Open Bug 2090687 Opened 9 days ago Updated 32 minutes ago

DigiCert: A misleading official support article causes a lot of misconfigured _validation-contactemail DNS TXT records and fake TLS certificate(s)

Categories

(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)

Tracking

(Not tracked)

ASSIGNED

People

(Reporter: zeyuw, Assigned: dcbugzillaresponse)

Details

(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [uncategorized] [external])

Attachments

(3 files)

4.05 KB, application/zip
Details
23.68 KB, application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet
Details
469.09 KB, application/pdf
Details

Steps to reproduce

Summery

In a massive scan for the usage of _validation-contactemail across the Internet, I observed some domains misconfiguring a _validation-contactemail DNS TXT record to authorize TLS certificates issuance via the mailbox validatedomain@digicerttest.com. After a careful review of this case, I found that these domain owners have been potentially misled by a DigiCert support article ( https://docs.digicert.com/en/certcentral/manage-certificates/dv-certificate-enrollment/domain-control-validation--dcv--methods.html ). The article intended to demonstrate how to use _validation-contactemail for validation, but the wording may be misinterpreted as these domain owners need to configure validatedomain@digicerttest.com.

I checked WHOIS to confirm that the domain digicerttest.com was available for registration, registered the domain, and successfully requested a fake TLS certificate for the domain qi.iq as a Proof of Concept. I also received numerous Domain Control Validation (DCV) emails addressed to digicerttest.com. Note that in some DigiCert certificate ordering interfaces (e.g., rapidsslonline.com), DigiCert's email-based DCV does not allow customers to select which email to use for validation. If the customer selects "email", DigiCert sends DCV emails to five construct email addresses defined in CA/B BRs (Section 3.2.2.4.4) and all emails defined in _validation-contactemail simultaneously. Therefore, when these domain owners misconfigured their _validation-contactemail DNS TXT records, selected email validation, and proceeded, I was able to receive DCV emails sent to validatedomain@digicerttest.com.

Some misconfigured email addresses are spelled in languages other than English. For example, some domains misconfigured validatedominio@digicerttest.com or validardominio@digicerttest.com. I queried ChatGPT, and it suggested this might originate from Spanish or Portuguese script "validar dominio", which translates to "validate domain" in English. I have searched all current and historical DigiCert support articles and the Internet Archive Wayback Machine, but could not find any related document written in Spanish or Portuguese. This may suggest that some incorrect documents or misunderstandings stem from internal DigiCert documents or the actions of DigiCert staff. If this hypothesis is correct, I suspect that domains with English-style email addresses, such as validatedomain@digicerttest.com, were also misled by DigiCert staff.

It is critical to note that no unauthorized access has been granted to the administrators of the affected domains. Under no circumstances did I engage in social engineering, nor did I manipulate DNS records or compromise their infrastructure. No attempts at DNS cache poisoning were made.

We submitted a Certificate Problem Report to DigiCert on 2026-11-07 08:01(UTC), and got a reply on 2026-11-08 02:22(UTC). In the response, DigiCert says it won't publish a Bugzilla ticket because this is not a compliance incident under the Baseline Requirements. The _validation-contactemail is worked as intended. The original response is provided in the textbox below.

Dear Zeyu and Jianjun,
 
Thank you for your detailed report, and for the care you took with the DCV emails you received. This is a useful finding, and we are glad you brought this to our attention.
 
We have reviewed the report and concluded that it is not a compliance incident under the Baseline Requirements, so we will not be opening a Bugzilla ticket. The Email to DNS TXT Contact method allows a domain owner to designate any email address, including one at a third-party domain, as an authorized contact for that domain. This is intentional: it supports cloud hosting and other delegated-authorization scenarios where the party managing certificates is not the domain owner. In each case you describe, DigiCert sent validation email to the address the domain owner published, which is exactly what the method requires. A domain owner who publishes a record pointing at an address they do not control has made an error in their own configuration, but the validation process itself operated as intended.
 
That said, our previous documentation may have contributed to the confusion. As you point out, the example address appeared on a deprecated support article.  We are now reviewing our knowledgebases for clarity, to reduce the possibility that customers might accidentally use an example address. We appreciate you drawing this to our attention.

We would be happy to revoke the certificate you requested as well, if you would like it revoked.

Thank you again for the responsible disclosure and for your work on this.

Kind regards,
DigiCert Support

Now we would like to publicize this report on Bugzilla, in order to confirm if this is a CA security incident. Additionally, we want to discuss if DigiCert is completely not liable for these misconfigurations, and if all responsibility should be attribute to these domain owners.

