318712 - Add Austrian Telekom-Control-Kommission root CA certificate

Status: RESOLVED DUPLICATE of bug 373174

(CA Program :: CA Certificate Root Program, task, P2)

Description

[ulrich.latzenhofer]

User-Agent:       Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
Build Identifier: 

[Attachments have been mailed to [e-mail]; however, there seems to be a problem with the e-mail address]

Dear Sir/Madam,

The Telekom-Control Commission (TKK) is the Austrian supervisory authority for electronic signatures. Its responsibility includes supervision of all certification service providers established in Austria. On behalf of the TKK, the Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH (RTR) maintains a PKI-based directory of all Austrian certification services. For every CA key used by an Austrian certification service provider, the TKK issues a certificate to the certification service provider. It would be for the benefit of all Austrian users of Firefox, Thunderbird, and other Mozilla-related software if the TKK's root certificate could be included with this software because in this way, all certificates issued by Austrian certification service providers could be verified.

As required by the Mozilla CA Certificate Policy, the TKK fulfills the requirements of ETSI TS 101.456 (see enclosed conformity assessment statement). It is bound by law to issue certificates as "qualified certificates" within the meaning of the European Electronic Signatures Directive. The current edition 1.3 of the certification practice statement can be downloaded in German from http://www.signatur.rtr.at/de/repository/tkk-cps-13-20050530.html (an outdated English translation of the draft edition 0.9 is included with this mail). More information is available from http://www.signatur.rtr.at/en/directory/index.html.

Please let me know if you need any additional documents for including the enclosed root certificate with the Mozilla default set of X.509 certificates.

Sincerely,
Ulrich Latzenhofer

_____________________________________

Ulrich Latzenhofer
Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH
Mariahilfer Straße 77-79
A-1060 Wien; Austria
Tel.: [phone] - 207
Fax: [phone] - 9207
email: [e-mail]
Website: http://www.signatur.rtr.at
_____________________________________


Reproducible: Always

Comment 1

[ulrich.latzenhofer]

Attachment: conformity assessment statement

Comment 2

[ulrich.latzenhofer]

Attachment: Root certificate of the Telekom-Control Commission

Comment 3

[Nelson Bolyard (seldom reads bugmail)]

Removing "Security-Sensitive" flag, which is used to mark bugs that report 
exploitable security vulnerabilities in mozilla products.  

This request seems to overlap and/or duplicate the request in bug 346614.
I wonder if this one should be marked a dupliate of the other, or vice versa.

Comment 5

[sec]

any news?

Comment 6

[Gervase Markham [:gerv]]

Hi,

There are a large number of outstanding CA requests, and it will take me some time to work through them. You can, should you wish, speed up the processing of your request by providing the following data in the following format, as a *plain text comment* in this bug. This will help me do whatever evaluation is necessary, and then will be part of a public record describing the Mozilla default root certificates.

Some of the information may already be present in, or calculable from, data in this bug or other Mozilla-maintained documents. However, having it all in one place in a standard plain format for each request will save me a great deal of time, and help me to make everyone happier quicker. :-)

CA Details
----------

CA Name:
Website:
One Paragraph Summary of CA, including the following:
 - General nature (e.g., commercial, government, academic/research, nonprofit)
 - Primary geographical area(s) served
 - Number and type of subordinate CAs
Audit Type (WebTrust, ETSI etc.):
Auditor:
Auditor Website:
Audit Document URL(s):
  
Certificate Details
-------------------
(To be completed once for each certificate)
  
Certificate Name:
Summary Paragraph, including the following:
 - End entity certificate issuance policy
Certificate HTTP URL (on CA website):
Version:
SHA1 Fingerprint:
MD5 Fingerprint:
Modulus Length (a.k.a. "key length"):
Valid From (YYYY-MM-DD):
Valid To (YYYY-MM-DD):
CRL HTTP URL:
OCSP URL:
Class (domain-validated, identity-validated or EV):
Certificate Policy URL:
CPS URL:
Requested Trust Indicators (email and/or SSL and/or code):

Thanks for your help in this matter. :-)

Gerv

Comment 7

[Gervase Markham [:gerv]]

Mr Latzenhofer has filed another bug with the information, so I am marking this one as a duplicate.

Gerv