SHECA: CA Certificate Serial Numbers Generated Using a Non-Cryptographically Secure PRNG
Categories
(CA Program :: CA Certificate Compliance, task)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: wangjiatai, Assigned: wangjiatai)
Details
(Whiteboard: [ca-compliance])
Preliminary Incident Report
Summary
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Incident description:
SHECA received a third-party research report forwarded by browser representatives identifying insufficient randomness in the serial numbers of certain historical CA certificates. SHECA’s investigation confirmed that the affected serial numbers have less than 31 bits of entropy and do not contain at least 64 bits of output from a Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator (CSPRNG).
The historical serial number generation mechanism was discontinued in March 2024. SHECA has revoked the two affected Xinnet CA certificates, Xinnet DV SSL and Xinnet OV SSL, and published the corresponding Authority Revocation List (ARL). The full scope of other historical certificates, applicable requirements, and related implementations remain under investigation.
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Relevant policies:
Section 7.1 of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (historical versions) requires that, effective September 30, 2016, certificate serial numbers be non-sequential, greater than zero, and contain at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.
SHECA will assess compliance for each certificate based on its type, issuance date, and the requirements applicable at the time of issuance. This requirement will not be applied retroactively to historical root certificates issued before its effective date.
Reference: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements v1.4.5, Section 7.1.
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Source of incident disclosure:
A third-party researcher reported the issue, which browser representatives forwarded to SHECA. SHECA subsequently conducted an internal investigation, confirmed the issue, and initiated a review of the affected scope and remediation.
Before publicly disclosing this case, SHECA submitted its investigation findings and supporting materials to browser representatives through confidential investigation channels. Following their feedback, SHECA assessed whether public disclosure could expose unresolved vulnerabilities or interfere with remediation, and disclosed the incident to the community after confirming that no such disclosure concerns remained. Due to the initial investigation and disclosure risk assessment, this incident was not publicly disclosed within the timeframe required by the CCADB Incident Reporting Guidelines.
Updated•7 days ago
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SHECA expects to complete the full incident report by this Friday, November 20, 2026.
Description
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