SSL.com: Timestamp Certificate private keys used more than 15 months after notBefore
Categories
(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: secauditor, Assigned: secauditor)
Details
(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [uncategorized])
Preliminary Incident Report
Summary
- Incident description: On 2026-11-01 01:27 UTC, SSL.com received an email from a prospective customer noting that a timestamp token from our Timestamp Authority that they received, with a genTime of 2026-10-25, was signed by a Timestamp Certificate whose notBefore date was more than 15 months earlier. Our investigation confirmed that the Private Keys of two generations of our Timestamp Certificates, while not in production for more than 15 months, were used to sign timestamp tokens more than 15 months after the notBefore date of the certificates. The Timestamp Certificates currently in production are within the 15-month period, so the incident is contained. We are investigating the root cause and the complete details will be provided in the full report.
- Relevant policies:
Code Signing Baseline Requirements v3.11.0, section 6.3.2
...
The CA or Timestamp Authority SHALL NOT use a Private Key associated with a Timestamp Certificate more than 15 months after the notBefore date of a Timestamp Certificate.
- Source of incident disclosure: Third Party Reported.
SSL.com will post our Full Incident Report on or before 2026-11-14.
Updated•14 days ago
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Full Incident Report
Summary
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CA Owner CCADB unique ID: A002038
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Incident description:
On 2026-11-01 01:27 UTC, SSL.com received an email from a prospective customer who had received a timestamp token from our Timestamp Authority that was signed using a Timestamp Certificate that had a notBefore date that was more than 15 months prior to the signing. This seemingly was a violation of CSBR v3.11.0 Section 6.3.2.
We confirmed the report. Our investigation found that the Private Keys of two generations of our Timestamp Certificates were used to sign timestamp tokens more than 15 months after the notBefore date of the certificates:
| Timestamp Certificates | notBefore | 15-month limit | In production | Used beyond the limit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2024 E1 and 2024 R1 | 2024-02-19 | 2025-05-19 | 2024-06-03 to 2026-01-27 | 253 days |
| SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2025 E1 and 2025 R1 | 2025-02-18 | 2026-05-18 | 2026-01-27 to 2026-10-30 | 165 days |
SSL.com measured the 15-month period from the date a Timestamp Certificate was placed in production rather than from its notBefore date. Timestamp Certificates were issued at our offline CA ceremonies and placed in production months later, so the time between issuance and production was not counted.
Because each of these keys was used past the 15-month limit, none of them could have been removed from the Hardware Crypto Module within 18 months of issuance, as section 6.3.2 also requires. The 2024 keys were removed in a key deletion ceremony on 2026-02-19, and the 2025 keys were removed on 2026-11-12 through a key deletion ceremony.
No Subscriber certificates were affected. The four Timestamp Certificates were not misissued. We have no indication that any of the affected Private Keys was compromised.
Correction to the Preliminary Incident Report. Our preliminary report stated that the affected Timestamp Certificates were not in production for more than 15 months. That is not correct for the 2024 generation, which was in production for about 20 months (2024-06-03 to 2026-01-27). We identified the error while building the timeline for this report. It happened because the preliminary report was written from the 2025 generation, which prompted the third-party report and was in production for about 9 months.
- Timeline summary:
- Non-compliance start date: 2025-05-19, the 15-month limit for SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2024 E1.
- Non-compliance identified date: 2026-11-01 01:27 UTC - customer email received.
- Non-compliance end date: 2026-11-12 - 2025 Timestamp Certificate keys were destroyed.
- Relevant policies: Code Signing Baseline Requirements v3.11.0, section 6.3.2
The CA or Timestamp Authority SHALL NOT use a Private Key associated with a Timestamp Certificate more than 15 months after the notBefore date of a Timestamp Certificate.
Effective April 15, 2025, Private Keys associated with Timestamp Certificates issued for greater than 15 months MUST be removed from the Hardware Crypto Module protecting the Private Key within 18 months after issuance of the Timestamp Certificate. For Timestamp Certificates issued on or after June 1, 2024, the CA SHALL log the removal of the Private Key from the Hardware Crypto Module through means of a key deletion ceremony performed by the CA and witnessed and signed‐off by at least two Trusted Role members.
- Source of incident disclosure: Third Party reported.
Impact
- Total number of certificates: N/A. 4 Timestamp Certificates are involved, none of which were misissued.
