NETLOCK: Arany (Class Gold) root CRL entry for subordinate CA certificate without reasonCode
Categories
(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: kaluha.roland, Assigned: kaluha.roland)
Details
(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [crl-failure])
Attachments
(1 file)
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3.18 KB,
text/csv
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Details |
Preliminary Incident Report
Summary
- Incident description: NETLOCK received a third-party report stating that the CRL issued by NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány (CRL number 47, thisUpdate 2026-10-26 17:06:45 UTC, published at http://crl1.netlock.hu/index.cgi?crl=gold) contains an entry for serial number 49412ce40027 (revocationDate 2021-09-28 19:50:17 UTC) without a reasonCode CRL entry extension. According to the report, the serial belongs to the CA certificate NetLock OnlineSSL (Class Online) Tanúsítványkiadó (SHA-256: cc9f72544ff617c14cebe8283194a70f1e8981cf163d5a3fd8dccfd846d5dc1a), issued by this root and valid until 2027-10-23. The report states that on 2026-10-06 the same CRL listed this entry with reasonCode unspecified (0), and that the extension has since been removed rather than replaced with a reason. The reporter points out that a CA certificate is technically capable of causing issuance, so its entry requires a reasonCode giving the reason for revocation, and that this requirement already applied when the entry was created, as BR Section 7.2.2 has required a reasonCode for CA certificates since 2020-09-30 and did not allow unspecified (0). The reporter further notes that this issue is distinct from the explicit reasonCode 0 issue of Bug 2075255, and that the Full Incident Report in Bug 2075255 counts only entries revoked on or after 2023-07-15 and does not list this CRL.
- Relevant policies: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates, Section 7.2.2 (CRL entry reasonCode extension: required unless the entry is for a Certificate not technically capable of causing issuance; reasonCode unspecified (0) not permitted). This requirement has applied to CA certificate entries since 2020-09-30. Mozilla Root Store Policy, Section 2.3 (conformance with the current version of the Baseline Requirements).
- Source of incident disclosure: Third-party report sent by email on 2026-10-31.
Updated•15 days ago
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Comment 1•8 days ago
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Full Incident Report
Summary
- CA Owner CCADB unique ID: A000039
- Incident description: The CRL of NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány lists 8 revoked subordinate CA certificates. BR §7.2.2 requires a reasonCode on CRL entries for CA certificates, and it must not be unspecified (0). Until 2026-10-26 these entries carried unspecified (0). From CRL number 47 (2026-10-26) they carried no reasonCode at all. The report named serial 49412CE40027; the other 7 have the same defect and are covered here. Since CRL number 50 (2026-11-10) all 8 entries carry cessationOfOperation (5).
- Timeline summary:
- Non-compliance start date: 2020-09-30, when the BR §7.2.2 requirement for CA certificate entries took effect; for 49412CE40027, its revocation on 2021-09-28.
- Non-compliance identified date: 2026-10-31.
- Non-compliance end date: 2026-11-10 11:25 UTC, when the CRL distribution points in the affected certificates served CRL number 50.
- Relevant policies: TLS Baseline Requirements §7.2.2; Mozilla Root Store Policy §2.3.
- Source of incident disclosure: Third Party Reported.
Impact
- Total number of certificates: 8 subordinate CA certificates (Appendix). No end-entity certificate is affected.
- Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: 0. All 8 are revoked; 2 of them have also expired.
- Affected certificate types: subordinate CA certificates.
- Incident heuristic: CRL entries for CA certificates with no reasonCode, or with unspecified (0).
- Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?: No. The 8 CAs were revoked between 2018 and 2021. None of them has issued certificates, or had valid customer certificates, for many years.
- Additional considerations:
- Scope. We checked all 32 NETLOCK CA certificates disclosed in CCADB against the CRL their issuer currently publishes (343 public CRLs, fetched 2026-11-10). Those CRLs carry 90 CA certificate entries. Only these 8, all on the Gold CRL, lacked a valid reasonCode. All 90 now carry one.
- Choice of reason. All 8 CAs were retired and none was re-certified, so the reason is cessationOfOperation (5), not superseded (4).
- Why the reasonCode was removed. The 2026-10-26 change implemented the BR §7.2.2 rule that an unspecified reason is shown by omitting the reasonCode. That is correct for end-entity certificates, and for the qualified (eIDAS) certificates on the same hierarchy, where RFC 5280 and ETSI EN 319 411-1 are met when the extension is omitted. Our error was applying the rule to CA certificate entries, for which the BR requires a specific reason.
- Broader remediation. A proposal for a larger-scope remediation of revocation reasons across our hierarchies will follow in a separate bug.
Timeline
All times UTC.
- 2018-08-16 15:24:59, 2019-09-03 23:35:58, 2020-06-02 21:56:46 and 2021-09-28 19:50:17: the 8 CA certificates revoked (per certificate in the Appendix) and published with reasonCode unspecified (0).
- 2020-09-30: BR §7.2.2 begins to require a reasonCode for CA certificate entries.
- 2026-09-26: Bug 2075255 Comment #1 counts the 8 unspecified entries on the Gold CRL.
- 2026-10-10 11:42: the Bug 2075255 Full Incident Report counts only entries revoked on or after 2023-07-15, so these 8 are left out of its remediation.
- 2026-10-15: CRL software change for Bug 2075255 in our legacy CA build: a previously published reasonCode 0 is published as no reasonCode.
- 2026-10-26 17:06:45: Gold CRL number 47 issued on the offline root CA with that change; the 8 entries lose their reasonCode.
- 2026-10-31: third-party report received by email.
- 2026-11-02 14:51: Preliminary Incident Report (Comment #0).