Attachments

  1. fake-certificate-PoC.zip. It contains the certificate file, and a signed CSR with Common Name "Zeyu Wang's Fake Certificate".
  2. affected-domains.xlsx. All affected domains and evidence are included. We use Internet Archive Wayback Machine or perma.cc to capture a DNS over HTTPS server (https://dns.google) to save evidence.
  3. vulnerability-report.pdf. This is exactly the same file we submitted to DigiCert in the CPR email. This file contains the full timeline as we observed. It includes PoCs of all Domain Control Validation emails we received. We only disclose the first four letters or digits of the DCV random code to make sure this vulnerability can not be exploited. In the end of this file, we asked DigiCert some questions related to this incident.

Authors

Zeyu Wang (Tsinghua University)
Jianjun Chen (Tsinghua University)

Actual results

We requested a fake TLS certificate for qi.iq and www.qi.iq. Technically we can request fake TLS certificates for about 140 domains with _validation-contactemail misconfigurations.

Expected results

  1. Do not misconfigure validatedomain@digicerttest.com in _validation-contactemail DNS TXT records.
  2. Investigate this incident.
Attached file affected-domains.xlsx —

Dear Zeyu and Jianjun,

Thank you for your detailed report, and for the care you took with the DCV emails you received. This is a useful finding, and we are glad you brought this to our attention.

We have reviewed the report and concluded that it is not a compliance incident under the Baseline Requirements, so we will not be opening a Bugzilla ticket.
...
Kind regards,
DigiCert Support

As reported this is a compliance incident, and still continues to be an extremely serious one. We have proof that a non-owner has received at least one certificate they were not authorised for. The certificate PoC had expired 2026-10-08, so "offering" to revoke an expired certificate that should be considered a keyCompromise event is unusual to say the least.

Baseline Requirements

4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate
5. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully‐Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon, including cases where the CA failed to perform CAA checking correctly or where issuance was not permitted according to Section 3.2.2.8 (CAA Records) (CRLReason #4, superseded).

Violation directly.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments
Additionally, the CA’s security program MUST include an annual Risk Assessment that:

  1. Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Processes;

We're past could here, and given the multiple breaches this year I hope DigiCert are taking researchers slightly more seriously when they provide evidence.

Chrome Root Program Policy 1.8

1.5. Reporting and Responding to Incidents

The failure of a Chrome Root Program Participant to meet the commitments of this policy is considered an incident, as is any other situation that may impact the CA's integrity, trustworthiness, or compatibility.

Not raising an incident or dealing with this properly certainly fits.

Mozilla Root Store Policy

2.2 Validation Practices
...
3. for a certificate capable of being used for TLS-enabled servers, the CA MUST ensure that the applicant is authorized to use all domain names and has control over all IP addresses referenced in the certificate.
...
Validation methods are occasionally found to contain security flaws. When this happens, Mozilla expects CA operators to evaluate their practices and respond appropriately to mitigate the risk. Mozilla MAY require CAs to make disclosures or modifications, up to and including immediately discontinuing use of a method.

The lack of any mention of an evaluation or responding to mitigate the risk here is yet another violation.

Of the 144 listed domains, 126 still publish digicerttest.com as their contact. The entities include and are not limited to...

  • governments: the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (fbih.gov.ba), Sharjah Digital Department (sws.gov.ae), the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (rcjy.gov.sa, rcjy.edu.sa), Homes Tasmania;
  • finance: Bank of Oak Ridge, dwpbank, AEON Credit Service (Asia), with an EV order in the timeline, and the Credit Guarantee Corporation of Cambodia;
  • health: Adventist Health (mcmc.net), the University of Ottawa Heart Institute;
  • utilities and industry: Alinta Energy, Rheem, Orascom, Sun TV, DPD Romania;
    universities: Schoolcraft College, Salem State, the UNM Foundation's VPN host.
  • a certificate provider’s own site (Valid Certificadora Digital);
  • GitKraken - an interesting supply chain target
  • criticalthreats.org - a right-wing thinktank impacting foreign policy (another big target...)

Let's not brush this aside as 144 random domains where a counterfeit certificate would have minor impact.

