[Form Autofill] Invisible fields should be ignored for detecting the fields correctly
Categories
(Toolkit :: Form Autofill, enhancement, P3)
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(Reporter: selee, Unassigned)
References
(Blocks 1 open bug)
Details
(Keywords: sec-want, Whiteboard: [form autofill])
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(1 file)
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Updated•7 years ago
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Comment 1•7 years ago
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Comment 2•7 years ago
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Updated•7 years ago
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Updated•7 years ago
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Updated•7 years ago
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Comment 5•5 years ago
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Attachment 9145346 [details] has a research paper on this topic in Firefox
Can you share the data on what data type the hidden fields collected?
For mitigating the aforementioned attacks we suggest:
●Detect form elements that use the techniques described above to hide their presence (i.e., transparent, off-screen), and avoid populating them with autofill. Apply the same restrictions to <select> tag menus.
I'm somewhat surprised that you consider this worth pursuing given that there are so many ways to fool such detection… we could constantly be playing whack-a-mole e.g. if we don't autofill into opacity:0
today then the malicious sites change to opacity:0.01
tomorrow and so on…
●Show more fine-grained categories/subcategories for the information that is autofilled in the warning notification.
There are trade-offs of making it too verbose and then people just ignore the warning altogether
- Address - We could call out street address separately I suppose?
- Telephone - I don't think there is much confusion with this one… worst case someone thinks the site only wants the phone country code but actually collects the whole number but that would be quite unusual.
- Name - I guess we could be more explicit about "full name" but are there really websites that ask for a first name but hide a last name field, or vice-versa?
Thank you
Comment 6•5 years ago
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(In reply to Matthew N. [:MattN] (PM me if request are blocking you) from comment #5)
Attachment 9145346 [details] has a research paper on this topic in Firefox
Can you share the data on what data type the hidden fields collected?
In our study we found pages that collect the following
- address-level1 1481
- first-name 1345
- last-name 1301
- country 1231
- address-level2 1122
- tel 1006
- organization 1050
- zip-code 803
- address-line1 737
- email 648
- name 534
- address-line2 395
- middle-name 60
- street-address 40
For mitigating the aforementioned attacks we suggest:
●Detect form elements that use the techniques described above to hide their presence (i.e., transparent, off-screen), and avoid populating them with autofill. Apply the same restrictions to <select> tag menus.I'm somewhat surprised that you consider this worth pursuing given that there are so many ways to fool such detection… we could constantly be playing whack-a-mole e.g. if we don't autofill into
opacity:0
today then the malicious sites change toopacity:0.01
tomorrow and so on…
Obviously a reasonable range is implied as opposed to a strict 0 for the opacity. A threshold could be set for the opacity value (e.g., 0.1), to ensure that input fields with opacity above the threshold are visually noticeable by the user
●Show more fine-grained categories/subcategories for the information that is autofilled in the warning notification.
There are trade-offs of making it too verbose and then people just ignore the warning altogether
- Address - We could call out street address separately I suppose?
- Telephone - I don't think there is much confusion with this one… worst case someone thinks the site only wants the phone country code but actually collects the whole number but that would be quite unusual.
- Name - I guess we could be more explicit about "full name" but are there really websites that ask for a first name but hide a last name field, or vice-versa?
See above the number of hidden fields we detected for address-line1, address-level1, street-address etc.
Thank you
Thanks
Comment 7•4 years ago
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[looks like Panagiotis supplied the requested information]
Comment 8•4 years ago
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Saving the testcase linked from the paper mentioned by Matt above.
Updated•2 years ago
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Comment 9•1 year ago
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This will be fixed by Bug 1847687. The patch updates the formautofill logic to only consider focusable elements for address and credit card filling.
Therefore for the home depot page, the two <input>
elements are ignored because they have the attribute tabindex
set to "-1". And the two <select>
elements are considered for filling.
Updated•1 year ago
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Description
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