- 2026-11-10: scope check of all CCADB-disclosed NETLOCK CA certificates; the reason of the 8 entries set to cessationOfOperation (5) on the offline root CA.
- 2026-11-10 10:36:44: Gold CRLs number 50 (full and valid-certificates) issued, with cessationOfOperation (5) on the 8 entries and every serial and revocation date unchanged.
- 2026-11-10 11:25: CRL number 50 served at the CRL distribution points of the affected certificates (crl1, crl2 and crl3.netlock.hu/index.cgi?crl=gold). Non-compliance ends.
Related Incidents
| Bug | Date | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 2011314 | 2026-01-19 | NETLOCK: reasonCode unspecified (0) on a Gold-hierarchy CRL; its scope did not include CA certificate entries. |
| 2075255 | 2026-09-24 | NETLOCK: reasonCode unspecified (0) on several CRLs. It counted these 8 entries but left them out of its remediation, and its software change removed their reasonCode. |
| 2085385 | 2026-10-23 | certSIGN: CRL entry with reasonCode unspecified. |
| 1931886 | 2024-11-18 | Entrust: CRL missing revocation reasonCode. |
Root Cause Analysis
Contributing Factor 1: the CA certificates were revoked with reason unspecified (0) and never corrected
- Description: The revocation of each of the 8 stored reason 0, and the Gold CRL published it. Since 2020-09-30 that is non-compliant for CA certificate entries.
- Timeline: revocations 2018–2021; unchanged until 2026-11-10.
- Detection: no control checked the reasonCode of CA certificate entries on root CRLs.
- Interaction with other factors: it supplied the 0 that Factor 3 turned into an absent reasonCode.
Contributing Factor 2: earlier remediations were scoped by the end-entity rule
- Description: Bugs 2011314 and 2075255 were scoped by the end-entity requirement (no explicit 0 on entries revoked on or after 2023-07-15). The CA certificate requirement is older and stricter, so the 8 entries fell outside both remediations, even though Bug 2075255 had counted them.
- Timeline: 2026-01-19 to 2026-10-10.
- Detection: the third-party report.
- Interaction with other factors: had these entries been in scope, they would have held a valid reason before Factor 3.
Contributing Factor 3: the CRL change treated CA certificate entries like end-entity entries
- Description: The 2026-10-15 change omits the reasonCode when the stored reason is 0. It did not distinguish CA certificate entries, which must carry a reason.
- Timeline: introduced 2026-10-15; first applied to the Gold CRL on 2026-10-26.
- Detection: the third-party report.
- Interaction with other factors: it replaced one non-compliance (0) with another (absent).
Root Cause Analysis methodology used: 5 Whys.
Lessons Learned
- What went well: The CRL software kept every serial and revocation date unchanged, and it allows a specific reason to be added to an entry that was published without one. The fix needed only a database correction and a new CRL, both under the existing dual-control procedure.
- What didn't go well: We had counted these 8 entries in Bug 2075255 and still left them out of its remediation. A CRL change made for end-entity entries was applied to a root CRL without checking the CA certificate rule (Action Items 1–5).
- Additional: Revocation-reason requirements differ by certificate type and by effective date; scope reviews now apply each requirement separately (Action Item 5).
Action Items
| Action Item | Kind | Corresponding Root Cause(s) | Evaluation Criteria | Due Date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Set cessationOfOperation (5) on the 8 entries and publish Gold CRL number 50 | Mitigate | 1, 3 | Every published Gold CRL URL serves number 50 with reasonCode 5 on all 8 entries | 2026-11-10 | Complete |
| 2. Check every CCADB-disclosed NETLOCK CA certificate against its issuer's published CRL | Detect | 1, 2 | All 90 CA certificate entries carry a reasonCode other than 0 and 6 | 2026-11-10 | Complete |
| 3. Revocation safeguard on our CA platform: a CA certificate can be revoked only with keyCompromise, cACompromise, affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation or privilegeWithdrawn; unspecified (0) and "no reason" are refused for CA certificates; reasonCode 0 is never published | Prevent | 1, 3 | Release test suite of v3.0.23; a CA certificate revocation request with 0 or no reason is refused | 2026-10-29 (v3.0.23) | Complete |
| 4. Legacy CA build used on the offline root CAs: reasonCode 0 is never published again, and an entry published without reasonCode is published with a specific reason once one is recorded | Prevent | 3 | Release test suite of 2.11.117.0; verified in production by Gold CRL number 50 | 2026-10-26 | Complete |
| 5. Training and written protocol for operations staff on revocation reasons by certificate type (BR §7.2.2 for CA and end-entity entries, RFC 5280 meaning of each reason), including a check of reason codes on every root CRL before publication | Prevent | 1, 2 | Training records for all operations staff; protocol in the root CA ceremony procedure | 2026-11-10 | Complete |
| 6. Update the CCADB revocation reason of the 8 intermediates from (0) unspecified to (5) cessationOfOperation | Mitigate | 1 | CCADB shows (5) for all 8 | 2026-11-12 | Ongoing |
Appendix
CSV attached: bug2088080-appendix.csv (8 rows).
Comment 2•8 days ago
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Comment 3•4 days ago
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I am András Somkuti, CEO of NETLOCK. I will post for NETLOCK from this account.
Action Item 6 is complete. On 2026-11-13, between 19:32 and 19:36 UTC, we changed the revocation reason recorded in CCADB for the eight subordinate CAs listed in Comment 1 to cessationOfOperation (5). The item was due on 2026-11-12; it was completed 1 day late.
Verification: the CCADB public report PublicIntermediateCertsRevokedWithPEMCSV shows reason (5) for all eight as of 2026-11-13 20:59 UTC.
All six action items in Comment 1 are now complete. We consider this incident resolved and ask that the bug be closed. We will answer any further questions here.
Description
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