Can DigiCert state if they ever:

  1. Stopped sending emails to the above email address once aware of the issue
  2. Performed an investigation on if more certificates were impacted than the researcher has provided
  3. Check if other 'test' domains (or grouped emails for unrelated entities) are impacted
  4. Notified the subscribers of this issue
  5. Considered giving subscribers choice in all ordering paths to not send DCV email to every address and TXT contact at once
  6. Stopped reusing the DCV validation information going forward
  7. Revoked the certificates of the impacted domains
  8. Raised a Secure Bug in Bugzilla over this matter (prior to public disclosure)
  9. Consider that their fix of "yourdomain.com" is also non-compliant and awaiting a repeat of this incident
  10. Handled any other security research as "not a compliance incident"?

Given this was 4.9.1.1 (5) DigiCert had 24h to revoke once made aware that the DCV validity should not be relied upon. Every domain provided, and whatever else appears in DigiCert's internal information, needs to be revoked immediately.

Flags: needinfo?(dcbugzillaresponse)

DigiCert requests this bug be declared INVALID. The (now expired) certificate was issued in compliance with the TLS BR Section 3.2.2.4.14 method.

On 2026-11-07 DigiCert received a Certificate Problem Report (CPR) describing domains that had published _validation-contactemail DNS TXT records containing email addresses at the domain digicerttest.com.

digicerttest.com was previously used by DigiCert as an example address in a knowledgebase article describing the Email to DNS TXT Contact method (TLS BR Section 3.2.2.4.14). That text was deprecated in January 2026 during a routine update of kB. The researchers registered digicerttest.com, received DCV emails addressed to that domain, and obtained a certificate for qi.iq as a proof of concept on 2025-10-08. That certificate expired on 2026-10-08 prior to DigiCert receiving the CPR.

In each case DigiCert sent the validation email to the address that the domain owner had published in DNS, and the Email to DNS TXT Contact method itself operated as specified in the TLS Baseline Requirements.

DigiCert emphasizes that the only reliance on the yourdomain.com and digicerttest.com domains in DigiCert-performed DCV using the Email to DNS TXT Contact method was for the certificate reported by the researchers, which was a properly performed DCV interaction. There are no certificates that require revocation.

DigiCert assessed the CPR as not constituting a compliance incident and communicated that to the researchers on 2026-11-08 02:22 UTC. Based on the contact from the researchers, DigiCert immediately undertook an internal investigation and made good faith improvements in the following areas:

  1. Blocked the example domains. digicerttest.com, yourdomain.com and example.com have been blocked from use as Email to DNS TXT Contact addresses in all DigiCert issuance paths.

  2. Confirmed no reliance on the example domains. DigiCert confirmed that no currently valid certificate was issued in reliance on an Email to DNS TXT Contact validation using an address at digicerttest.com or yourdomain.com. The only DCV conducted, and the only certificate ever issued, in reliance on such a validation is the expired proof of concept certificate.

  3. Subscriber notification. DigiCert is contacting the owners of all identified domains that have the record, advising them to correct their DNS records.

  4. Documentation review. A review of DigiCert knowledgebase content was completed to ensure clear example values.

Flags: needinfo?(dcbugzillaresponse)

I have to disagree on this being INVALID, as stated in my previous response. In particular 112 of the domains have no CAA record, and other CAs need to be aware of the misconfiguration that DigiCert promoted. I provided 4 different reasons why this is a compliance issue, none of which were addressed.

My questions are still outstanding.

We have identified evidence that DigiCert retrospectively modified its "Change log" in historical documentation following the disclosure of this incident, replacing the email address directly associated with this vulnerability. Specifically, DigiCert's official 2021 change log contains an entry dated January 13, 2021, which originally included validatedomain@digicerttest.com as an example email address for DNS TXT contact validation.

The Internet Archive provides clear evidence of this modification.

Original documentation:
https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

Please refer to the entry dated January 13, 2021, near the bottom of the page.

2024-09-14 14:12:15 UTC:
The example email address was validatedomain@digicerttest.com.
https://web.archive.org/web/20240914141215/https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

2025-10-04 11:27:42 UTC:
The example email address was validatedomain@digicerttest.com.
https://web.archive.org/web/20251004112742/https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

2026-04-13 04:47:33 UTC:
The example email address was still validatedomain@digicerttest.com.
https://web.archive.org/web/20260413044733/https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

2026-07-12 21:07:43 UTC:
The example email address remained validatedomain@digicerttest.com.
https://web.archive.org/web/20260712210743/https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

2026-11-09 06:19:37 UTC:
The example email address had been changed to validatedomain@example.com.
https://web.archive.org/web/20261109061937/https://docs.digicert.com/en/whats-new/change-log/older-changes/change-log--2021.html

This establishes that DigiCert modified a historical entry in its 2021 change log between July 12 and November 9, 2026, replacing the problematic email address with a different example address. Notably, this modification was already reflected in the archived page on November 9, 2026, shortly after this incident was reported to DigiCert on November 7, 2026.

