Closed
Bug 904757
Opened 12 years ago
Closed 12 years ago
Ensure that NSS doesn't accept weak signatures in OCSP responses
Categories
(NSS :: Libraries, defect)
Tracking
(Not tracked)
RESOLVED
DUPLICATE
of bug 663313
People
(Reporter: KaiE, Unassigned)
Details
(Whiteboard: [sg:dupe 663313])
This potential problem was mentioned by Hubert Kario. We must verify it.
When verifying a signature in an OCSP response, we should require that a sufficiently strong signature algorithm had been used.
For example, we probably shouldn't accept signatures that are based on the MD2 or MD4 hash algorithms.
I couldn't immediately find OCSP related code that limits the acceptable signature algorithms for OCSP responses.
We should verify Hubert's test experience that MD2 based signatures are accepted by the ocspclnt tool.
Reporter | ||
Updated•12 years ago
|
Summary: Verify that NSS doesn't accept weak signatures in OCSP responses → Ensure that NSS doesn't accept weak signatures in OCSP responses
Updated•12 years ago
|
Group: core-security
Updated•12 years ago
|
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 12 years ago
Resolution: --- → DUPLICATE
Comment 2•12 years ago
|
||
For historical note: We currently do allow 'weak' algs for OCSP responses
http://mxr.mozilla.org/nss/source/lib/certhigh/ocsp.c#3803
Uses VFY_VerifyDataWithAlgorithmID() to verify the signed data. However, unlike http://mxr.mozilla.org/security/source/security/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c#61 (used to verify certs), it DOES NOT check any policy flags, such as NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE , and thus is permitted.
Updated•12 years ago
|
Group: crypto-core-security, core-security
Whiteboard: [sg:dupe 663313]
You need to log in
before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.
Description
•