Closed Bug 296514 Opened 15 years ago Closed 14 years ago
event handler and modal dialog allows XSS attacks
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) Build Identifier: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.8b2) Gecko/20050602 Firefox/1.0+ (2005060218) Mozilla stops any scripts in the current page including event handlers when it loads a new page. But in some cases, mozilla fails to stop event handlers in the previous page. This is not a problem because such event handler finish their exection before the new page is loaded. However, if such event handler shows a modal dialog, the handler stops its execution and mozilla continues to load the new page. If user closes the modal dialog after mozilla loaded the new page, the handler continues its execution in the context of the new page. Reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce: 1. load the testcase. 2. push "invoke an exploit" button. Actual Results: The event handler is executed in the context of the new page. Expected Results: The event handler must be stopped before loading the new page.
the testcase which tries to read cookies for www.google.com.
confirm it gets my google cookie.
Status: UNCONFIRMED → NEW
Ever confirmed: true
Assignee: events → jst
We really need separate inner windows.... :( Perhaps taking down a modal dialog in cases like this should throw an exception? That seems like the simplest way to abort script execution.
We could validate cookie access using the script's principals, or some such. An exception in this case seems like the easiest fix in the short run, and it should not break anything. bz: can you remind me whether the inner-window-object bug is on file? If not, file away and cc: me. /be
> We could validate cookie access using the script's principals, or some such. Yes, but that feels like a stopgap... what other things would we need to do such validation for? In any case, that should be already happening. The "cookie" property of HTMLDocument is under the SameOrigin policy, so we're clearly ending up with the wrong subject principal anyway... Or is that the needsSecurityCheck thing biting us? I don't see an existing bug on the window split; I filed bug 296639 on that.
Depends on: splitwindows
I bet we're beeing bit by needsSecurityCheck again here, yeah. We need to either fix that, or make modal dialogs suspend all network activity for the current window while they're being shown. I tested that with just alert(), and that does fix this bug, but there are other ways to bring up modal dialogs, so we need more than what I hacked up so far (probably need to do this in our prompter implementation). Thoughts?
I was wrong above when betting that this was due to documentNeedsSecurityCheck(). It's not. The problem is far worse than that. What happens here is that we're running script from the previous page after the new page is done loading. When we do that, and we access document.cookies XPConnect does do the appropriate security check, but that check fails to notice that the running code is from a different origin. Caps ends up calling GetSubjectPrincipal(), which returns the principal of the new page, not the page where the code came from. It does that by iterating over the JS stack frames and it finds a cloned function on the stack (second frame, the first one is native, so we skip it). Since it finds a clone, it can't rely on the principals compiled into that function, so it walks up the function object's parent chain looking for the principal... and since we've already loaded a new page, it finds the principals of the new page. I don't think we can change how the above works, so it seems like we need to make modal dialogs suspend/resume network requests, at least for now...
Michael Krax reports the same thing for xul in bug 298249. I assume it's a dupe, but maybe just parallel implementations.
I've got what's sort of a fix for this, but it's not complete yet. It'll fix this problem, but I can still break the security model here by using more than one window since the fix involves suspending/resuming requests in the parent window when modal dialogs are opened, but if the parent is different than the caller, then we've still got problems. Any number of windows could be used to trigger a similar attack, so a complete fix that involves suspending/resuming network requests is starting to look pretty nasty...
(In reply to comment #9) > I've got what's sort of a fix for this, but it's not complete yet. It'll fix > this problem, but I can still break the security model here by using more than > one window since the fix involves suspending/resuming requests in the parent > window when modal dialogs are opened, but if the parent is different than the > caller, then we've still got problems. Any number of windows could be used to > trigger a similar attack, so a complete fix that involves suspending/resuming > network requests is starting to look pretty nasty... bug 298315 has already been filed at 2005-06-21. but it have not been confirmed yet.
Per 1.0.5 meeting, minusing for 1.0.5, let's get this for 1.0.6.
Updating the the 1.7.x flags.
Whiteboard: [sg:fix] → [sg:fix] [cb] bumped to 1.0.6, defer to 1.8b4?
Did split window fix this on the trunk? If so, please mark this fixed.
The testcase no longer works. Fixed by bug 296639. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv:1.8b4) Gecko/20050811 Firefox/1.0+
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 14 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Indeed, and it's fixed on the 1.8 branch too...
Whiteboard: [sg:fix] [cb] bumped to 1.0.6, defer to 1.8b4? → [sg:fix] [cb] splitwindows?
Fixed on the aviary1.0/mozilla1.7 branches by the split-window alternative (bug 316589)
v.fixed on 1.0.1 Aviary branch with Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.13) Gecko/20060220 Firefox/1.0.8, didn't see anything bad happen with testcase, just got an error in the jsc.
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