While correcting misleading documentation is an appropriate remediation measure, retrospectively altering a historical change log without clearly documenting the correction raises concerns about transparency and the preservation of evidence relevant to a security incident. The original entry is particularly relevant because it demonstrates that DigiCert itself published the exact email address that subsequently appeared in numerous affected domains' DNS TXT records.

We would appreciate an explanation from DigiCert regarding when and why this historical entry was modified, whether the modification was made in response to this security report, and why the original content was not preserved with a correction notice. We believe that remediation should not come at the expense of transparency or the integrity of historical records relevant to a publicly reported security incident.

Type: defect → task
Flags: needinfo?(incident-reporting)
Assignee: nobody → dcbugzillaresponse
Status: UNCONFIRMED → ASSIGNED
Ever confirmed: true
Flags: needinfo?(incident-reporting)
Whiteboard: [ca-compliance] [uncategorized] [external]

In response to Comment 6:

Please see our response in Comment 4 where we report in Item 4 that DigiCert conducted a documentation review on 2026-11-08 to ensure clear example values. This was performed in good faith to improve the documentation.

DigiCert has a continuous cycle of refreshing and clarifying kB and other documentation. Earlier texts using the digicerttest.com example had already been updated in the course of this routine activity earlier in the year.

On 2026-11-08, following your report DigiCert updated two email addresses, one in a change log entry and one in a domain validation instructions, to use the generic domain name example.com which is reserved by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for use in documentation.

• validatedomain@digicerttest.com with validatedomain@example.com
• validatedomain@yourdomain.com with validatedomain@example.com

There is no requirement to maintain strict version control on support documentation. The change log was included in the update to avoid confusion by users stumbling upon the content via search or AI.

In response to the questions posed in Comment 3:

DigiCert did react to the information provided in this report, but determined that this was not a certificate incident under the standards you cite. The technical implementation of the Email to DNS TXT Contact method worked as intended. DigiCert sent validation email to the address the domain owner published in their DNS, which is exactly what the method requires.

Can DigiCert state if they ever:

  1. Stopped sending emails to the above email address once aware of the issue

Yes, as we detailed in Comment 4, digicerttest.com, yourdomain.com and example.com have been blocked from use as Email to DNS TXT Contact addresses in all DigiCert issuance paths.

  1. Performed an investigation on if more certificates were impacted than the researcher has provided

Yes, as we detailed in Comment 4, DigiCert confirmed that no currently valid certificate was issued in reliance on an Email to DNS TXT Contact validation using an address at digicerttest.com or yourdomain.com. The only DCV conducted, and the only certificate ever issued in reliance on such a validation, is the expired proof of concept certificate.

  1. Check if other 'test' domains (or grouped emails for unrelated entities) are impacted

Under the TLS BR-defined method, domain owners are allowed to use alternate domains in the DNS TXT record.

  1. Notified the subscribers of this issue

Yes, as we detailed in Comment 4, DigiCert is contacting the owners of all identified domains, advising them to correct their DNS records.

  1. Considered giving subscribers choice in all ordering paths to not send DCV email to every address and TXT contact at once

We already provide this option: there are selection choices where the customer may select the 3.2.2.4.4 (Administrative Email Addresses) and/or the 3.2.2.4.14 (Email to DNS TXT Contact) option. In other words, the options may be selected separately.

Furthermore, if Email to DNS TXT Contact is selected by the customer, DigiCert displays the email addresses to which we will send the DCV emails.

  1. Stopped reusing the DCV validation information going forward

Yes, as we have described, the proof of concept certificate was issued more than a year ago based on a compliant conduct of the TLS BR Section 3.2.2.4.14 method. There were no other domain validations performed using that method and the email domains noted in point (1) above.

  1. Revoked the certificates of the impacted domains

There are no certificates that require revocation. The only certificate ever issued using the 3.2.2.4.14 method and the email domains noted in point (1) is the expired proof of concept certificate.

The CPR provided a list of other domain names whose DNS records included validatedomain@digicerttest.comin 2025. When using the 3.2.2.4.4 and 3.2.2.4.14 methods with multiple email addresses, DigiCert is able to differentiate which email address responded to the challenge. DigiCert has confirmed that certificates issued to the other domains identified by the CPR were not validated using the @digicerttest.com email domain.

