Closed
Bug 420262
Opened 17 years ago
Closed 24 days ago
Possibility to use the STARTTLS command when available with NNTP.
Categories
(MailNews Core :: Networking: NNTP, enhancement)
MailNews Core
Networking: NNTP
Tracking
(Not tracked)
RESOLVED
WONTFIX
People
(Reporter: bugzilla, Unassigned)
References
()
Details
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; fr; rv:1.8.1.12) Gecko/20080201 Firefox/2.0.0.12
Build Identifier: version 2.0.0.12
Contrary to the POP/IMAP/SMTP implementation in Thunderbird, it is impossible to ask for a TLS connection with NNTP (that is to say using STARTTLS when available). Only *complete* SSL connections are currently possible.
Reproducible: Always
Comment 1•17 years ago
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I wonder whether this bug wouldn't be more appropriate for "Core -> MailNews: Security" or "Core -> Networking: News" components (availability of a TLS backend for news). Or else, should a separate bug be filed in "Mozilla Application Suite -> Accounts Manager" to track the same UI in SeaMonkey? Or maybe all three? (here for the Tb account settings frontend, Core for the Tb+Sm backend, Suite for the Sm account settings frontend)?
Comment 2•17 years ago
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Banal triage stuff.
Severity: normal → enhancement
Status: UNCONFIRMED → NEW
Component: Account Manager → Networking: News
Ever confirmed: true
Product: Thunderbird → Core
QA Contact: account-manager → networking.news
Assignee | ||
Updated•16 years ago
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Product: Core → MailNews Core
Updated•3 years ago
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Severity: normal → S3
Comment 3•24 days ago
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Since the newer RFC clearly recommends not to use STARTTLS, see RFC 8143 Section 2, I suggest to WONTFIX this.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 24 days ago
Resolution: --- → WONTFIX
Reporter | ||
Comment 4•24 days ago
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Yes, thanks for pointing this out. I had totally forgotten this bug report I opened 17 years ago, in 2008. And yes, also as the author of RFC 8143, I agree explicit TLS with STARTTLS is no longer a feature to implement.
Comment 5•24 days ago
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Well, it's a recommendation to prefer implicit TLS, but seems mostly due to concerns opportunistic STARTTLS (which we don't do elsewhere either since long). Non-opportunistic STARTTLS is basically as safe as implicit TLS.
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Description
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