Support RFC 5929 - Channel Bindings for TLS
Categories
(NSS :: Libraries, enhancement, P5)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
People
(Reporter: ryan.sleevi, Unassigned)
References
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Details
Attachments
(1 file, 1 obsolete file)
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19.58 KB,
patch
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Details | Diff | Splinter Review |
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Comment 1•16 years ago
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Comment 2•16 years ago
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Comment 3•16 years ago
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Updated•16 years ago
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Comment 4•14 years ago
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Comment 5•14 years ago
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Updated•13 years ago
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Updated•13 years ago
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Updated•12 years ago
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Updated•12 years ago
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Updated•12 years ago
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| Reporter | ||
Comment 7•11 years ago
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Comment 8•7 years ago
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Any news on it?
Channel-Binding Support is important.
It is needed for SCRAM-SHA-XXX-PLUS variants
Linked to:
Comment 9•7 years ago
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It is possible to change the "Milestone"?
It is a forgotten ticket I think...
Comment 10•7 years ago
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It is already done for XMPP:
- SCRAM-SHA-1: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1267649
- SCRAM-SHA-256: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1577688
SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS are missing because https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=563276
This ticket, people can look?
Tickets:
- For IMAP: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1503382
- For POP: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1597102
- For SMTP: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1597103
- For LDAP: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1597106
People can look?
RFCs:
- RFC5802: Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
- RFC7677: SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7677 - since 2015-11-02
- RFC5056: On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5056
- RFC5929: Channel Bindings for TLS: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929
- RFC5803: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema for Storing Salted: Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) Secrets: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5803
- RFC7804: Salted Challenge Response HTTP Authentication Mechanism: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7804
IANA:
- Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms: https://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms/sasl-mechanisms.xhtml
- Channel-Binding Types: https://www.iana.org/assignments/channel-binding-types/channel-binding-types.xhtml
Cyrus SASL supports:
- SCRAM-SHA-1
- SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS
- SCRAM-SHA-224
- SCRAM-SHA-224-PLUS
- SCRAM-SHA-256
- SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS
- SCRAM-SHA-384
- SCRAM-SHA-384-PLUS
- SCRAM-SHA-512
- SCRAM-SHA-512-PLUS
-> https://cyrusimap.org/sasl/sasl/authentication_mechanisms.html
-> https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl/commits/master
Dovecot SASL supports:
GNU SASL supports:
- SCRAM-SHA-1
- SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS
-> http://www.gnu.org/software/gsasl/
CRAM-MD5 to Historic:
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-to-historic-00 // 20 November 2008
RFC6331: Moving DIGEST-MD5 to Historic
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6331 since July 2011
More informations:
Comment 11•6 years ago
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After old TLS version, for TLS 1.3, there is: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13
And there are other SCRAM too:
- SCRAM-SHA-512(-PLUS): https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-scram-sha-512
- SCRAM-SHA3-512(-PLUS): https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-scram-sha3-512
- Extensions to Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) for 2 factor authentication: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-scram-2fa
Comment 12•4 years ago
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It is official, it is here: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3:
Little details, to know easily:
- tls-unique for TLS =< 1.2
- tls-exporter for TLS = 1.3
Can you add the support?
SCRAM-BIS: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-scram-bis
Updated•4 years ago
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Comment 13•4 years ago
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The bug assignee is inactive on Bugzilla, and this bug has priority 'P1'.
:beurdouche, could you have a look please?
For more information, please visit auto_nag documentation.
Updated•3 years ago
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Comment 15•3 years ago
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There was a jabber.ru (and xmpp.ru) MITM. Security is important and Channel Binding is the solution.
Can you add the support to have SCRAM-SHA-*-PLUS?
It is for all protocols.
Some sources:
- https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/
- https://snikket.org/blog/on-the-jabber-ru-mitm/
- https://www.devever.net/~hl/xmpp-incident
- https://blog.jmp.chat/b/certwatch
Thanks in advance.
Linked to:
Comment 16•1 year ago
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Dear Mozilla Team,
Good news, the recent Dovecot 2.4.0 has SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS/SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS supports in more SCRAM-SHA-1/SCRAM-SHA-256. It arrives after Exim, indimail-mta, msmtp, mpop, ...
After, several years, can you add Channel Binding for TLS support?
Thunderbird Mobile / K-9 Mail included of course.
- tls-unique for TLS =< 1.2
- tls-server-end-point =< 1.2 + 1.3
- tls-exporter for TLS = 1.3
All list is here:
Thanks in advance.
Comment 17•7 months ago
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I copied the code from the NTLM auth module over to the Negotiate module and got it to a state where
Negotiate channel bindings are accepted.
Updated•6 months ago
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Comment 18•3 months ago
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Feature request can be voted at https://connect.mozilla.org/t5/ideas/omemo-encryption-for-xmpp-messages/idc-p/133200/
Updated•1 month ago
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Comment 19•27 days ago
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Dear all,
For your information, TLS Channel Binding will be added in PHP soon:
A lot of other languages or libs or softwares have already TLS Channel Binding supports.
Here a list of a lot of projects which support it:
2027 will be here soon, can you look for Mozilla projects starting NSS?
Security is very important...
Thanks in advance.
Comment 20•25 days ago
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Thanks for following up.
If I understand correctly, for RFC 9266 specifically, NSS already supports the required tls-exporter binding through SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial. This was also noted in bug 1807870, comment 1.
According to me, no additional NSS implementation appears necessary for RFC 9266 itself. Is there a specific limitation of the existing API that needs addressing?
Description
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