  1. Raised a Secure Bug in Bugzilla over this matter (prior to public disclosure)

No, a Secure Bug was not raised as the DCV was performed in a compliant manner.

  1. Consider that their fix of "yourdomain.com" is also non-compliant and awaiting a repeat of this incident

Yes, as described in Comment 4, digicerttest.com, yourdomain.com and example.com have been blocked from use as Email to DNS TXT Contact addresses in all DigiCert issuance paths.

  1. Handled any other security research as "not a compliance incident"?

In recent months DigiCert and other CAs have received, in addition to legitimate CPRs, a rapid increase in AI-generated CPRs that are provably incorrect or even directed to the wrong CA. These are answered with details, and without filing an incident. In addition, there are cases when certificates are properly issued but DigiCert chooses to revoke when additional information is received (such as the subsequent linking of a domain to a sanctioned entity).

Given this was 4.9.1.1 (5) DigiCert had 24h to revoke once made aware that the DCV validity should not be relied upon. Every domain provided, and whatever else appears in DigiCert's internal information, needs to be revoked immediately.

The only certificate ever issued in reliance on such a validation is the expired proof of concept certificate. There are no certificates that require revocation.

In response to the questions posed in Comment 5:

Please see our responses in Comment 4 and Comment 8 which addressed your questions. DigiCert seeks to answer community questions accurately and promptly, and well within the expectations of the CCADB Policy.

DigiCert disagrees with your stance that DigiCert promoted a misconfiguration.

The only validation performed and the only certificate that was issued relying on the email addresses was the proof of concept; and it had expired. There were no certificates to revoke.

The DCV system performed in compliance with the TLS BR requirements. Based on the contact from the researchers, DigiCert immediately undertook an internal investigation and made good faith improvements to our support documentation.

Hello,

Some of the questions and concerns I raised in my initial CPR email remain unanswered. In this follow-up, I would like to reorganize my questions and remove those that have already been addressed.

  1. When and why did DigiCert decide to stop renewing the domain digicerttest.com? Could you please disclose a full list of DigiCert-owned domains and confirm if there are any other domains that were previously owned by DigiCert but have since expired or were intentionally transferred to other parties? Before allowing the domain to expire or otherwise relinquishing control of it, did DigiCert assess whether the domain was still referenced by its official documentation, customer configurations, internal systems, email services, or third-party services?

  2. When the domain digicerttest.com was owned by DigiCert, did it ever set up MX records to receive emails? If so, did it receive any domain control validation emails because customers misconfigured this _validation-contactemail TXT record? If so, please provide the full list of received emails and explain whether DigiCert was aware of this issue.

  3. If DigiCert was previously aware of any issues related to the domain digicerttest.com, did it take any action to address them? Or did it ignore this issue, attributing all blame to domain owners who misinterpreted the documentation?

  4. Some customers (e.g., clinicanasnuvens.com.br) repeatedly triggered DCV emails to addresses under digicerttest.com. If these customers believed that configuring an email address under @digicerttest.com was a requirement for completing DCV and had therefore misconfigured their DNS TXT records, they might have found themselves unable to complete the validation process.

Could DigiCert confirm whether any customers previously contacted its support team because they were unable to complete DCV due to this issue? If so, when DigiCert identified that a customer had incorrectly configured this record, did it notify the customer of the misconfiguration and instruct them to remove or correct it?

  1. I observed that some domain owners misconfigured the TXT record for "validatedomain@", while others used "validardominio@" or "validatedominio@". However, I have only found the English version of this support article. Could you please explain the origin of the Spanish or Portuguese email addresses used in the validation process? Additionally, could you provide any email correspondence or online chat history between (Spanish, Portuguese and English speaking) DigiCert technical support and these domain owners to confirm if any DigiCert staff explicitly instructed them to misconfigure the records?

  2. Following question 5, I would like to discuss a potential threat model related to misconfiguration. Previous discussions of CA bribery and malicious certificate issuance have often focused on the difficulty of corrupting a CA as an organization, particularly given the potentially catastrophic consequences of distrust by browser and operating-system root programs. However, this framing may overlook the possibility of targeting individual employees rather than the CA organization as a whole.

Consider a hypothetical scenario involving a CA whose DCV system is correctly implemented and has no technical vulnerability or validation bypass. A legitimate domain owner registers an account (Account A) with the CA, submits a certificate order for domain.com and chooses DNS Change(BRs 3.2.2.4.7) for DCV. The CA generates a random DCV challenge value (Random Code 1) for this order. Separately, an attacker registers another account (Account B) and submits their own certificate order for the same domain. The CA legitimately generates a different random DCV challenge value (Random Code 2) for the attacker's order.