- Total number of "remaining valid" certificates: N/A. No misissued certificates, no revocation required.
- Affected certificate types: N/A.
- Incident heuristic: N/A.
- Was issuance stopped in response to this incident, and why or why not?: No. Certificate issuance was not a part of this incident, and the Timestamp Certificate had already been replaced when the email was received.
- Analysis: N/A.
- Additional considerations: N/A.
Timeline
All times provided are in UTC, unless otherwise noted.
2022-06-02 - RSA key pairs generated and “parked” in HSMs for use in Timestamping Certificates.
2022-11-29 - ECDSA key pairs generated and “parked” in HSMs for use in Timestamping Certificates.
2024-02-19 - SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2024 E1 and 2024 R1 issued at an offline CA ceremony.
2024-06-03 - 2024 Timestamp Certificates placed in production.
2024-06-13 - Ticket for internal review of proposed ballots CSC-25 and CSC-26 is created.
2024-06-19 - Voting period begins for CSC-25 on Importing Guidelines into the Code Signing Baseline Requirements.
2024-06-20 - Voting period begins for CSC-26 on Timestamping Private Key Protection.
2024-08-01 - CSBR v3.9.0 (Ballot CSC-26) takes effect. Section 6.3.2 now measures the 15-month limit from the notBefore date and adds the key removal and deletion ceremony requirements.
2024-12-13 - SSL.com CP/CPS v1.22 adopts the CSC-26 wording in section 6.3.2. TSA operating procedures are not changed.
2025-02-18 - SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2025 E1 and 2025 R1 issued at an offline CA ceremony.
2025-04-15 - The CSBR requirement to remove Timestamp Certificate keys from the HSM within 18 months takes effect.
2025-05-19 - 15-month limit is up for the use in production of the 2024 Timestamp Certificates.
2025-08-19 - 18-month HSM removal deadline for the 2024 keys.
2026-01-27 - 2025 Timestamp Certificates placed in production, replacing the 2024 Timestamp Certificates. The 2025 Timestamp Certificates have 111 days left before their 15-month limit.
2026-02-19 - 2024 Timestamp Certificate keys removed from the HSM through a logged key deletion ceremony.
2026-05-18 - 15-month limit for the 2025 Timestamp Certificates.
2026-06-12 - SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2026 E1 and 2026 R1 issued at an offline CA ceremony.
2026-08-18 - 18-month HSM removal deadline for the 2025 keys.
2026-10-25 04:33 - Timestamp token observed by the reporter, signed by SSL.com Timestamping Unit 2025 E1.
2026-10-30 - 2026 Timestamp Certificates placed in production, replacing the 2025 Timestamp Certificates.
2026-11-01 01:27 - Email from a prospective customer received not through the CPR channel.
2026-11-01 14:42 - Investigation started.
2026-11-03 17:05 - Production history of all TSUs compiled. The 2024 generation is confirmed as also affected.
2026-11-03 22:14 - Preliminary Incident Report posted to this bug.
2026-11-12 17:00 - 2025 Timestamp Certificate keys removed from the HSM through a logged key deletion ceremony.
2026-11-13 19:30 - Full Incident Report posted (this report).
Related Incidents
We reviewed incidents in the CA Certificate Compliance component from the last two years and found no incidents involving Timestamp Certificate private keys used beyond the CSBR section 6.3.2 key usage period.
Root Cause Analysis
Contributing Factor #1: Combined ballots review
- Description: For the internal review of ballots CSC-25 and CSC-26, because of the similar time frames, the review process was combined for both changes. Between the 2 ballots, there were quite a few requirements changes that overshadowed discussion and allowed the ‘notBefore’ date declaration used in determining the 15-month Timestamp Certificate to get missed.
- Timeline: The review ticket was created on 2024-06-13. CSC-26 took effect on 2024-08-01 and was added to the CP/CPS on 2024-12-13. The gap persisted until this incident.
- Detection: Not detected internally. Our ballot review missed this item.
- Interaction with other factors: Because the requirement was not recognized, the TSU lifecycle (Contributing Factor #2) and monitoring (Contributing Factor #3) continued to work from the production date.
- Root Cause Analysis methodology used: 5-Whys.
