User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30) Build Identifier: * Name of the CA certificate Entrust has three Roots that are requested to be enabled for EV. Entrust Root Certification Authority Key Identifier: 68 90 e4 67 a4 a6 53 80 c7 86 66 a4 f1 f7 4b 43 fb 84 bd 6d Thumbprint: b3 1e b1 b7 40 e3 6c 84 02 da dc 37 d4 4d f5 d4 67 49 52 f9 Entrust.net Secure Server Certification Authority Authority Key Identifier: f0 17 62 13 55 3d b3 ff 0a 00 6b fb 50 84 97 f3 ed 62 d0 1a Thumbprint (SHA1): 99 a6 9b e6 1a fe 88 6b 4d 2b 82 00 7c b8 54 fc 31 7e 15 39 Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Key Identifier: 55 e4 81 d1 11 80 be d8 89 b9 08 a3 31 f9 a1 24 09 16 b9 70 Thumbprint (SHA1): 80 1d 62 d0 7b 44 9d 5c 5c 03 5c 98 ea 61 fa 44 3c 2a 58 fe All Entrust roots can be found at: http://www.entrust.net/developer/index.cfm * Published CP/CPS where you describe how you're operating in accordance with the EV guidelines. Entrust's EV CPS can be found at: http://www.entrust.net/CPS/pdf/evssl_cps_english080107.pdf The Entrust EV Business Practice statement can be found at: http://www.entrust.net/ev/business_practice.htm * Published report describing how you're meeting the audit requirements of secton J of the EV guidelines (e.g., EV equivalent of current WebTrust reports). Entrust's WebTrust for EV audit report can be found at: http://www.entrust.net/ssl-resources/pdf/webtrust-ev.pdf * EV OID(s) for the CA certificate in question. Entrust's EV Policy OID is: 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2 Reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce: 1. 2. 3.
It appears that two of the 3 certificates named above are already in NSS's root cert module, and for them, this bug merely asks that they be marked for EV with the appropriate EV OID(s). Those certs have "Entrust.net" in their names. One of the certs named above, named: "Entrust Root Certification Authority" does NOT appear to be presently in NSS's root CA list. I will attach a copy of the cert (obtained from their web site) shortly.
Created attachment 306155 [details] Entrust Root Certification Authority Here's the "Entrust Root Certification Authority" cert in PEM format. Of course, don't take my word for it. Check the SHA1 thumbprint for yourself.
Making EV root cert requests have uniform summaries.
Summary: Request Entrust Root Certificates be enabled for EV → Add Entrust EV Root Cert, enable Entrust roots for EV
This bug requests that one cert be added to NSS, and that that cert and two others (already in NSS) be approved for EV. But it appears that the cert that this bug asks to add to NSS has already been requested in a prior bug, bug 382352, and has already been approved to be added to NSS (see bug 387892). If we remove the apparently-duplicate request to add this cert from this bug then I think this bug reduces to merely a request to approve some existing Entrust roots (already in NSSckbi) for EV. Agreed? By the way, the serial number for the twice-requested cert is an ASCII string reading "EkPT". Does that string have significance to Entrust? :)
OK, I've got it straightened out now. This bug originally requested only that 3 Entrust roots be approved for EV. One of those certs was not yet added to NSS, but it had already been approved to be added. So, I'm changing the summary of this bug back to indicate that the scope of this bug is only to request EV approval.
Bruce, can you please provide links to live EV test servers for each of the 3 roots?
For the first root listed above, here is a link: https://www.entrust.net/ There are no EV certificates issued under the other two roots. I will work on getting test certs/pages set up for those roots.
Created attachment 312131 [details] [diff] [review] patch Please ignore this attachment. (I created it for some testing and attach it here as a backup.)
Kai, I hope that the lack of test certificates for the two roots does not impact the EV status of the first root. If this makes a difference, I will consider withdrawing the request for the latter two roots to be enabled for EV.
(In reply to comment #9) > Kai, I hope that the lack of test certificates for the two roots does not > impact the EV status of the first root. If this makes a difference, I will > consider withdrawing the request for the latter two roots to be enabled for EV. If I understand correctly, Frank has not yet approved your request to enable your roots for EV. Correct? I think the lack of test sites is irrelevant for Frank's approval work. I'm not involved in the approval process at all, but I'll be waiting for a signal from Frank. (Only after the approval processed is finished we can start the technical aspects of getting it enabled. I think the lack of test sites is not a requirement to technically enable your certs for EV, but would be highly preferred.)
Yes, Frank's approval is the issue of concern. My understanding was until this bugzilla is resolved then our roots were not approved for EV.
I've posted to mozilla.dev.tech.crypto newsgroup soliciting public comments on the request to enable the Entrust Root Certification Authority root for EV. (I'm postponing any action on Entrust.net Secure Server Certification Authority and Entrust.net Certification Authority for now.) I've also updated the Entrust entry in the pending list to include the current EV info, including a link to the Entrust EV audit: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/#Entrust (I just checked in these changes, so they may take an hour or two to show up on the site.)
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Bruce, as you previously noted to me, the Entrust Root Certification Authority has only one subordinate CA, Entrust Certificate Authority - L1A, which issues EV certificates. Does the L1A subordinate issue *only* EV certs? I'm guessing so, but again wanted to confirm.
Yes the L1A CA currently only issues EV certs; however, we do not want to limit the trust to only EV. Currently, the Entrust Root Certification Authroity is embedded in Microsft IE for all standard public key usages (server auth, client auth, code signing, secure email). It is also marked for EV. Our goal is browser ubiquity. The intention is that L1A will only issue SSL certificates and currently only issues EV SSL certificates. Additional certificate types (code signing, S/MIME) would likely require other issuing CAs to manage different certificate policies.