An attacker who has bribed or otherwise recruited an individual CA support employee could then exploit the trust relationship between the CA and its customers. For example, the employee might contact the legitimate domain owner while posing as a technical support representative and instruct them to publish Random Code 2 in their DNS records, presenting this as a necessary troubleshooting step or routine configuration change. The domain owner, believing they are following legitimate instructions from the CA, publishes the requested record without understanding that the challenge belongs to a separate certificate order submitted under Account B.

The CA's DCV system then operates exactly as designed: it detects Random Code 2 in the domain's DNS records, considers the corresponding validation successful, and allows the certificate order under Account B to proceed to issuance. No cryptographic mechanism has been broken, no validation check has been bypassed, and no unauthorized modification of the CA's systems is necessarily required. Nevertheless, the domain owner may never have knowingly authorized the certificate order under Account B.

An attacker might also attempt to obtain legitimate internal access by joining a CA as a customer-support employee, rather than recruiting an existing employee. Depending on the employee's assigned privileges and access to customer-support or certificate-order workflows, this could provide another potential avenue for facilitating such attacks.

This threat model does not imply that DigiCert or any other CA has participated in bribery or insider-assisted certificate misissuance. Nor does it establish that such an attack has occurred. Rather, it illustrates a potential gap between successful technical Domain Control Validation and the domain owner's informed authorization of a specific certificate issuance. It raises the question of whether existing CA security controls and audit requirements adequately account for the possibility that an authorized domain administrator could be manipulated by a malicious or compromised CA employee into completing a valid DCV challenge for an attacker's certificate order.

  1. A company sent many Azure DevOps backup failure alert emails from tfs@ecclesiastical.com to digicerttest@digicerttest.com, as well as to five [staff-name]@ecclesiastical.com addresses and one [staff-name]@benefactgroup.com address. The domain ecclesiastical.com is owned by Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc (EIO), Reg. No. 24869. It is registered in England. The domain benefactgroup.com is owned by Benefact Group plc, Reg. No. 01718196. Could DigiCert clarify whether it has any business, operational, or other relationship with either company that would explain why this automated notification was sent to digicerttest@digicerttest.com? I cannot find any public documentation regarding the email address digicerttest@digicerttest.com. Why was this email address used? Could you please confirm if there are any other companies related to or dependent on the domain digicerttest.com?

  2. Has DigiCert notified other CAs that support the _validation-contactemail DCV method about this security risk? As stated in Comment 5 , I believe all CAs implementing this validation method should be notified of the issue so that they can assess their exposure and take appropriate mitigation measures. I also believe that digicerttest.com should be permanently prohibited in all CAs from being used as a validation contact email domain for this DCV method, to prevent domain owners who have not yet corrected their existing DNS configurations, or who encounter cached copies of historical documentation, from being misled into repeating the same misconfiguration.

In response to the questions posed by Zeyu Wang in the attachment to Comment 2, posted on 2026-11-08. DigiCert seeks to respond promptly and accurately, within the timelines of the CCADB Policy.

  1. When and why did DigiCert decide to stop renewing the domain digicerttest.com? Could you please disclose a full list of DigiCert-owned domains and confirm if there are any other domains that were previously owned by DigiCert but have since expired or were intentionally transferred to other parties?

DigiCert does not have records relating to digicerttest.com and its origin in the kB. The use of the domain appears to have been an oversight by the original writer of the kB when choosing an illustrative example. We have updated our policy to only use reserved domains such as example.com in future.

DigiCert has an extensive portfolio of website domains which are not relevant to this report as they have not been used in contexts related to the incident.

  1. When was the exact publication date of the support article?

The article was first posted on January 13, 2021.

  1. When the domain digicerttest.com was owned by DigiCert, did it ever set up MX records to receive emails? If so, did it receive any domain control validation emails because customers misconfigured this TXT record? If so, please provide the full list of received emails and explain whether DigiCert was aware of this issue.

DigiCert does not have records relating to digicerttest.comand no MX records were setup for DigiCert to receive emails on the domain.

DigiCert was unaware of this issue; the only certificate ever issued using the Email to DNS TXT Contact method and the digicerttest.comaddresses is the expired proof of concept certificate.

No other domain cleared DCV using the Email to DNS TXT Contact method with these email addresses and no certificates, other than the one obtained by the researcher in 2025, were issued relying on a domain validation completed using the reported email address.