Contributing Factor #2: Timestamp Certificate creation combined with annual events and procedure completion when time permitted
- Description: Timestamp Certificates were created during other annual events in offline CA maintenance. The after-creation tasks were handled via tickets when time permitted, rather than having a specific date determined ahead of time, since the procedures are performed at least annually, and the requirement assumed was 15 months in production.
- Timeline: This practice was in place for every TSU generation reviewed. The 2026 Timestamp Certificates were placed in production 140 days after issuance.
- Detection: Identified during this Root Cause Analysis. Post-ceremony tickets were tracked for completion but not against a deadline.
- Interaction with other factors: Because of Contributing Factor #1, the time between issuance and deployment was not seen as reducing a certificate's usable life. With a notBefore-based deadline on the ticket, the deployment would have been prioritized.
- Root Cause Analysis methodology used: 5-Whys.
Contributing Factor # 3: No monitoring of Timestamp Certificate deadlines
- Description:
SSL.com had no monitor or alert for Timestamp Certificate deadlines. Replacement was tracked manually from the date a TSU entered production. There was no alert based on notBefore, and nothing tracked the 18-month HSM key removal deadline. The manual tracking also did not prevent the 2024 Timestamp Certificates from being used for about 20 months after entering production. - Timeline: Manual tracking was in place before 2024 and continued until this incident.
- Detection: The incident was detected by a third party, not by SSL.com.
- Interaction with other factors: Monitoring based on notBefore would have alerted us to Contributing Factors #1 and #2 before 2025-05-19.
- Root Cause Analysis methodology used: 5-Whys.
Contributing Factor #4: Key removal was tied to replacement, not to the 18-month deadline
- Description: Timestamp Certificate keys were removed from the HSM only after the certificate was replaced in production. Because replacement was late (Contributing Factors #1 to #3), the 18-month removal deadlines for the 2024 keys (2025-08-19) and the 2025 keys (2026-08-18) were also missed.
- Timeline: The 18-month requirement took effect on 2025-04-15.
- Detection: Identified during this investigation.
- Interaction with other factors: This is a direct consequence of Contributing Factors #1 to #3. It needs its own control because the removal deadline is distinct from the usage deadline.
- Root Cause Analysis methodology used: 5-Whys.
Lessons Learned
- What went well:
After the email was received, we confirmed it, identified both affected generations, and posted the Preliminary Incident Report within 72 hours of receipt.
The affected Private Keys remained protected in HSMs throughout, and there is no indication of compromise. - What didn’t go well:
CSC-26 was reviewed together with CSC-25, and these 2 operational changes were missed (Contributing Factor #1).
There was no automated monitoring of Timestamp Certificate deadlines (Contributing Factor #3), and the 18-month key removal deadline was also missed (Contributing Factor #4). - Where we got lucky:
The 2026 Timestamp Certificates had been placed in production two days before the report, for unrelated reasons, so no further affected tokens were signed after we became aware. - Additional: N/A.
Action Items
| Action Item | Kind | Corresponding Root Cause(s) | Evaluation Criteria | Due Date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Remove the 2025 Timestamp Certificate Private Keys from all HSMs through a key deletion ceremony witnessed and signed off by two Trusted Role members. | Mitigate | Contributing Factor #4 | Signed ceremony record. | 2026-11-12 | Complete |
| 2. Create post-ceremony TSU deployment tasks as priority tickets with a due date derived from notBefore. | Prevent | Contributing Factor #2 | Compliance review of the tickets from the next offline ceremony shows a due date and an owner on each. | 2026-12-18 | Ongoing |
| 3. Hold offline CA ceremonies at least twice a year, in addition to ceremonies held as needed, so that Timestamp Certificates can be issued close to deployment. | Prevent | Contributing Factor #2 | 2027 ceremony schedule approved, with at least two ceremonies. | 2026-12-18 | Ongoing |
| 4. Add monitoring of each Timestamp Certificate's notBefore date, alerting ahead of both the 15-month replacement deadline and the 18-month HSM key removal deadline. | Detect | Contributing Factors #3, #4 | Alerts tested with a test certificate past each threshold. | 2026-12-18 | Ongoing |
| 5. Update the ballot review process to create tickets on a per-ballot basis only, send notifications to specific task owners, and require explicit sign-off from each department. | Prevent | Contributing Factor #1 | Updated procedure approved, and the process applied to ballots since 2026-05-01. | 2026-05-01 | Complete |
Appendix
N/A, no misissued certificates.
Description
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