PUB CA4 and PUB CA8 containing EKUs limited to their intended non-TLS purposes and serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 Issuance records and certificate profiles confirm the EKU restrictions and the serial-number generation requirements. 2026-11-10 Complete
#3 Revoke SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA4 and SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA8. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 Both certificates appear as revoked in the applicable CRLs by 2026-11-20T09:00:00Z. 2026-11-20 Ongoing
#4 Change the serial-number generation method for CA certificates so that serial numbers contain at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. Prevent Contributing Factor #1 All CA certificates issued on or after 2020-07-10T12:47:41Z have serial numbers containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. 2020-07-10 Complete
#5 Identify all CA certificates with the affected serial-number structure, including expired and revoked certificates, and disclose the full affected population. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #2 The affected population of 42 Subordinate CA Certificates was identified on 2026-11-13T09:30:00Z and was disclosed in Comment 7. The population was subsequently updated as described in Action Item #9. 2026-11-13 Complete
#6 Review the technical constraints (EKU) of all non-expired Subordinate CA Certificates, and ensure that those not technically constrained are replaced and revoked. Prevent Contributing Factor #2 All non-expired Subordinate CA Certificates either are within the Baseline Requirements audit scope or contain EKUs excluding id-kp-serverAuth. 2026-11-20 Ongoing
#7 Add a check of serial-number entropy (at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output) and EKU technical constraints for all non-expired CA certificates to the items reviewed in the quarterly self-audit. Detect Contributing Factors #1 and #2 The quarterly self-audit procedure is revised to include these items, and the first quarterly self-audit under the revised procedure is completed and its results are recorded. 2026-11-27 Ongoing
#8 Revoke SECOM Passport for Member PUB CA5. Mitigate Contributing Factors #1 and #3 The certificate appears as revoked in the applicable CRL by 2026-11-23T09:00:00Z. 2026-11-23 Ongoing
#9 Re-assess all CA certificates with the affected serial-number structure against the scope of the Mozilla Root Store Policy, including CA certificates technically capable of issuing email certificates, and update the affected population. Mitigate Contributing Factor #3 The affected population was updated to 43 Subordinate CA Certificates on 2026-11-16 and is disclosed in the Appendix. 2026-11-16 Complete

Appendix

The affected population consists of the 43 Subordinate CA Certificates listed in the following CSV:

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=9683316

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