  1. If DigiCert was previously aware of any issues related to the domain digicerttest.com, did it take any action to address them? Or did it ignore this issue, attributing all blame to domain owners who misinterpreted the documentation?

DigiCert was not previously aware of any issues related to the domain digicerttest.com. DigiCert did not ignore this issue and reacted promptly when the issue was brought to our attention. DigiCert is reaching out to the affected domain owners to advise them to correct their records. We reiterate that using the Email to DNS TXT Contact method, the only DCV conducted and certificate issued via digicerttest.comaddresses is the expired proof of concept certificate.

  1. I observed that some domain owners misconfigured the TXT record for "validatedomain@", while others used "validardominio@" or "validatedominio@". However, I have only found the English version of this support article. Could you please explain the origin of the Spanish or Portuguese email addresses used in the validation process? Additionally, could you provide any email correspondence or online chat history between (Spanish, Portuguese and English speaking) DigiCert technical support and these domain owners to confirm if any DigiCert staff explicitly instructed them to misconfigure the records?

DigiCert staff certainly did not direct customers to misconfigure records. We have no record of advising customers to use non-customer email addresses in conjunction with the Email to DNS TXT Contact method. DigiCert has reviewed a large sample of support cases that reference the `digicerttest.com’ domain. In the reviewed cases, support agents were seen to direct customers to the kB article and that the email should be an email address they controlled.

We can only assume that the variant email addresses may appear for some users with auto-translate software. They do not appear in our materials.

  1. A company sent an Azure DevOps backup failure alert from tfs@ecclesiastical.com to digicerttest@digicerttest.com, as well as to five [staff-name]@ecclesiastical.com addresses and one [staff-name]@benefactgroup.com address. The domain ecclesiastical.com is owned by Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc (EIO), Reg. No. 24869. It is registered in England with its registered office at Benefact House, 2000 Pioneer Avenue, Gloucester Business Park, Brockworth, Gloucester, GL3 4AW, United Kingdom. The domain benefactgroup.com is owned by Benefact Group plc, Reg. No. 01718196. What is the relationship between DigiCert and these two companies? I cannot find any public documentation regarding the email address digicerttest@digicerttest.com. Why was this email address used? Could you please confirm if there are any other companies related to or dependent on the domain digicerttest.com?

There is no organizational link between DigiCert and the named entities. We do not know why the email address was used. Companies control their own DNS settings, and we are not the current registrant of digicerttest.com’, so we cannot answer if there are other companies related to or dependent on digicerttest.com`.

  1. Why did DigiCert change the demo email from @digicerttest.com to @yourdomain.com in Jan 2026? Did DigiCert be aware of fake certificates or misconfigured DNS TXT records at that time?

The article was updated in January 2026 as part of a routine refresh of kB content. The kB clearly states that RDATA value of the TXT record must be a valid email address, along with a link directly to the TLS BR section on how DNS TXT to Email works. A number of other CAs use yourdomain.com in their examples.

DigiCert was not aware of any issues with use of digicerttest.com with this method until the CPR of 2026-11-07.

As noted in Comment 4 and Comment 7, we are shifting to the use of the reserved domain example.comin examples to avoid confusion, as these are reserved by IANA and can be leveraged for example use cases.

In response to the modified questions posed in Comment 10. Involved questions require research to answer in appropriate detail and confidence. We have already provided answers to the original versions of the questions as posed in the attachment to Comment 2. We request that questions not be modified in flight, and that new questions be separated for clarity.

  1. When and why did DigiCert decide to stop renewing the domain digicerttest.com? Could you please disclose a full list of DigiCert-owned domains and confirm if there are any other domains that were previously owned by DigiCert but have since expired or were intentionally transferred to other parties? Before allowing the domain to expire or otherwise relinquishing control of it, did DigiCert assess whether the domain was still referenced by its official documentation, customer configurations, internal systems, email services, or third-party services?

This is a variant text of the question previously answered in Comment 11.

  1. When the domain digicerttest.com was owned by DigiCert, did it ever set up MX records to receive emails? If so, did it receive any domain control validation emails because customers misconfigured this _validation-contactemail TXT record? If so, please provide the full list of received emails and explain whether DigiCert was aware of this issue.

This is a variant text of Question 3 previously answered in Comment 11.

  1. If DigiCert was previously aware of any issues related to the domain digicerttest.com, did it take any action to address them? Or did it ignore this issue, attributing all blame to domain owners who misinterpreted the documentation?

