Closed Bug 346663 Opened 18 years ago Closed 17 years ago

Arbitrary code execution with DOM Inspector by using document.open or document.write

Categories

(Other Applications :: DOM Inspector, defect)

x86
Windows XP
defect
Not set
normal

Tracking

(Not tracked)

RESOLVED FIXED

People

(Reporter: moz_bug_r_a4, Unassigned)

References

Details

(Keywords: fixed1.8.0.15, fixed1.8.1.5, Whiteboard: [sg:critical])

Attachments

(2 files)

See also bug 344494. When document.open, or document.write on a document that has finished loading, is called by a script in a different security context, the document's principal is set to the caller's principal. In such case, if there are references to objects/functions that were created in that document's context, then the references also get the caller's principal. This can be used to escalate privilege in a similar way to bug 344494.
This does not work with the proposed patch in bug 344495 applied.
Assignee: dom-inspector → nobody
QA Contact: timeless → dom-inspector
moz_bug_r_a4, still a problem with current trunk? we should get sg:critical in the whiteboard and marked P1 if its something we need to try and get fixed for firefox 3.
This type of exploit no longer works on trunk and 1.8 branch. It seems that when chrome calls document.open() on an about:blank document, the inner window is not reused, thus a function that was created in the about:blank document does not get chrome privileges. Fixed by bug 332182 (and bug 381300 on 1.8 branch)? Bug 346664 and bug 346665 are essentially the same as this bug, and no longer work on trunk and 1.8 branch.
Yeah, bug 332182 would have the effect described in comment 4.
ok, I'll mark fixed. reopen if thats not the case.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 17 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
Depends on: 332182, CVE-2007-3089
Flags: wanted1.8.1.x+
Whiteboard: [sg:critical]
Group: core-security
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