Bruce, thanks. Note that at present we have no way to technically restrict recognition to just EV certificates -- inclusion of a root automatically implies recognition of non-EV certs (with EV certs treated as non-EV), then there's a separate change to have EV certs recognized as EV. My question was rather directed at the question of which CPS governed various aspects of the Entrust Root CA and the L1A subordinate. Based on your response my assumption is that the EV CPS governs issuance of EV certs by the L1A CA, and the original Entrust CPS would govern any future issuance of non-EV SSL certs by the L1A CA. As for any future issuance on S/MIME or code signing certs by other subordinates under Entrust Root CA, right now Entrust Root CA is enabled for recognition of SSL certs only. Recognition of S/MIME or code signing certs would require us to turn on the respective "trust bits" for those uses, and that in turn would depend on Entrust having a CPS or CPSs in place that addressed those types of certs. My understanding is the current CPS addresses SSL certs only.
Frank, your assumption on which CPS to use for EV and non-EV SSL certificates is correct. The end-entity certificate will have the specific policy OID that is referenced in the applicable CPS. I understand your position on future issuance of S/MIME and code signing certificates. Traditionally, these trust bits are requested at the time of embedding. This allows the root to gain some browser ubiquity prior to actually issuing the certificate type. It would be a shame to have to cross-certify an embedded root at some future date to gain this coverage.
(In reply to comment #16) > Frank, your assumption on which CPS to use for EV and non-EV SSL certificates > is correct. The end-entity certificate will have the specific policy OID that > is referenced in the applicable CPS. Thank for confirming this. > I understand your position on future issuance of S/MIME and code signing > certificates. Traditionally, these trust bits are requested at the time of > embedding. This allows the root to gain some browser ubiquity prior to > actually issuing the certificate type. You don't have to wait until you actually start issuing certificates. Our concern is rather with having a CPS that covers the procedures relating to the to-be-issued certs.
Kathleen Wilson has confirmed with Deloitte Touche that the WebTrust EV audit report for Entrust downloadable at http://www.entrust.net/ssl-resources/pdf/webtrust-ev.pdf is indeed genuine. So that particular issue is resolved to my satisfaction.
We've completed the initial period of public comments on the request to EV-enable the Entrust Root Certification Authority root CA certificate in Mozilla products. I am now ready to make a preliminary decision and start the second round of public comment on this request. NOTE 1: This request is limited to the Entrust Root Certification Authority root, and it is independent of any requests or issues related to Entrust's other roots. In particular, I am postponing for now considering the requests in this bug to EV-enable the Entrust.net Secure Server Certification Authority and Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) roots. We'll come back to those requests later. NOTE 2: The Entrust Root Certification Authority root has already been approved for inclusion in Mozilla per the Mozilla CA certificate policy; see bug 382352. There was an issue raised in the first public comment period for this request relating to Entrust verification of ownership/control of domains when issuing non-EV SSL certificates. After reading the various comments on this issue and Entrust's responses, it is my judgment that Entrust is in compliance with the basic requirements of the policy with regard to non-EV SSL certs. I'm therefore going to make my decision on this request based solely on Entrust's compliance with the EV parts of the Mozilla policy: Section 6 [Relevancy and Policy]. Entrust's EV-related policies are documented in the Entrust CPS for EV SSL certificates: http://www.entrust.net/CPS/pdf/evssl_cps_english080107.pdf A summary of Entrust's EV offering is at http://www.entrust.net/ev/business_practice.htm Section 7 [Validation]. For EV SSL certificates Entrust verifies individual and organizational identity per the EV guidelines (see the Entrust EV CPS, including section 3 and in particular sections 3.1.8 and 3.1.9). The Entrust Root Certificate Authority root as presently included in Mozilla is not marked for email or code signing use, so only SSL use is relevant for purposes of this request. Section 8-10 [Audit]. Entrust has successfully completed an audit using the WebTrust EV criteria. The auditors were Deloitte and Touche. The audit is currently valid. The audit report is available from Entrust: http://www.entrust.net/ssl-resources/pdf/webtrust-ev.pdf We've verified with Deloitte that the report is genuine. Section 13 [Certificate Hierarchy]. Entrust EV certificates are issued through the Entrust Certification Authority - L1A subordinate CA. At present that is the only subordinate CA under the Entrust Root Certification Authority root. Based on the above I am minded to approve the request to EV-enable the Entrust Root Certification Authority root. Before I do any final approval, I'm opening up a final one-week period of public discussion of this request in the mozilla.dev.tech.crypto newsgroup .  The mozilla.dev.tech.crypto newsgroup is accessible via NNTP-capable newsreaders at: news://news.mozilla.org/mozilla.dev.tech.crypto via email by subscribing to the associated mailing list: https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto and via the web at: http://groups.google.com/group/mozilla.dev.tech.crypto/topics
The second comment period is now over, with no further comments received. Based on my evaluation and the comments received thus far, I am officially approving this specific request to enable the Entrust Root Certification Authority for EV use, and have filed bug 442561 against PSM for the actual change.
Changing whiteboard status to approved.
Whiteboard: EV → EV - approved
Since the corresponding PSM change (bug 442561) has been resolved FIXED, I'm resolving this bug as FIXED as well.
Status: ASSIGNED → RESOLVED
Last Resolved: 9 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.