This is a variant text of Question 4 previously answered in Comment 11. DigiCert does not attribute blame to domain owners.

  1. Some customers (e.g., clinicanasnuvens.com.br) repeatedly triggered DCV emails to addresses under digicerttest.com. If these customers believed that configuring an email address under @digicerttest.com was a requirement for completing DCV and had therefore misconfigured their DNS TXT records, they might have found themselves unable to complete the validation process.

This is a new question. As noted in our earlier responses, the only DCV ever completed using the digicerttest.com domain and the DNS TXT to Email method was the proof of concept certificate. Certificates issued to the domain you mention were issued in reliance on another DCV method. A review of our support records for the domain you identify confirms that they completed DNS TXT to Email using an mailbox on their own domain address.

Could DigiCert confirm whether any customers previously contacted its support team because they were unable to complete DCV due to this issue? If so, when DigiCert identified that a customer had incorrectly configured this record, did it notify the customer of the misconfiguration and instruct them to remove or correct it?

This is a new question. As noted, DigiCert was not aware that customers were using the digicerttest.com domain in their DNS.

Yes, our support cases include customers seeking support for the DNS Text to Email method. In the cases we have reviewed, support agents were seen to direct customers to the kB article and that the email should be an email address they controlled. In some cases, customers chose to use another method to complete DCV.

  1. I observed that some domain owners misconfigured the TXT record for "validatedomain@", while others used "validardominio@" or "validatedominio@". However, I have only found the English version of this support article. Could you please explain the origin of the Spanish or Portuguese email addresses used in the validation process? Additionally, could you provide any email correspondence or online chat history between (Spanish, Portuguese and English speaking) DigiCert technical support and these domain owners to confirm if any DigiCert staff explicitly instructed them to misconfigure the records?

DigiCert staff did not direct customers to misconfigure records. This is a variant text of Question 5 previously answered in Comment 11.

  1. Following question 5, I would like to discuss a potential threat model related to misconfiguration. Previous discussions of CA bribery and malicious certificate issuance have often focused on the difficulty of corrupting a CA as an organization, particularly given the potentially catastrophic consequences of distrust by browser and operating-system root programs. However, this framing may overlook the possibility of targeting individual employees rather than the CA organization as a whole. […etc.]

The hypothetical case you lay out is not a realistic risk under the current method. The random values used in the DigiCert DCV are system-generated in a process that cannot be viewed, modified, or intercepted by support personnel. The point of the DCV automation is to exclude human intervention and to protect against the very compromise of support personnel that you hypothesize.

  1. A company sent many Azure DevOps backup failure alert emails from tfs@ecclesiastical.com to digicerttest@digicerttest.com, as well as to five [staff-name]@ecclesiastical.com addresses and one [staff-name]@benefactgroup.com address. The domain ecclesiastical.com is owned by Ecclesiastical Insurance Office plc (EIO), Reg. No. 24869. It is registered in England. The domain benefactgroup.com is owned by Benefact Group plc, Reg. No. 01718196. Could DigiCert clarify whether it has any business, operational, or other relationship with either company that would explain why this automated notification was sent to digicerttest@digicerttest.com? I cannot find any public documentation regarding the email address digicerttest@digicerttest.com. Why was this email address used? Could you please confirm if there are any other companies related to or dependent on the domain digicerttest.com?

This is a variant text of Question 6 previously answered in Comment 11. We are not aware of any use of the email address digicerttest@digicerttest.com.

  1. Has DigiCert notified other CAs that support the _validation-contactemail DCV method about this security risk? As stated in Comment 5 , I believe all CAs implementing this validation method should be notified of the issue so that they can assess their exposure and take appropriate mitigation measures. I also believe that digicerttest.com should be permanently prohibited in all CAs from being used as a validation contact email domain for this DCV method, to prevent domain owners who have not yet corrected their existing DNS configurations, or who encounter cached copies of historical documentation, from being misled into repeating the same misconfiguration.

As noted in our Comment 4 and Comment 8, DigiCert is reaching out to the domains that are known to still host the affected email(s), advising them to correct their DNS records.

DigiCert is aware that other CAs have similar illustrative emails in their documentation, and in light of this exploit, has reached out in some cases to advise. DigiCert recommends that CAs use the IANA-reserved domain example.com in documentation.

Given the proof of concept, we advise other CAs to not rely upon the digicerttest.com domain in the DNS TXT to Email method.

DigiCert continues to work on the Full Incident Report which will be posted on or before November 20.

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