Closed Bug 529087 Opened 10 years ago Closed 10 years ago

Crash [@ nsXBLBinding::AllowScripts]

Categories

(Core :: XBL, defect, critical)

defect
Not set
critical

Tracking

()

RESOLVED FIXED
Tracking Status
blocking2.0 --- beta1+
blocking1.9.2 --- .7+
status1.9.2 --- .7-fixed
blocking1.9.1 --- .11+
status1.9.1 --- .11-fixed

People

(Reporter: mats, Assigned: sicking)

References

Details

(Keywords: crash, Whiteboard: [sg:critical?][ccbr][critsmash:patch] [qa-needs-str])

Crash Data

Attachments

(1 file)

It's ranked #276 in the 3.5.5 (past 7 days) top crash list:
http://crash-stats.mozilla.com/topcrasher/byversion/Firefox/3.5.5/7
with 389 crashes, 380 on Win, 9 on OSX.

stack:
nsXBLBinding::AllowScripts               content/xbl/src/nsXBLBinding.cpp:1380
nsXBLBinding::ExecuteAttachedHandler     content/xbl/src/nsXBLBinding.cpp:977
nsXBLBinding::ExecuteAttachedHandler     content/xbl/src/nsXBLBinding.cpp:975
nsRunnableMethod<nsFileUploadContentStream>::Run   xpcom/nsThreadUtils.h:278
nsContentUtils::RemoveScriptBlocker   content/base/src/nsContentUtils.cpp:4344
PresShell::DoFlushPendingNotifications	layout/base/nsPresShell.cpp:4842
PresShell::FlushPendingNotifications	layout/base/nsPresShell.cpp:4798
nsDocument::FlushPendingNotifications	content/base/src/nsDocument.cpp:6375
nsQueryReferent::operator	nsWeakReference.cpp:88
nsComputedDOMStyle::GetPropertyCSSValue layout/style/nsComputedDOMStyle.cpp:349
xul.dll@0x8c4807	

There are also 2 crashes on trunk within the past week, so it appears
the bug hasn't been fixed yet.
Line 1380 is:

1380   nsIDocument* doc = mBoundElement->GetOwnerDoc();

right?
Yes.

This crash might be what bug 307562 was about?
Hmm.  mBoundElement is a weak ref, and is never unset, as far as I can tell.  How's that supposed to work?
Group: core-security
blocking2.0: --- → beta1
Whiteboard: [sg:critical]
Whiteboard: [sg:critical] → [sg:critical?]
Assignee: nobody → jonas
Whiteboard: [sg:critical?] → [sg:critical?][ccbr]
Taking this. ETA end of next week.
Attached patch Patch to fixSplinter Review
I think this should do it.

Usually we're protected by the fact that nodes are always UnbindFromTree'ed from their document before they die. And unbinding removes any xbl bindings.

However nodes with NODE_FORCE_XBL_BINDINGS set can have xbl bindings without being in a document, and thus can die while still having bindings.

The change in this patch to nsNodeUtils takes care of this. This should ensure that mBoundElement never becomes dangling. This should be enough to take care of the security issues here.

However we also need to deal with that we can get a null mBoundElement while running nested constructors. Otherwise we would crash with a nullpointer deref and still have the topcrash reported in comment 0. The change to nsXBLBinding should take care of that.
Attachment #441671 - Flags: review?(bzbarsky)
I think I can come up with tests for this. Asking for review in the meantime though.
Attachment #441671 - Attachment is patch: true
Attachment #441671 - Attachment mime type: application/octet-stream → text/plain
Whiteboard: [sg:critical?][ccbr] → [sg:critical?][ccbr][critsmash:patch]
Attachment #441671 - Flags: review?(bzbarsky) → review?(Olli.Pettay)
Olli, can you review this security bug fix?
Yes, I will later this week. Sorry for the delay.
Comment on attachment 441671 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch to fix

Ok, makes sense.

Though, if BindingManager() may return null, we should rename it to GetBindingManager().
In theory it may return null, but I think we need to change ownership back to what it used to be (so that we can have strong parent pointer - which is a different bug.).
Attachment #441671 - Flags: review?(Olli.Pettay) → review+
I think it can only return null during cycle collection. But yes, ideally we should improve the situation there.
Can we get this landed?
Security bugs need also sr.
Attachment #441671 - Flags: superreview?(peterv)
Comment on attachment 441671 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch to fix

Or if peterv is away for some time, perhaps jst could sr.
Attachment #441671 - Flags: superreview?(peterv) → superreview?(jst)
> Security bugs need also sr.

Not anymore. That rule was removed from the policy.
http://www.mozilla.org/hacking/reviewers.html
(the policy change was announced in mozilla.governance)
Comment on attachment 441671 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch to fix

Huh, we're changing rules faster than people learn them.
Attachment #441671 - Flags: superreview?(jst)
Can we land this?
Checked in. Thanks for the review!

http://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/60fda31d4012
blocking1.9.1: --- → ?
blocking1.9.2: --- → ?
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.2.5?
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.1.11?
This should be marked fixed now, no?
Indeed! Somehow missed that in all the flag-setting.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 10 years ago
Resolution: --- → FIXED
blocking1.9.1: ? → .11+
blocking1.9.2: ? → .5+
Comment on attachment 441671 [details] [diff] [review]
Patch to fix

Approved for 1.9.2.5 and 1.9.1.11, a=dveditz for release-drivers
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.2.5?
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.2.5+
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.1.11?
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.1.11+
blocking1.9.2: .5+ → .6+
Attachment #441671 - Flags: approval1.9.2.5+ → approval1.9.2.6+
Are there STR that can be used for verification of this fix on 1.9.1 and 1.9.2?
Whiteboard: [sg:critical?][ccbr][critsmash:patch] → [sg:critical?][ccbr][critsmash:patch] [qa-needs-str]
Jonas? Mats? Any reply?
Group: core-security
Crash Signature: [@ nsXBLBinding::AllowScripts]
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