1.10 KB, patch
(not reading, please use firstname.lastname@example.org instead): review+
Scott MacGregor: superreview+
Christopher Aillon (sabbatical, not receiving bugmail): approval1.4.3+
(not reading, please use email@example.com instead): approval1.7+
|Details | Diff | Splinter Review|
more to do for bug #157644... dan got email from firstname.lastname@example.org, pointing out that the fix for #157644 plugged one security hole, but not them all. from the reporter: the correct fix is to limit the number of messages to (MAXINT(sizeof(Pop3MsgInfo)) if an evil server sends a larger number of messages, we'll only allocate space for 50k. but if part way through the list, if the server introduces a message that is < than the max but > 50k, we'll allocate more space. SendUidl() doesn't bounds check on the 50k message limit. the patch in bug #157644 assumes that message numbers are sequential. I've got the complete email from zen-parse.
giving zen-parse (email@example.com) access to this new bug.
As far as I can tell, this is our only open bug which would allow a remote server to take control of a Mozilla session. 'twould be nice if we could fix it :-)
putting on the 1.7 radar to see if we can get a patch.
Comment on attachment 148899 [details] [diff] [review] proposed fix this was the fix I proposed all along...
Comment on attachment 148899 [details] [diff] [review] proposed fix r/a=sspitzer I'm not sure why we just didn't do what david suggested. david, should we back out http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=157644
yes, we should back it out, just to remove the unneeded code and simplify it.
Fix got approvals on 5/19, is it checked in?
I think your patch is short a parentheses :)
fixed on branch, with added parenthesis
or not - new cvsisn't working for this tree...
cleaning up 1.7 bug lists -- is this bug ready to be marked fixed?
over to david who has the fix and is going to land on trunk (he already landed on the branch). I'll log a bug about backing out bug #157644. note, if we need to test this we can use servterm http://www.snapfiles.com/get/servterm.html to emulate an evil pop server.
fixed on trunk.
13 years ago
backing out the fix for bug #157644 is covered by bug #245066
Adding Jon Granrose to CC list to help round up QA resources for verification
adding karen to verify on the 1.7 branch
Comment on attachment 148899 [details] [diff] [review] proposed fix a=blizzard for 1.4.3
And checked in.
Removing security-sensitive flag for bugs on the known-vulnerabilities list
Since David mentioned that this bug need to be verified in the debugger, by tweaking some values at runtime... I had requested Seth to help for verifying this bug for 1.7....
Note: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2004-0757 to this issue.